

THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

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VOLUME 3


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 118 Middle East Institute, takes no editorial stand on the problems of the Middle
 121 East. Its sole criterion is that material published be sound and informative, and
 243 presented without emotional bias. All opinions expressed, therefore, are those of
 495 the individual authors and not necessarily those of the *Journal* or of the Institute.



Jammu and Kashmir

(See page 17)

The Middle East Journal

VOLUME 3

January 1949

NUMBER 1

THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AND ITS PROBLEMS

Edwin Samuel

PALESTINE has a known history stretching back into remote antiquity. During this long period it has undergone many vicissitudes: warring armies have marched across it; its cities have been besieged; its buildings flattened; its inhabitants put to the sword; its territory partitioned into a variety of patterns. In our own day we are witnessing yet another violent

▼ THE HON. EDWIN SAMUEL, C.M.G., first went to Palestine with the British forces under Lord Allenby in World War I. After taking his degree at Oxford, he returned to stay for the entire Mandatory period as a member of the British Colonial Administration Service with the Palestine Government. During World War II he held the post of Chief Censor, and later founded the Middle East College of Public Administration in Jerusalem. In charge of broadcasting at the time of his departure in the spring of 1948, he is currently Visiting Professor of Middle East Government and Administration at Dropsie College's Institute for Israel and The Middle East in Philadelphia.

change in the fortunes of this tiny country. The Ottoman Empire has disappeared; the Mandatory regime has collapsed; and out of the ruins has emerged the State of Israel.

Although Israel is the youngest of nations, for the fifty years — two whole generations — since the Zionist movement was started, the Jews in Palestine have been learning the art of self-government. Since Ottoman days Jews took a hand in the management of their own local concerns, both in town and village. In addition to this experience, they had unique opportunities under the Mandatory regime of learning to control their affairs both on the national and international level. The National Council of the Jews of Palestine (the Va'ad Leumi) exercised governmental functions in the realms of education, health, social welfare, and ecclesiastical administration. The Jewish Agency for Palestine, with main offices in Jerusalem, London, and Washington, not only conducted immigration and colonization on a large scale, but also exercised diplomatic functions in many foreign countries. Both the Va'ad Leumi and the Jewish Agency were democratically elected bodies, and the great mass of Jews in Palestine were fully aware, by the end of the Mandatory period, of the machinery of party politics, representative government, and financial control. When the end came in May 1948 they were thus no backward people permitted by a beneficent colonial power to taste the joys of self-government for the first time. They had already been responsible for a large part of their own destiny, and now took on all the remaining responsibilities of national existence.

The State of Israel, however, has been faced with a multiplicity of problems. Among these is the large-scale absorption of immigrants who are of divergent social and political backgrounds. Israel has also been faced with hostile neighbors on all sides, culminating in a state of war even before termination of the Mandate. Both its very existence and the limits of its territory have been the subject of international debate for over a year, with all the conflicting pressures of national interests that that implies. These obstacles are fully recognized by the Israeli Government; upon the success with which they are overcome rests the future of the State of Israel.

CHARACTER OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL

The Government of Israel today is a coalition. How solidly is it based on popular support, and how permanent is it likely to be?

The proportional system of Jewish political representation in Palestine in the past has led to a multiplicity of parties. The electoral system is based on national party lists rather than on local geographical constituencies. A small party which would have no chance whatever of getting a majority in a single constituency anywhere in Israel, might nevertheless get a few votes in every town and village, and the combined total would be sufficient to return at least one member to the Assembly. A two-party system, as in Great Britain or the United States, has not yet emerged and may never do so. The political pattern is at present conditioned by the retention, by foreign-born Israeli citizens, of characteristics brought with them from their several countries of origin. Yemenite Jews in Israel, for example, tend to organize Yemenite parties and to appeal to Yemenite voters to vote for them as Yemenites. The same applied to immigrants from Central and Western Europe (chiefly German Jews), who have had their own political party (the Aliyah Hadashah) in contradistinction to the older parties dominated largely by Russian or Polish Jewish leaders.

Then again, the differentiation of Jews primarily as a religious sect still persists in Israel. For very orthodox Jews, a secular Jewish state is a contradiction in terms. Hence, from the very beginning of political Zionism, many Zionists who were orthodox Jews have enrolled in a political party of their own (the Mizrahi). Some ultra-orthodox Jews who were living in Palestine or who came to Palestine from purely religious motives, rejected political Zionism altogether and formed a separate political party (the Agudat Israel) which until recently actively opposed Zionism but is now reconciled with and represented in the new Government of Israel.

All these fissions and cross-divisions, aided by an electoral system based on proportional representation, have resulted in large numbers of party lists being presented to the voter at each election. Palestinian Jewry has always preferred a mathemat-

ically exact distribution of seats among the different parties to effective government by the strongest. Indeed, in one instance the number of seats in an elected council was doubled to allow the smaller splinter parties to be represented on it, even though it thereby became unwieldy.

Nevertheless, in spite of the faithful application of the principles of proportional representation, and in spite of the multiplicity of parties, the Government of Israel is solidly established. As constituted at the end of 1948, it represented a coalition of all the parties, with the exception of those of the extreme right (the Revisionists) and of the extreme left (the Communists). Within this coalition, the parties of the Left form a cohesive bloc which has developed largely through the existence of the General Federation of Jewish Labor (the Histadrut). The Histadrut is not only a trade union organization, but a wide-flung business concern controlling large sectors of the economic life of Israel. Its members unite in the management of their common economic and social interests; and it is natural that the mutual confidence engendered by such co-operation should be carried into national affairs. The parties of the Left which make up the General Federation have just over a 50 percent control of the seats in the elected bodies in which they participate. The Opposition is formed by the parties of the Right, which are far less united. As nearly all parties, however, are represented in the Cabinet, there is little effective opposition.

Within the parties of the Left, the Palestine Labor Party (the Mapai) is the largest and was allotted four out of the thirteen portfolios in the first Cabinet. But as these portfolios included those of Prime Minister and Minister of Defense (Mr. Ben Gurion), the Minister of Finance (Mr. Kaplan), and the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Mr. Shertok), the influence of the Palestine Labor Party is considerable. The party is moderate socialist in complexion.

The only real danger from within Israel to the authority of the Government comes from the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Group. These so-called "dissidents" have never accepted the modified boundaries for Israel that were finally agreed to by the Jewish Agency and accepted in principle by the Israeli Gov-

ernment. On the contrary, they have pressed for the inclusion of all of both Palestine and Transjordan in the Jewish State, and have believed, moreover, that these ends could be achieved only through violence, and, if necessary, by deception. They have adopted the facile view that the end, if beneficial to themselves, fully justifies the most brutal means. The Government of Israel now has itself to face these fanatics who receive passive support from those sections of the Israeli population who are either anti-Labor or who are still conditioned against the role of informer — even when the security authorities are those of its own government rather than of a Mandatory regime. So long as there are Israeli citizens who, contrary to their clear civic duty, are willing to harbor and finance political terrorists, the Government of Israel will have to continue its policy of outlawing all terrorist groups and of prosecuting their leaders.

THE PROBLEM OF RECOGNITION

The most immediately important problem facing Israel at the close of 1948 would seem to be that of international recognition. Recognition has already been accorded by the United States, the Soviet Union, and seventeen smaller powers. Great Britain, France, and China have still to do so. There is little immediate prospect of recognition by any member of the Arab League or, for that matter, by any power in Western Asia with the possible exception of Turkey. Nevertheless, Israel has now applied for admission to the United Nations; and to secure this international recognition is one of the major tasks facing Israel's Foreign Ministry staff — Moshe Shertok, the Minister; Walter Eytan, the permanent head of the Ministry; and Aubrey Eban (now Hebraized to Aba Even), the chief Israeli representative before the United Nations. The question of recognition, however, is not merely one of external relationship. To the average citizen of Israel, recognition means much more — it is recognition of the fact that he exists. For nearly twenty centuries the Jewish people had ceased to have any national identity or even any direct connection with the soil of Israel. That it has continued to survive at all is a miracle. Jews, in addition, have been subjected all this time to relentless persecution. There has hardly been a moment in

history since the Dispersion when some community of Jews somewhere in the world was not in danger of physical extermination. On top of all this, six million Jews have just recently been "liquidated" in Europe. No wonder that the survivors should feel more than a little shaken; no wonder that international recognition of the new State of Israel should be regarded as such a precious prize.

THE DETERMINATION OF BOUNDARIES

Next to the fundamental question of the very recognition of its existence, the most important problem facing Israel is that of its boundaries. Had there been an effective United Nations organization, with a single policy and the means of enforcing its authority, the problem would have been settled long ago. As it is, the question has been left to the arbitrament of arms. In these circumstances, whatever the merits of any particular proposal, they are overshadowed by the disposition of the armies in the field, whose motto is "We have what we hold." Unless some superior military or diplomatic force, or combination of forces, is to coerce a victorious army (either Jewish or Arab) into yielding up territory it has won by the sword, any discussion of boundaries from the point of view of "right" is largely futile.

The question of boundaries is further complicated by the avowed objectives of the several political parties represented in the Government of Israel. The Revisionists (and their strong-arm men, the Irgun Zvai Leumi) have always claimed, as already pointed out, the whole of Palestine *and* Transjordan as the legitimate patrimony of Israel. Most orthodox Jews, largely represented by the Mizrahi and the Agudat Israel, feel very strongly that Jerusalem, as the Holy City of Israel, must be included in the Jewish State. This view is shared by many Jews in all parties, and not only for religious reasons. Most Jews in Palestine accepted Partition only after considerable heart-searching and only because they preferred to be dominant in part of Palestine than subordinate in the whole. Now that many Arabs have fled from Jewish-held Palestine, and Jewish immigrants are pouring into Israel at twice the maximum rate ever reached under the

Mandate, the situation has altered and many Partitionists are reconsidering their position.

The flight of large numbers of Arabs from Palestine has a real bearing on the question of boundaries. For if the Arab refugees do not all come back to Israel, their lands will be used for the settlement of further Jewish immigrants, compensation presumably being paid. If, on the other hand, there is no such Arab land available for Jewish settlement, then, from the point of view of Jewish need, the boundaries of Israel must be cast on a wider scale to provide for future Jewish immigrants. This might require intensive colonization of the Negev and the large investment required to carry out the Lowdermilk scheme for its irrigation.

The United Nations partition boundaries adopted in November 1947 were devised on the assumption that there would be an economic union of Jewish and Arab states, and certain common services such as railways, posts and telegraphs, currency, and customs. The proposed boundaries of the two states were therefore neither customs frontiers nor strategic frontiers. It was not intended that they should be defended or watched any more than the "frontiers" between the several states of the United States. Hence they could be long and intricate. But with the breakdown of the idea of economic union and the creation by force of arms of two wholly separate states, it became imperative that frontiers be short and defensible.

The Bernadotte Plan,¹ which formed the basis for boundary discussions for several weeks in the fall of 1948, attempted to exchange territory in such a fashion that the northwest became Jewish while the southeast became Arab. This cut out the Negev altogether from the Jewish State, and offered Western Galilee in exchange. In opposition to the proposal, a full-page Zionist official advertisement published in the American daily press in October 1948 argued that Western Galilee was much smaller than the Negev, and hence that the exchange would be a bad bargain. But in the Middle East, area as such has little value (except for strategic retreats, as in North Africa). What does count is

¹ For the boundaries of Israel according to the United Nation's Partition and Bernadotte plans, see p. 76.

fertility: for example, the small area south of the Sea of Galilee, dotted with Jewish villages, is far more significant to Israel than the much larger area of Galilean hills just to the west, where water for irrigation is unobtainable. The small area of Western Galilee actually supports a much greater population than the much larger area of the Negev. On the other hand, the plains of the Negev are more easily irrigable than the hills of Western Galilee; sweet subterranean water may also still be discovered there. The area is thus *potentially* more valuable than Western Galilee.

A further factor influencing opinion on the Negev is the possible presence of oil. None has yet been discovered there in commercial quantities and the only licenses given by the Mandatory Government were for prospecting. But oil has recently been discovered at two points just southwest of the frontier between the Negev and Egypt, so that Zionist hopes of oil in the Negev may not be so groundless as many people seem to believe.

But even without potential subterranean water and oil resources; without the possibility of irrigation from the north under the Lowdermilk scheme; without the question of Jewish colonization needs, international award, and the right of military conquest—even if the Jews did not want the territory, there is little chance that Israel will surrender the Negev except in return for something else it does want. Israel has its back to the wall, fighting for its very existence and for the freedom of its citizens; its government cannot afford to give away even the slightest bargaining points. Everything it holds or can seize is useful in the final balance of claims, either in direct negotiation with the Arab states or in argument before the United Nations. In the long run, boundaries will be determined by possession, not by any "plan."

One of the thorniest problems is the future of the city of Jerusalem. Without doubt, Jerusalem is the most distinguished city in Palestine and a worthy capital for any country. For the past thirty years it has been the seat of government and the home of Jewish national institutions—the Jewish Agency, the Keren Hayessod, the Jewish National Fund, and the Va'ad Leumi. It

also houses the only University at the disposal of the citizens of Israel.

Jerusalem is, however, pre-eminently sacred to Christians, and, after the Holy Cities of Arabia, to Moslems as well. There is, therefore, a strong case, recognized by many Zionists, that Jerusalem should be placed under international regime. Most Zionists do not like the idea of internationalization but have been willing to put up with it as part of the price of Partition and the recognition of Israel.

Had internationalization been put promptly into effect upon the termination of the Mandate, with the Mandatory Government handing over its installations in Jerusalem to a United Nations commission, all might have been well. But the golden moment was lost. The Arabs moved in to the kill; the Jews defended their own areas with vigor. The Christian Churches, which might have been expected to throw their weight solidly behind internationalization, were largely silent. It was not until almost a year later that the Pope's Encyclical *De Multicibus* endorsed the principle. On June 28, 1948, Count Bernadotte submitted his proposal to throw Jerusalem into the Arab State. This, for most Zionists, was the last straw, and strengthened the hands of all those, and particularly Orthodox Jewry, who wanted to see Jerusalem incorporated within Israel.

For geographic and economic reasons it is, unfortunately, not possible to internationalize Jerusalem as an island, whatever the size of the surrounding area to be included in the international zone. The very life of the city depends on unrestricted access. Even if it be internationalized, it must be linked with the coast by a corridor: otherwise under hostile conditions it becomes a second Berlin, with no possibility of provisioning from the air. The British Royal Commission on Palestine of 1936 recognized this difficulty and in the partition plans of those days provided for an internationalized corridor from Jerusalem to the sea — not a very neat device, perhaps, but at least realistic. The arguments that supported that proposal still hold good today. Whether Jerusalem be internationalized or incorporated in the Jewish State, it must have access to the sea if it is to exist at all, quite apart from recovering its position as the national capital or from

further development as a place of pilgrimage and an intellectual center.

FINANCIAL STRAIN

Meanwhile, the unsolved problem of frontiers places a great strain on the Israeli economy. There is total mobilization of men for national defense; the farms are denuded of man-power; the factories are devoted to war needs. The Arab states, by keeping armies in the field that do little real fighting, are doing their utmost to wear down their rival.

The cost of living in Palestine at the end of the Mandate was already nearly three times the cost of living before World War II. The reasons are well-known: limited imports; a vastly increased purchasing power through military expenditure; inadequate taxation; an ill-disciplined population; and delay by the Mandatory Government in applying adequate wartime economic controls.

The present Government of Israel has shrewder economists at its command than had the Mandatory Power, and the population is now willing to make greater sacrifices. But imports of consumer goods are even more restricted than before, through shipping difficulties and through diversion of precious foreign exchange to the purchase of war material. The population is rapidly increasing through immigration: the pressure on all available articles for sale, whether foodstuffs or otherwise, is prodigious, and prices soar still higher in consequence. This upsets once more the delicate balance of wages and the cost of living, and cripples still further Israel's power to compete in international markets with its finely finished manufactured goods.

The picture of state finances is scarcely more encouraging. With an immigration of 120,000 a year (equivalent proportionally to a sudden influx of 30,000,000 immigrants into the United States), the demand for new land, housing, and farm and factory equipment is enormous. The necessary investment for colonization is estimated by the Israeli authorities at \$16,000,000 a month, exclusive of the cost of land. Even in peacetime, such a sum would seem astronomic; to add it to the even larger monthly cost of the war and the cost of normal civil administration pro-

duces a quite fantastic total. The total expenditure of the Mandatory Government for the whole of Palestine raised by local taxation only amounted to \$8,000,000 a month. The burden on the State of Israel at present for defending, colonizing, and administering only part of the country is nearer \$50,000,000 a month.

Yet the progress of the war in Palestine has shown that the State of Israel is not synonymous with a state of alarm; nor is it synonymous with a state of bankruptcy. The men that direct Israel's finances (Eliezer Kaplan, the Minister of Finance; David Horowitz, his alter ego; Siegfried Hoofien, General Manager of the Anglo-Palestine Bank, now serving in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry) are too astute to resort to the wholesale printing of paper money that has ruined China, pre-Hitler Germany, and many other countries that have tried it. Israel has approached its problems from another angle. It has raised an internal loan — large by local standards, but only enough to pay for the war for a few weeks. It has doubled the income tax; but when most wage earners are in the army on meager pay, income itself is reduced. The relatively large proportion of national revenue formerly obtained from import duties has dwindled with the dwindling of imports, and is not susceptible of increase by decree — only by an increase of trade. The State of Israel is therefore financing its commitments by purchase on credit; by short-term loans at inconvenient rates of interest; and by delaying payment of its bills. This is the reason for Zionist insistence on the vital necessity of a long-term American loan.

It would be easy to conclude from this situation that Israel not only will go bankrupt, but is in fact bankrupt now. But predictions on Palestine are notoriously wide of the mark. Most observers have underestimated Zionists' will-power, and their skill at improvisation. Their methods may often be unorthodox but they seem to succeed. The late Siegfried van Vriesland, one-time Treasurer of the Jewish Agency, said that, in Palestine, a deficit was a source of income. He implied, somewhat satirically, that only when there is a substantial deficit, can an appeal for funds be made to World Jewry.

World Jewry today stands strongly behind Israel. This is a comparatively recent phenomenon. Thirty years ago, only a small fraction of World Jewry was Zionist; now, excluding Russia, the great majority of Jews are interested in Israel, are proud of it, have faith in it, are willing to pay out of their own pockets whatever is needed to preserve it from disaster. As far as the younger generation is concerned, many Jews not born in Palestine and not Israeli citizens are willing to go to Israel and fight for it, even at the risk of losing their own citizenship. This is the response of World Jewry to the thirty years of growth of the Jewish National Home in Palestine. In some ways, it is not the Jewish People that have created Israel; it is Israel that has created a Jewish People.

It is here that the importance of American Jewry to Israel is most felt. As the largest, richest, and one of the most Zionist of all sections of World Jewry, its financial support of the infant State of Israel is of vital importance. It is American Jewry today that underwrites the debts of the new government in Tel Aviv, and as long as it is willing to do so, Israel will not be bankrupt.

THE ARAB POPULATION

Another problem that besets Israel is the question of its Arab population. The bearing of the Arab refugees on the boundaries of the Jewish state has been discussed above, but the Arab problem is wider than that.

Many Jews in Israel pride themselves on their humanity and their sense of justice. They claim that, as a race hounded for centuries in Europe, they know only too well how a minority feels, what guarantees it needs, and how anxious it is to achieve the impossible — to be absorbed into the commonweal while retaining its own identity.

Ever since Dr. Leo Kohn, the draftsman of the Israeli constitution, set out some years ago in a letter to the *Palestine Post* the rights that a Jewish state would accord its Arab citizens, the intention of racial equality has been clear and, many observers think, quite genuine. The new draft constitution is unexceptionable on this point. How far it is capable of realization when the Arab minority in Israel is largely sullen, frightened, and resent-

ful is another matter. It is obvious that the Arabs of the Jewish state will not be left in peace by the neighboring Arab states. The government in exile at Gaza or elsewhere — the old Palestinian Arab Higher Committee in new dress — will do its best to stir at least some of the bolder Arab spirits in Israel to rebellion, to demonstrate that Israel seethes with unrest. If, as a result, the Israeli police expenditure is crippling (as it often was under the Mandatory regime), so much the better from the Arab nationalist point of view. Hence the great sensitivity of Israel to Arab relations, and its desire to show the world that, contrary to statements by Arab nationalists, the Arabs of Israel will be well treated, content, prosperous, and better educated than Arabs elsewhere.

The first blow to these hopes came in the spring of 1948 when Arabs began to evacuate villages on the edge of the Jewish coastal area in Palestine. Some of the evacuation was effected in an orderly fashion: livestock was driven off to the hills; movable property was taken away in trucks; house keys were in some cases handed over to friendly Jewish neighbors. This was often merely a wise precaution by peaceful citizens who did not want to be in the firing line during a civil war. Many Jews, however, claim that the exodus was ordered by the Mufti in order to discredit the Jews and weaken their economy.

This exodus did not assume catastrophic proportions until after the massacre of Arabs by Jewish terrorists at the village of Dair Yasin near Jerusalem on April 9. This village had shown no special animosity to its Jewish neighbors, yet it was attacked by Jewish terrorists in order to demonstrate their military strength. Although Jewish terrorist leaders now deny that it was they who planned and executed the attack, it was they themselves who held a press conference the same night and boasted of what they had done.

The figures of Arabs killed, which run into hundreds, were first given by the terrorists. The truth was bad enough; but when magnified by rumor, both innocent and malevolent, it was sufficient to bring panic to the Arabs and cause them to evacuate all areas where Jews were in the ascendant, in particular Jaffa and Haifa.

The Jewish authorities were at first dumbfounded by this mass evacuation. They had roundly condemned the Dair Yasin massacre, but many failed to comprehend its disastrous consequences. The Jewish Agency itself denounced Arab evacuation as unnecessary, as a maneuver by the Mufti to blacken the faces of the Jews. The exodus, however, continued until the great majority of Arabs within the State of Israel had fled. They were taking no risks.

The next stage in this tragedy was widespread Jewish looting of Arab property, contrary to the implicit instructions of the Jewish military commanders. But men were not available to police all the evacuated areas. Similar looting by Arabs had already occurred in the evacuated Jewish areas and by Jews in the evacuated Arab areas of Jerusalem even before the end of the Mandatory regime.

By the autumn of 1948 several hundred thousand Arab refugees were camped in the Nablus and Hebron hills, around Gaza, and in neighboring Arab countries under very bad conditions. A few of the well-to-do Palestine Arab families had left earlier and were better housed and financially independent.

By the time the problem came before the United Nations relief organizations and pressure was exerted on the Government of Israel to allow the Arab refugees to return, Jewish public opinion in Israel had undergone a profound change. Some Jews were in favor of unconditional return; most, however, supported the stand made by the Foreign Minister, Moshe Shertok, who asserted that a settlement of the Arab refugee problem must await a general peace settlement. The Arab refugees, he said, were hostile elements who could not be allowed back in wartime except in very special cases. Other Jews took a much more radical view and opposed the return of any Arab refugees at any time, arguing that they had brought this disaster on their own heads by fighting — or encouraging the fighting — against the United Nations decision to partition Palestine and create a Jewish state. There were also some Jews who welcomed the opportunity to acquire Arab lands within the Jewish state for further Jewish colonization; still others who were glad to see the possibility of a more homogeneous population in Israel.

It may well be that some Arabs will prefer not to return to Israel; but the vast majority are peasants or small shopkeepers who cannot be resettled easily elsewhere without vast expenditure. When the Greeks fled from Smyrna during the Greco-Turkish War of 1920, it was considered wiser to resettle them in Eastern Greece and to repatriate Turks from Eastern Greece to Turkey. This may serve as a precedent for the Arab refugee problem — an exchange of populations between Israel and the neighboring Arab states, the Arab states taking those of the Palestinian Arabs who are prepared to be resettled; Israel in return taking those Jews of Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, and other Arab cities whose position has become extremely precarious as a result of feeling over the war in Palestine. The cost of this resettlement scheme, if adopted, would have to be met in part by the United Nations, in part by the Arab states and by the Government of Israel.

What is the alternative to resettlement of Arabs and Jews? If all the Arab refugees return to Israel they will form a large minority bloc with their own language, religion, and customs. Although the Government of Israel regards Arabs as equal citizens and has refused to treat them as a racial bloc, in actual practice it has already been found necessary to create a Ministry of Minorities to "assist" other Ministries (for example, those which deal with health, education, and employment) in handling the Arab problem. It might be possible over decades to integrate the Arabs completely into a mixed Jewish-Arab State of Israel, but it would be an extremely difficult task.

It is not easy to govern Arabs; they are a proud people and most of them are now governing themselves. It was only possible for the Mandatory Power to govern the Arab districts of Palestine by the exercise of great patience backed, when necessary, by considerable forces of British troops and British police. For Jews to take over this responsibility is a bold experiment. In some ways, as a Semitic people themselves, the Jews understand the Arabs better than did the British — the way the Arab's mind works, his prejudices, and preferences. The relations between the Jewish citrus grower of the older generation and his Arab laborers were generally harmonious; but it was never a wholly

desirable relationship. It may therefore be wiser in the long run to segregate Arabs and Jews throughout the Middle East, even at the price of much immediate human suffering.

THE KASHMIR CONFLICT

Alice Thorner

(For map of Jammu and Kashmir, see facing page 1.)

I: DISSENSION

WHEN THE two new dominions of India and Pakistan were inaugurated on August 15, 1947, the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir at the northern apex of the sub-continent emerged as an unattached political entity with an uncertain future. The basis for the partition of India was the contention put forward in 1940 by the Muslim League that India's Muslims and Hindus constituted two separate nations. On the insistence of the Muslim League that in no other way could a peaceful transfer of power be effected, and with the most reluctant consent of the Indian National Congress, which had long been committed to the ideal of a free and united India, the withdrawing imperial authorities divided the eleven provinces of British India into predominantly Muslim areas and predominantly non-Muslim areas. The former, wherever they were roughly contiguous, were assigned to Pakistan; the latter remained to India. As for the 560-odd Indian states, the ruling princes were advised by the Viceroy to accede voluntarily to one or the other of the new dominions, in accord with the same communal and geographic considerations. But they were under no formal constraint to accept this advice.¹

¹ In June 1947 the British Cabinet announced that upon the withdrawal of British power from India the "paramountcy" relation of the Crown to the Indian princes would "lapse" rather than be handed on to the successor states of India and Pakistan. Accordingly, the Indian Independence Act of July 18, 1947, provided that "as from the appointed day [August 15, 1947] the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses. . . ." This policy was generally understood to mean that upon partition the princes would become independent sovereigns, theoretically free to join either dominion or neither at their own free will. Speaking for the Muslim League and the future Gov-

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Had Kashmir been awarded on the same terms as the provinces of British India, it would unquestionably have been assigned to Pakistan. Of the four million inhabitants, more than three-quarters are Muslims, and the Muslims are in a majority in each province of the state. Its three mountain-fed rivers, the Indus, the Jhelum (which flows through the famed Vale of Kashmir), and the Chenab, join in a single stream to descend through the Pakistan lowlands and empty into the Arabian Sea at Karachi. Kashmir's sole railroad connection is a spur line from Sialkot in the West Punjab (Pakistan) to Jammu. Its only all-weather roads then led to the West Punjab and the Northwest Frontier provinces of Pakistan. Its border with the East Punjab and United Provinces of the new Indian Dominion was several hundred miles long, but for the most part passed through mountainous and sparsely populated territory.

The Congress Party leaders, however, were by no means reconciled to the prospect of Kashmir's inclusion in Pakistan. Since it borders on Afghanistan, Soviet Tadzhikistan, Sinkiang, and Tibet, Kashmir was conceived as both a gateway to greater Indian influence in Central Asia and a bastion of defense. India alone, it was argued, had the economic strength to develop Kashmir's so far untapped water-power potential and mineral resources. Historical and cultural ties were adduced as evidence that Kashmir was and had always been an integral part of India.

Within the last two decades previous to partition, a vigorous and widely supported popular movement for civil rights, representative government, and economic reform had grown up in Kashmir. Leadership was provided by the All-Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, an organization predominantly Muslim in membership but including representatives of all

ernment of Pakistan, Mr. Jinnah explicitly endorsed this position: "Constitutionally and legally, Indian states will be independent sovereign States on the termination of paramountcy, and they will be free to decide for themselves to adopt any course they like. . . . In my opinion they are free to remain independent if they so desire." (*Dawn* [New Delhi], June 18, 1947). The principle was also accepted by the Government of the Dominion of India, whose representative to the Security Council stated on January 15, 1948: "On the 15th of August, when the Indian Independence Act came into force, Jammu and Kashmir, like other States, become free to decide whether she would accede to the one or other of the two Dominions, or remain independent." In connection with the 1948 Hyderabad controversy, however, Indian officials have argued that paramountcy did not and could not lapse, and that in consequence none of the states could presume to independence.

creeds, castes, and communities, and deriving much of its political inspiration from the Indian National Congress. The founder and president, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, a graduate of the famed university at Aligarh, a staunch Muslim and an equally staunch adversary of Jinnah's two-nation ideology, was bound closely by long-standing friendship and deep personal loyalty to Jawaharlal Nehru. In view of Abdullah's remarkable popularity, the architects of the Dominion of India believed that they could use Kashmir as a living demonstration that a distinctively Muslim community would survive and prosper in the secular atmosphere of the new India. During the crucial summer of 1947, however, Abdullah was serving out a lengthy jail sentence for sedition in consequence of his 1946 campaign calling upon the Maharajah to "Quit Kashmir!"²

The key figure in the Kashmir case was, of course, the Maharajah, who belongs to a dynasty of Hindu Dogras, the ruling clan of the Jammu district. Since the maintenance of his regime over his considerably disaffected Muslim subjects depended largely on heavy-handed measures by an administration staffed chiefly with royal kinsmen, court favorites, and Hindus from outside the state, he could scarcely be expected to exercise his option to join Pakistan. On the other hand, he held little brief for Nehru and the other Congress leaders, several of whom had intervened in internal Kashmir affairs by coming to the assistance of Sheikh Abdullah.

Earl Mountbatten, the then Viceroy, has subsequently related that he went up to Srinagar in July and pleaded with the Maharajah for the whole of four days to join either India or Pakistan by August 14, but all to no avail.³ On August 11 the Government of Kashmir requested and was granted by the States Department of the nascent Pakistan Government a temporary standstill agreement providing for the continuance of economic and administrative relations between the State and Pakistan on the same basis as before the creation of the Dominion. By the terms of this agreement Pakistan undertook to operate the post and telegraph system in Kashmir, and to supply the State with the quotas of

² The background and history of the National Conference is developed in some detail in A. Thorner, "The Issues in Kashmir," *Far Eastern Survey*, XVII (Aug. 11, 1948).

³ *Asiatic Review*, XLIV (1948), pp. 352-3.

gasoline, wheat, salt, kerosene, and cloth which had been allotted to it under the former All-India Basic Plan. Kashmir also approached India for a similar standstill pact, but was informed that further discussion of the matter would be required.⁴

In a very few weeks suspicions began to be voiced in Pakistan that the Maharajah of Kashmir did not intend to remain neutral, but was, in fact, negotiating secretly with the object of eventual accession to the Indian Dominion.⁵ From this time forward, relations between Pakistan and Kashmir deteriorated; a series of border incidents speeded the process and provided content for mutual recriminations. As communal warfare gripped the divided Punjab, several thousands of Hindu and Sikh refugees from Pakistan poured over the Kashmir border into the district of Jammu. Economically and socially uprooted and full of bitterness, these refugees quickly came into conflict with the local Jammu Muslims, among whom were many supporters of the Muslim League. Neighborhood clashes ensued, as well as smash-and-grab raids across the Pakistan-Kashmir frontier both by Muslims from the Punjab side and by Dogras and refugees from the Jammu side. In this manner a large number of villages on both sides of the boundary were burned or destroyed.

In the northern part of Jammu district an armed uprising against the administration of the Poonch *jagir* (a feudal type of estate in which the landlord exercised civil and judicial rights) broke out toward the end of August. Large numbers of Muslim veterans of the old Army of India had been settled as peasants in this area and in the Rawalpindi district just across the Jhelum River in the Punjab. The Poonchis, with the aid of arms and reinforcements from their former comrades on the Pakistan side, proved more than a match for the Kashmir State troops detailed to put down the disturbances, and in several places forced them to withdraw.

Difficulties also developed over the supplies due to Kashmir

⁴ See the Maharajah's letter of Oct. 26, 1947, to Lord Mountbatten, quoted in *Statement of the Honourable Mr. N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar before the Security Council, January 15, 1948*, Verbatim Record of the 227th Meeting, S/P.V. 227, 46.

⁵ In a communiqué issued on September 23, 1947, the Government of Jammu and Kashmir termed reports that Kashmir had decided to join India "unauthentic," and reiterated its intention of finalizing standstill arrangements with both dominions. *The Statesman (Calcutta)*, Sept. 24, 1947.

under the standstill agreement with Pakistan. Telegrams, conferences, and the dispatching of Kashmir State officials to Rawalpindi all failed to achieve the delivery of the Kashmir quotas. About the middle of September railway service between Sialkot and Jammu was suspended.

During the same time high Pakistan officials were conducting exploratory negotiations with Sheikh Abdullah's lieutenants. G. M. Bakshi, the second in command of the National Conference, has stated that while Abdullah was still in jail he went down to Lahore to confer with Premier Liaquat Ali Khan and other Pakistan leaders. They told him, Bakshi's account continues, that they would be unwilling to support any proposal for a popular poll on accession in Kashmir unless the National Conference was privately pledged to vote solidly for Pakistan.⁶

At the close of September 1947 the Maharajah took his first public step toward reconciliation with India by releasing Abdullah, while keeping in jail Chowdhury Ghulam Abbas, the leader of the Kashmir Muslim Conference, an organization sponsored and encouraged by Jinnah. In quick succession all voices in Kashmir pleading for accession to Pakistan were silenced: newspapers were censored or shut down, journalists were interned, and finally the Kashmir State Assembly was prorogued to prevent further criticism of the State Government.

Abdullah, in his first public speeches after coming out of jail, rapidly disabused the Muslim League leaders of any expectations of help from him in achieving Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. Terming the attainment of "responsible government" rather than the decision to join one dominion or the other the issue of first importance for the people of Kashmir, Abdullah went out of his way to criticise the States policy of Pakistan as anti-democratic.⁷ As if at a signal, the Muslim League press and the government-controlled Pakistan radio began grinding out daily news stories in which mass meetings, organizational gatherings, and prominent individuals both within Kashmir and without were reported as appealing to the Maharajah of Kashmir to accede promptly to Pakistan, and as threatening dire steps

⁶ *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), Nov. 16, 1947.

⁷ *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), Oct. 11, 1947; *People's Age* (Bombay), Oct. 26, 1947.

should he join India. Abdullah and the National Conference were attacked for their "unholy alliance" with the Maharajah, and were depicted as rapidly losing all popular support in the State.⁸

By this time rumors that a road link was being cut through from Kathua in Jammu to Pathankot in the East Punjab (India) had been confirmed. The governments of Pakistan and Kashmir began to exchange sharply worded notes protesting on the one side against the mistreatment of Muslims in Poonch and on the other against the infiltration of "thousands" of armed raiders into Poonch, the withholding of supplies, and so forth. When Kashmir threatened to ask for "friendly assistance" in order to "oppose trespass on its fundamental rights," Pakistan warned that "grave consequences" would ensue if an "outside power" should intervene.⁹

II: INVASION

While the telegrams passed back and forth, military preparations within Pakistan for bringing Kashmir promptly to heel were well under way. Several scores of truckloads of tribesmen were brought to the edges of Kashmir from the so-called Tribal Areas situated between the "Inner Frontier," which bounds the regularly administered districts of the North-West Frontier Province, and the "Durand Line," which defines the border with Afghanistan. The operation was organized by the Prime Minister and other officials of the North-West Frontier Province with at least the knowledge of some members the Pakistan Central Government. The date of the invasion was set for about October 21.¹⁰

⁸ *Pakistan Times*, Oct. 7-28, 1947; *Hindustan Times*, Oct. 17, 1947.

⁹ The original Pakistan protest of October 13 is reported in *Pakistan Times* (Lahore), Oct. 15, 1947. A partial text of the Prime Minister of Kashmir's telegram of October 15 is reproduced in *Invasion of Kashmir*, published by the Secretary for Information and Broadcasting to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir (December, 1947), pp. 9-10. The Prime Minister of Pakistan's reply of October 18 and a second reply by Jinnah, the Governor-General of Pakistan, on October 20, are reported in *Pakistan Times*, October 22 and 28, 1947, respectively.

¹⁰ This information was contained in a letter sent on October 20 by Sir George Cunningham, then Governor of the North West Frontier Province, to General Sir Rob Lockhart, the then Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army. The contents of the letter leaked into the public press after being cited by General Roy Bucher, present Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan

At 4:30 on the morning of October 22, a column of approximately two thousand armed tribesmen, some on foot and some in motor buses, entered Muzaffarabad, the first town inside Kashmir on the Jhelum valley road to Srinagar. The force was under the military command of a Major Khurshid Anver (or Anwar), a Pakistan national and an officer of the Muslim League National Guards. The tribesmen made quick work of Muzaffarabad and proceeded on down the Vale, reaching Uri, 60 miles inside the border, before they were temporarily checked on October 24 by a small company of Kashmir State troops. By this time the Indian Government in Delhi had received word of the fall of Muzaffarabad and had also received an urgent request for military aid from the Government of Kashmir State. The Pakistan Prime Minister was busy inditing yet another telegram of protest to the Prime Minister of Kashmir about serious disturbances on the border in the Jammu-Sialkot area.

On the fourth day of the invasion, the Pakistan newspapers reported under a Palandari (Poonch) dateline that a Provisional Azad (Free) Kashmir Government had established its rule over a large part of the State territory.¹¹ Mohammad Ibrahim Khan, the "President" of this fledgling government, a 30-year-old scion of a prominent Poonch family, had served briefly as Assistant Public Prosecutor in the State Government and was a political nonentity. Subsequently military items from Kashmir were carried in the Pakistan press and radio as communiqués from the Azad Kashmir Headquarters, the tribesmen being described as the Troops of the Provisional Government.

Under pressure of the growing threat to Srinagar, the Gov-

in Delhi on or about July 16, 1948, and were confirmed in a Press Note issued on August 6 by the External Affairs Ministry. *Times of India* (Bombay, Aug. 7, 1948). A more detailed and circumstantial account of the preparations for the invasion, also presented as evidence to the United Nations Commission by the Government of India, was given by a journalist named G. K. Reddy in the rather sensational Bombay weekly *Blitz*, on June 9, 1948. Reddy, a Hindu of South Indian origin, served as a news agency correspondent in Kashmir. He claims to have been impressed on pain of his life into service as Director of Public Relations for the rebel forces in Kashmir beginning on October 21, 1948, and to have escaped from Pakistan to India only after seven months of virtual internment. Reddy alleged that the tribal invasion of Kashmir was planned at a meeting held in Rawalpindi in late September, attended by the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and of the West Punjab and Frontier provinces, and by high ranking officers of the Pakistan Army, including General Sir Frank Messervy, the then Commander-in-Chief, and General Sir Douglas Gracey, who subsequently succeeded to that post.

¹¹ *Pakistan Times* (Lahore), Oct. 25, 1947.

ernment of India made plans for sending in troops by air, while the Maharajah (who had fled from Srinagar to Jammu) signed an instrument of accession to the Indian Dominion. The following day (October 27) Lord Mountbatten formally accepted the accession on behalf of India and the first contingent of Indian soldiers landed at the Srinagar airport in the morning.

In Pakistan, news of India's intention to fly in troops preceded news of Kashmir's decision to accede to India. In any case, the tribesmen who had been expected to capture Srinagar in three or four days after crossing the border had wasted valuable time by dispersing in search of loot.¹² Accordingly, orders were issued from the Pakistan Government House in Lahore to General Gracey, Acting Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, at his headquarters in Rawalpindi to send troops immediately across the Kashmir border and up the road to Srinagar. But General Gracey had just received word that Kashmir had joined India. He therefore advised the Pakistan Government that to send in troops would be an act of war and the project was abandoned.¹³

In Srinagar itself the National Conference had practically taken over control. The streets were filled with marching volunteers, wearing the red armband of the Conference, who constituted themselves a local defense force and effectively prevented any outbreak of communal rioting. In accordance with the pledge wrung from him by the Government of India as a prerequisite of accession, the Maharajah had agreed to ask Sheikh Abdullah to serve in an interim cabinet.¹⁴ Despite the front-line

¹² *Times* (London), Nov. 10, 1947; *Daily Express* (London), Nov. 10, 1947.

¹³ This incident is described in the first leader of the London *Times* of Oct. 30, 1947. At that time supreme authority over British officers in both the Indian and Pakistan armies was still exercised by the Supreme Commander, Field-Marshal Auchinleck. According to the *Times* leader, Auchinleck, who intervened personally at Lahore and "pointed out that all the British officers in both armies would resign rather than be involved in a fratricidal Indian conflict," thereby "staved off an irrevocable step." The news columns of the same day reported that General Sir Rob Lockhart, the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, had ordered that British officers attached to the Indian Army not take part in the operations in Kashmir and Jammu, and that any British officers there be withdrawn. On November 12 it was announced that the Supreme Commander's headquarters were to be dissolved, ahead of schedule, on November 30 because the absence of good will between India and Pakistan made it impossible for Auchinleck and his staff to carry on. *Times* (London), Nov. 13, 1947.

¹⁴ Prime Minister Nehru's address to the Indian Dominion Parliament on Nov. 25. *The Statesman* (New Delhi), Nov. 26, 1947.

battles going on at the outskirts of the town, Srinagar was decked out in banners and bunting for Abdullah's swearing in on October 31 as "Head of the Emergency Administration."

Pakistan went on record from the first as refusing to recognize Kashmir's accession to the Indian Dominion. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan wired on October 30 to Nehru: "Your action of sending troops to Kashmir on pretext of accession has made things infinitely worse." For India's stand, Nehru reiterated over an All-India Radio hookup the position taken in Mountbatten's letter of acceptance to the Maharajah that "the question of accession should be settled by a reference to the people." Nehru insisted, however, that no such referendum could be held until the invaders had been driven out of Kashmir and peace restored.¹⁵

On the day following Nehru's broadcast, Pakistan announced a set of conditions under which it would "exert its influence with the Kashmir Muslims to cease fire and disband their fighting troops":

1. Withdrawal of Indian troops from Kashmir and immobilization of the State forces.
2. Replacement of Sheikh Abdullah's government by a coalition administration (i.e., one including Mohammad Ibrahim).
3. Holding of a plebiscite under international auspices after the above two steps had been taken.¹⁶

These terms for a plebiscite were totally unacceptable to India. Events on the military front were no more conclusive. Substantial reinforcements of Indian Dominion troops were brought in over the new Pathankot-Jammu road and thence through the Banihal Pass to Srinagar. In an offensive launched the second week of November they pushed the invaders back to Uri, about two-thirds of the way from Srinagar to the Pakistan border, and then came to a standstill. The Muzaffarabad district in the west, practically all of Poonch except for the beleaguered town of that name, and considerable parts of Jammu remained in rebel hands.

¹⁵ *The Statesman* (New Delhi), Nov. 3, 1947. Mountbatten's letter is quoted in the Indian White Paper on Kashmir (March 5, 1948), Part IV. Liaquat's telegram was quoted in Sir Zafrullah Kahn's statement before the Security Council on Jan. 16, 1948. Verbatim Record S/P.V. 228, 106.

¹⁶ *Times* (London), Nov. 4, 1947.

An unexpected accretion to the territory under Azadi control was announced in a telegram from Gilgit in the well-nigh inaccessible mountain reaches of northernmost Kashmir. Although constituting part of the domain of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, Gilgit had been administered for some years before partition as a special Agency under a British Political Agent. When he handed over the Agency on August 15, 1947, to Brigadier Ghansara Singh, the governor named by Kashmir, two young British officers remained in command of the Gilgit Scouts, an irregular force attached to the Frontier Corps, which was in turn attached, after partition, to the Pakistan Army. During the first week in November the Gilgit Scouts took Brigadier Ghansara Singh prisoner and proclaimed Gilgit's accession to Pakistan.¹⁷

The *mirs* (chieftains) of Hunza and Nagir, two small principalities within the Gilgit Agency, were reported to have declared their allegiance to Pakistan as well. Earlier the same week three local rulers of hill states in the North West Frontier tribal areas just west of Gilgit — the Mehtar of Chitral, the Wali of Swat, and the Nawab of Dir — had also repudiated their rather tenuous sub-feudatory relations with Kashmir and placed their lands and resources at the disposal of Mr. Jinnah.

The rebel forces at this time were estimated at about 10,000. In addition to the tribesmen from the Frontier, they included a number of Muslim deserters from the Kashmir State Forces, a few hundred Poonchis, and a sprinkling of Punjabis and other Pakistan nationals, among whom were officers and enlisted men of the Pakistan Regular Army.¹⁸ Major Khurshid Anver was replaced early in November by Colonel (now Brigadier) Akbar Khan, a Sandhurst-trained Pakistan Army officer.¹⁹ He was designated "General Tariq" in press releases from "Azad Kashmir Headquarters."

As it became clear that the Kashmir campaign was going to

¹⁷ For a concise statement of Gilgit's emergence as a place of significance in the international rivalry of the Great Powers, see L. E. Frechling, "Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Eastern Turkistan, 1863-1881," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, XXVI (1939), pp. 483-4.

¹⁸ *Times* (London), Oct. 30 and Nov. 10, 1947. *Indian White Paper on Kashmir*, March 4, 1948, Parts II and III.

¹⁹ *Dawn* (Karachi), Dec. 7, 1947.

be a protracted affair, regular headquarters for the Azad Forces were set up in Rawalpindi under the direct supervision of the Pakistan Army General Headquarters.²⁰ Problems of providing food, transport, communications, munitions and other supplies, accounts and finances, medical care, and training centers for the rebel troops were handled and co-ordinated by Pakistan civil and military officials acting in their normal course of duty. Tens of thousands of tribesmen on their way to or home from the Kashmir front were quartered in Pakistan Army cantonments or in commandeered accommodations at a dozen or more places in the West Punjab and Frontier provinces.

An operation of this magnitude could scarcely be concealed; in any case, no great pains were taken to keep it a secret. Immediately upon the announcement of Kashmir's accession to India, the outspoken Prime Minister of the Frontier Province appealed to his fellow countrymen to right the wrong which had been done. Declaring that Kashmir, which was a Muslim majority state, "belonged to Pakistan as a matter of right," he called upon "every Muslim in Pakistan" to prepare to face the situation created by India's "invasion" of Kashmir.²¹

Muslim League leaders and Pakistan provincial officials addressed public meetings at which funds as well as moral support for the Azadi fighters were solicited. Recruiting for service in Kashmir, which had hitherto been confined to the Frontier, was now carried on actively throughout Pakistan.²² Special cars full of cheering and singing volunteers on their way to Kashmir were entrained at Karachi, Lahore, and other Pakistan cities. Nothing, in fact, could have been more congenial to the climate of public opinion in Pakistan than the picture drawn by official and non-official propaganda of the struggle for their very existence of a long-oppressed Muslim people (the Kashmiris) aided by their valiant Muslim brethren (the tribesmen) against the tot-

²⁰ On November 12 General Sir Frank Messervy, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, issued a communiqué stating that "there is absolutely no truth in the allegations made by the Government of India that serving Pakistan Army officers are directing operations in Kashmir against State forces." (Quoted by Sir Zafrullah Khan to the Security Council on January 17, 1948, Document S/P.V. 229, 63-65.) It may be noted that the denial did not apply to those Pakistan army officers who were *on leave* or who were serving at the Azad Kashmir headquarters in Pakistan.

²¹ *Pakistan Times* (Lahore), Oct. 30.

²² *The Observer* (London), Nov. 2.

tering regime of an autocratic Hindu despot (the Maharajah) propped up by the hostile intrigues and the brutal armies of an aggressive and powerful neighbor (India). With their too fresh memories of the Punjab massacres, seen in retrospect as a unilateral campaign to wipe out all Muslims within the territory of the Indian Dominion, Pakistanis were altogether ready to believe that the Maharajah of Kashmir was pursuing a deliberate and "widespread plan for the extermination of Muslims" and their elimination from the State. India's role in accepting the accession of Kashmir and coming to the aid of the Maharajah was thought to be a direct threat to the sovereignty and security of the smaller Dominion.²³ The opinion was, in fact, commonly held throughout Pakistan that at every step in the dealings between the two dominions India was following "a prepared but veiled plan to enforce reunion."²⁴

In India, on the other hand, the Kashmir story was propagandistically presented and popularly received as an epic tragedy set in a scenic demi-paradise where Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, and Buddhists (sturdy peasants, hill-country shepherds, and talented artisans) lived together in communal peace and harmony. The once idyllic Vale had been ravaged by an unprovoked and unwarranted incursion of tribal freebooters, incited to a jihad by unscrupulous Muslim Leaguers and fanatical religious leaders with exaggerated tales of Dogra atrocities on the Muslim inhabitants of Kashmir and with promises of loot and rapine. The Indian attitude toward the role of Pakistan in these events, as it appeared in both official and non-official expressions, tended more toward sorrow than toward anger. Shocked surprise was registered that the sister dominion, which had so short a time before been part and parcel of the centuries-old common homeland, should act in so unneighborly a fashion.

Even the most heated Indian protests respected the semi-fiction that the tribal raiders came not *from* but *through* Pakistan.²⁵ In the name of neighborly duty, Pakistan was called upon to

²³ Radio address by Liaquat Ali Khan on November 4. *Pakistan Times* (Lahore), Nov. 5, 1947.

²⁴ *Times* (London), Feb. 26, 1948.

²⁵ Under a unique dual-frontier system inaugurated by Lord Curzon in 1900, the Tribal Areas have constituted a special territory inside the frontier but outside the bounds of the regularly administered area of the North West Frontier Province.

check the "tribal invasion" and to refrain from aiding and abetting it. Thus Nehru telegraphed to Liaquat on October 28: "I want to invite your government's co-operation in stopping these raiders entering Kashmir territory. As raiders come across Pakistan territory it should be possible to stop them there."²⁶

Kashmir was by no means the only issue over which the two dominions were at loggerheads, but it proved the thorniest. At the end of November, face-to-face negotiations at the cabinet level were resumed for the first time since the invasion and accession of Kashmir. In short order agreement was reached upon all matters connected with partition which — through lack of time or clash of views — had not been resolved before August 15.

In an atmosphere of remarkable good will the representatives of the two dominions apportioned between themselves the cash assets of the old Government of India, its billion-pound sterling balances immobilized in London, and its stocks of military equipment and munitions. A subsidiary pact recognized the rights of refugees in India or Pakistan to the property and claims they had left behind in the dominion from which they had fled.

Even on Kashmir, progress was made toward a settlement, but in the final stage the demands of the two governments proved irreconcilable. Winter weather tipped the military scales in favor of the invading forces. Snow began to pile up on the Banihal Pass road from Jammu to Srinagar, the only motorable line of communication for troops, military, and civilian supplies from India. Flying conditions deteriorated. On the other hand, routes from Pakistan into Jammu and Western Kashmir were numerous and led through much easier terrain. Attacks were launched regularly from bases in Pakistan, and in many cases the attackers retired across the border after completing their missions. Indian Army officers advised their government that a complete clearing of the raiders from the State would involve crossing the frontier and capturing the rebel headquarters in Pakistan; even Indian possession of the reconquered Vale could not be guaranteed so long as the rebel bases existed.

²⁶ Statement of the Honourable Mr. N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar before the Security Council, January 15, 1948, Verbatim Record, S/P.V. 227, 76.

But India hesitated to jeopardize its good name in the court of world opinion by appearing to take the first step toward war. Only after putting Pakistan squarely in the wrong could India, preserving an unblemished reputation for devotion to the cause of peace, proceed with the military consolidation of Kashmir by such measures as might prove necessary. Accordingly, on December 31, 1947, Premier Nehru dispatched to the Security Council of the United Nations a charge-sheet listing unfriendly acts, both of omission and commission, by the Government of Pakistan, and an urgent appeal to the Council to persuade the Government of Pakistan to mend its ways promptly.²⁷

²⁷ "The Government of India request the Security Council to call upon Pakistan to put an end immediately to the giving of such assistance which is an act of aggression against India. If Pakistan does not do so, the Government of India may be compelled, in self-defense, to enter Pakistan territory, in order to take military action against the invaders. The matter is, therefore, one of extreme urgency and calls for immediate action by the Security Council for avoiding a breach of international peace." Jawaharlal Nehru's December 31 letter to the Security Council, quoted in *Indian Information*, Apr. 1, 1948, pp. 384-85.

*Part III: The Kashmir Conflict at the United Nations
will appear in the April issue of the Journal.*

UNITY AND NATIONALISM IN LIBYA

Benjamin Rivlin

AMONG THE major points of controversy arising during the protracted negotiations over the disposition of the Italian Colonies in Africa is the future status of Libya. Consideration of this question has not been limited to the alternatives of independence or trusteeship, and of who is to be the administering authority in the event of agreement on the latter: in addition, the negotiations have involved proposals to partition Libya into two or possibly three separate entities, with each segment falling under a distinct political regime. The unity or division of Libya is a complicating problem because the internal trends in either direction are difficult to evaluate, and the whole question is overlaid with Big Power differences.

Until September 15, 1948, the fate of Italy's African colonies was in the hands of Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and France. Having failed by then to reach agreement on the problem, the Big Four turned it over to the United Nations General Assembly in accordance with the procedure outlined in the Treaty of Peace with Italy.¹ Although put on the agenda of the Third Session of the General Assembly at Paris, the question never came up for discussion and was put over for the second part of the session, meeting in New York in April 1949.

¹ For a discussion of the problem of the Italian Colonies in its earlier stages, see C. Grove Haines, "The Problem of the Italian Colonies," *Middle East Journal*, I (1947), pp. 417-31. For the pertinent clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Italy, see *ibid.*, pp. 331-33.

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As on most issues involved in the negotiations over the Italian Colonies, the Big Four have been sharply divided on the question of Libyan unity. Moreover, again as on most issues, the *rationale* for the respective stands of the powers has not been any intrinsic validity possessed by their proposals either from the point of view of the inhabitants of the territory or from any objective standard. On the contrary, the attitude of each has been an expression of subjective interests reflecting the power-politics atmosphere of post-war international relations.

Thus, Great Britain, seeking to retain a foothold in the area, has steadfastly supported the claims of the Grand Sanusi, Al-Sayid Idris, who has indicated his willingness to enter into close ties with his British benefactors in the event of his coming to power in Libya. In supporting the Sanusi claims, Great Britain has become the chief advocate of a divided Libya, for the Sanusi issue presents one of the major obstacles to the establishment of unity. Similarly, the United States has given support to a divided Libya by abandoning its original proposal for an international trusteeship, in favor of support for the British position. On the other hand, as might be expected during the East-West "cold war," the USSR has vehemently opposed such a partition for Libya. The Soviet argument has contended that since the "integrating factors" in Libya largely counterbalance the "differentiating factors," the territory's unity should not be impaired. At an earlier stage of the negotiations, however, when the Soviet Union was seeking the trusteeship over Tripolitania for itself, no such qualms about partition were expressed. Not to be forgotten is the last remaining member of the Big Four. France, also, advocated a partitioning of Libya, but a partition of its own special variety. Under the guise of "border rectifications," France has laid claim to the Fezzan in southwestern Tripolitania and to all of Libya south of the Tropic of Cancer. The French position is only partly explicable in terms of power politics, for the area claimed is of no great strategic or intrinsic value. The French claim is based primarily on the fact that Free French troops wrested this desert region from Italian control, and is an attempt to bolster the sagging prestige of France as a world power by a tangible reward for its role in the war.

During their futile attempts to find a solution to the Italian Colonies question, the Big Four Powers received formal presentation of views on the subject from nineteen other interested governments, as called for by the Italian peace treaty. On the specific problem of Libyan unity, the views of these governments ran the gamut of the proposals considered by the Big Four, with several additional variations. The Soviet satellite states supported the Russian proposals for a united Libya under Italian trusteeship; New Zealand and Australia, British trusteeship for all of Libya; Egypt, an independent united Libya; the Union of South Africa, separate British trusteeships over Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, with the Fezzan under French trusteeship; and Pakistan, a united Libya under the Sanusi. Canada, reflecting the basic dilemma of the situation, could not express a firm opinion on whether Libya should be established as a single trust or divided into separate trusts for Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. If separatist sentiment in Cyrenaica was too strong to admit the inclusion of that territory in a single Libyan trust territory, Canada favored the creation of two separate trusts, with Great Britain the administering authority of both.

On what were these diverse opinions based? According to the Italian peace treaty, a Four Power Commission of Investigation was to visit the Italian Colonies, gather data regarding them, and ascertain the views of the local populations. In theory, the findings of the Commission, which was sent out in November 1947, were to aid the governments concerned in arriving at an ultimate decision with regard to the colonies. Actually, in most cases the nineteen other interested governments were little affected by the findings of the Commission, their views being as predetermined by other factors as were those of the Big Four. It should be noted, however, that from all available evidence, the reports of the Four Power Commission are not what can be termed "wholly objective," inasmuch as there was a tendency on the part of several delegations on the Commission to pursue lines during the inquiries which were designed to support the views espoused by their respective governments.² It is therefore not

² The texts of the reports have not yet been released. Their contents, however, were made public by the Deputy Foreign Ministers and summaries appeared in the press. On Libya see *London Times*, *Manchester Guardian* and *New York Times*, all of July 28, 1948.

surprising, what with the Commission's reports serving as the "factual" basis, to find contradictory understandings of "the facts" in the form of so many diverse recommendations.

It is presumed that even in the irrational state of contemporary international diplomacy, "the facts" of a case merit serious consideration, particularly from the point of view of the Western democracies. The Treaty of Peace with Italy accepts this contention by providing for the Commission of Investigation and consultation with other interested governments. If an equitable decision is to be reached on the larger question of the future political status of Libya as a whole, the question of Libyan unity must first be clarified. Only through an examination of the history of the territory, of its geography and economy, and of the "separatist" and "nationalist" tendencies among the native population, can the "integrating" and "differentiating" factors be better discerned, and a disposition in closer conformity with "the facts" be achieved.


II

In examining the history of Libya one is struck with the fact that only on rare occasions has the area constituted a unified political entity. Its history is rather the history of two distinct territories, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, which have followed similar although not identical courses, and between which there have never been firm bonds of union. In general, Tripolitania has been more closely connected with the West, particularly Tunisia, while Cyrenaica has faced eastward toward Egypt and the Levant.

The historical individuality of the two territories can be traced back to the days of antiquity, when colonies representing two dissimilar cultures were established in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania by Greece and Phoenicia respectively. In the 6th century A.D., Cyrenaica and Tripolitania were merged for a short while into a single province under the rule of the Eastern Roman Emperor Justinian. This union did not prevail, however, and it was not until the Arab invasions of the 7th and 11th centuries that Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were again joined. However,

the Arab conquests did not lead to the emergence of a unified Libya, since Tripolitania and Cyrenaica then became integrated into the over-all history of the Arabs in North Africa.

In the 16th century, with the extension of Turkish domination to North Africa, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica nominally became provinces of the Ottoman Empire. While in Tripolitania the



Turkish governor ruled with almost autonomous powers, Cyrenaica remained in the state of complete anarchy and tribal confusion into which it had been thrown earlier by the invasion of the nomadic Arab tribes of Beni Hillal and Beni Suleim. In 1714, the governor of Tripoli, Ahmed Pasha Qaramanli, revolted against the Ottoman Government and succeeded in establishing a personal dynasty in control of Tripoli and parts of northern Cyrenaica which was recognized by the Sublime Porte. It was during the Qaramanli regime that Tripoli achieved notoriety as a center of piracy in the Mediterranean. Taking ad-

vantage of a civil war in 1835, Turkey abolished the Qaramanli dynasty and re-established its direct authority over Tripolitania. It established the territories as a single Turkish province (*vilayet*) divided into the five districts (*sanjaks*) of Tripoli, Jebel Gharian, Murzuk, Homs, and Benghazi. In 1869, Benghazi was separated from Tripoli and made into an independent *vilayet*, an arrangement which became permanent in 1879 after another short period of union. After Italy acquired sovereignty over Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in 1912, the two territories continued in existence as separate colonies, generally under a single governor-general. In 1934, a complete administrative union, forming the new colony of Libya, was effected. It should be noted that although the territory, since the defeat of Italy, has been partitioned into three separate military administrations — British in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, and French in the Fezzan — the Italian peace treaty makes mention only of the over-all unit, Libya.

The division of Libya into Cyrenaica and Tripolitania down through the ages is no mere quirk of history. It reflects, rather, the basic physiographic character of the territory. A great natural barrier — the Gulf of Sirte and the projection of Libyan desert along its 400-mile shore — divides Cyrenaica from Tripolitania, limiting communication between the two territories and to a very large extent shaping their economies.³ Trade between the two territories has played a minor role, and the movement of the nomadic tribes in both territories has been and remains north-south, not east-west. At best, the unity of Libya is a negative unity of the desert void between Tunisia and Egypt. The breaching of the great desert divide by the Italian-built highway, running the entire length of the Libyan coastline from the Egyptian to the Tunisian border, has not changed the disjointed character of the territories to the extent of radically altering the centuries-old separateness of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania.

It would seem from this cursory examination that there is little basis for an argument in favor of a united Libya. However,

³ See Jean Despois, *La Colonisation Italienne en Libye* (Paris, 1935), for a detailed examination of Libya's physiography and its effect on the territory's economy.

these factors do not categorically rule out a consideration of Libyan unity, for precedent and experience, while often being important guides to human behavior, are not necessarily fixed guideposts to every course of action. With regard to Tripolitania and Cyrenaica this may well prove to be the case, for while the history of the territories does not lean toward unity, at the same time it does not point up any basic incompatibilities or rivalries between them. Reference has already been made to the similar, although by no means identical, histories of the two territories. It may also be noted that although the economies of the two territories are independent of each other, there is a general resemblance between them. Both areas have been sparingly endowed by nature; and in both, with the exception of the northeastern Cyrenaican plateau, which enjoys an adequate rainfall, the development of the territories' main resource — land — involves the problem of overcoming serious water shortages. One can easily picture the great benefit both territories could derive from the concerted approach to their economic problems which a united Libya might achieve.

III

In appraising the relative merits of a united or divided Libya, perhaps the most important factor to be considered is the will of the people living in the territory. It is no simple task, however, to fulfill the promise of the Atlantic Charter to make "no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned." To a certain extent the Allies took cognizance of this pledge by dispatching the Four Power Commission of Investigation to Libya and the other Italian Colonies. That the Commission came back with contradictory findings is not due entirely to the pursuit of self-interest by its members. It is also attributable to the great difficulties encountered in determining the views of a predominantly backward and illiterate people. Just as the diplomatic machinations involved in the future of Libya are beyond their understanding, so is the basic question of Libyan unity outside the realm of comprehension of the vast majority of the 800-odd thousand politically unsophisticated, unorganized, and inarticulate Libyans. The question

of Libyan unity, however, has received considerable attention from the traditional tribal leaders, and from the newly developed urban middle class and intelligentsia, as is demonstrated by their "nationalist" and "separatist" talk. For want of other articulate opinions on the subject, and in view of the dominant position which this numerically small group of leaders holds in the community, the "nationalist" and "separatist" sentiment must be examined as perhaps the closest thing to an expression of the will of the people.

A note addressed to representatives of the Big Four Powers in Cairo on May 23, 1947, by the National Council for the Liberation of Libya maintains that "Libya with its three main provinces [Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and the Fezzan] forms an indivisible whole, a unit in fact incapable of division," and declares that "the Libyans demand the unity of their country from the Egyptian Frontier in the East to those of Tunisia and Algeria in the West."⁴

While it is true that this National Council in Cairo is made up of Cyrenaican and Tripolitanian *émigrés* and exiles, who, aided by other Pan-Arab nationalists, have almost single-handedly championed the cause of the Arabs of Libya during the past thirty years, there is no evidence to support their assertion of unanimity in Libya. Besides the barriers of nature and historical tradition, the movement for unity faces the complicating presence of a strong particularist sentiment in Cyrenaica.

There is a marked tendency among Pan-Arab nationalists to attribute to all Arab-speaking peoples a feeling of common national consciousness. In reality, the growth of Arab nationalism has been a hybrid development, in part manifesting a feeling of Arab unity extending over all Arab lands but in greater measure leading to the emergence of separate and distinct Arab nations. Despite the Arab League, the tendency toward fusing these Arab states into a single nation-state has been singularly weak.⁵

On a smaller scale, the unity of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania

⁴ The note has been published by Kornak Press, Cairo.

⁵ See H. A. R. Gibb, "The Future of Arab Unity," in Philip W. Ireland, ed., *The Near East: Problems and Prospects* (Chicago, 1942), p. 73.

represents a situation analogous to that involved in the problem of fusion among the Arab states. There is no denying the fact that the people of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania possess many of the attributes of a single nationality. They speak the same language, practice the same religion, share common ethnic origins, and face similar economic and social problems. Yet, between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania there exists a barrier to unity in the form of the separatist sentiment that centers in, and is aroused by, the Sanusi order, which dominates nearly the entire Cyrenaican population while playing only a minor role among the Tripolitanian.

Pan-Arab nationalism has not fired the Arab masses to the extent of overcoming the influence of local politicos, whose strength has been thrown in the direction of separatism. In Libya today, the Sanusi leader, Al-Sayid Idris, is such a political leader: he represents a vested interest in Cyrenaica of such magnitude as to be able to forestall Libyan unity. On the other hand, the situation has not hardened, as yet, to the point of precluding any chance of overcoming the separatist tendency of the Sanusi, and it is quite possible that unity might be achieved either through the establishment of Sanusi rule over all Libya, or conversely by the order's acceptance of a subservient role in a unified Libya.

Unity vs. separatism has been the chief concern of all political leaders in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica ever since the relaxation of military administration controls during the past three years permitted organized political activity. From the third component of Libya, the Fezzan, which is under French military administration, there has been no indication of any political activity among the native population. In Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, the nationalist groups, appearing largely among the Sanusi leaders in Cyrenaica and the small urban intelligentsia and middle class in Benghazi and Tripoli, are in general agreement on the following ultimate objectives: (1) independence; (2) unity of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and the Fezzan; and (3) membership in the Arab League. However, all attempts to close ranks for achieving these objectives through an immediate program of specific action have thus met with failure, largely

because of the Sanusi factor. According to the report of the Four Power Commission of Investigation, 90 percent of the Cyrenaican population favors the establishment of an independent hereditary Sanusi monarchy, with few favoring a united Libya other than one under a Sanusi Emirate.

In spite of what has already been said about the difficulty of ascertaining the views of the predominantly backward population of Libya, these findings can be accepted as valid. It is not strange to find such sentiments expressed by the politically naive Cyrenaican Bedouins, since the Sanusi order is a very conservative movement closely identified with the tribal system of the nomadic herdsmen.⁶ Notables of the Sanusi order and Bedouin tribal leaders make up the leading Arab political faction in Cyrenaica, the *Jebha*, or National Front, and together with the Omar Mukhtar Club constitute the Cyrenaican National Congress. The Omar Mukhtar Club, honoring the name of an anti-Italian Cyrenaican martyr, was formed by the members of the urban intelligentsia in opposition to the "reactionary and unconstructive attitude" of the National Front.⁷

While both factions favor an independent Sanusi Emirate for Libya, they differ in their emphasis. To the Omar Mukhtar Club, Libyan unity is of primary importance, with the establishment of a Sanusi regime a secondary matter; the *Jebha* places the Sanusi Emirate first and foremost on its program. There are also indications that the Grand Sanusi, if he cannot be recognized as ruler over all of Libya, would prefer separation of Tripolitania from Cyrenaica, with the latter under his dynasty. In fact the Cyrenaican National Congress is reported to have said as much to the Four Power Commission when the latter visited Cyrenaica in the spring of 1948. At the same time, it was reported that adherents of the Omar Mukhtar Club deviated from this position, maintaining support for united Libya.⁸

In Tripolitania all the leading political groups favor a united Libya, but they do not all agree to the establishment of a Sanusi

⁶ See E. E. Evans-Pritchard, "The Sanusi of Cyrenaica," *Africa* (London) XV (1942) pp. 61-79.

⁷ British Military Administration, *Annual Report by the Chief Administrator of Cyrenaica*, (1947).

⁸ *Sunday Gibli* (Tripoli), May 16, 1948.

Emirate over Tripolitania. Only one of the three leading Tripolitanian parties, the United National Front, favors Libyan unity under the Sanusi, and even it has somewhat curbed itself on this score as a result of the failure of its attempts to come to an agreement with the Cyrenaican National Congress. In January 1947, the Tripolitanian United National Front sent a delegation to Cyrenaica to discuss proposals for the creation of a united Libya under the Emirate of the Sanusi. The negotiations fell through, primarily because the Tripolitanians were unwilling to accept Sanusi rule unconditionally, fearing that this would give a disproportionate control of the government to the hierarchy of the Sanusi family.⁹

The United National Front was originally formed for the express purpose of uniting all Tripolitanian nationalist factions behind a common program, but the two other leading political parties, the Nationalist Party (*Al-Hizb Al-Watani*) and the Free National Bloc (*Kutla Al-Ahrar*), both of which favor a united Libya but not under the Sanusi, failed to accord it their support. That the Sanusi order does not enjoy strong support in Tripolitania is not surprising, since less than 25 percent of the Moslem population, largely among the nomad tribes, adhere to it.

Another attempt, made more recently, to effect an agreement between Cyrenaican and Tripolitanian nationalists met with no more success than did the earlier effort. Tripolitanian nationalist groups are reported to have "patched up their differences by agreeing to a federal union of the two territories under a constitutional monarchy with the Emir on the throne." The proposal was rejected by the Cyrenaican Nationalist Congress which stood fast in support of a Sanusi "absolute monarchy."¹⁰ The Arab League has also sought to bring about a united front among nationalist groups in Libya. Under the League's sponsorship, members of the *émigré* National Council for the Liberation of Libya, headed by a Tripolitanian-born adviser of King Ibn Saud, Beshir Bey Sadawi, visited Cyrenaica and Tripolitania in the

⁹ British Military Administration, Tripolitania, *Report of the Chief Administrator*, 1947, p. 14.

¹⁰ Fabian Colonial Bureau, *The Fate of Italy's Colonies* (London, July 1948), p. 59.

spring of 1948 for this purpose. In Tripolitania, the program suggested by this group, calling for the immediate independence of all of Libya and the postponement of questions concerning the form of government until after independence had been attained, received the support of the nationalist parties. However, in Cyrenaica it was denounced by the Sanusi press for not proposing Al-Sayid Idris as the ruling Emir for the whole country.¹¹ As matters stand now, both in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania there are ardent protestations for unity, but because it has not been possible for all factions to agree on the form the unified state is to take, some nationalists have indicated a preference for a divided Libya in the event unity is attainable only on terms unfavorable to themselves.

IV

It is quite evident that determining a balance between "integrating" and "differentiating" factors is not a simple task of examining the history, economy, and geography of Libya, of surveying the views of its people, and of then arriving at a categorical conclusion. On the whole, history, geography, and economic conditions can be considered "differentiating" factors, with certain important reservations. On the other hand, the views of the people, as far as they are validly obtainable, are strongly on the side of the "integrating" factors, except for the separatist implications of the Sanusi order. In view of this inconclusiveness, is it then futile to propose a disposition of the problem on the basis of the so-called "facts"? It may well be argued that the Big Four and the other interested governments discharged their obligations with regard to the native population by sponsoring the Commission of Investigation, and that in view of the absence of any conclusive "facts" on which to base proposals, they are justified in advancing their subjective suggestions. Such, however, is not the case, because an examination of "the facts," while not revealing any overwhelmingly "integrating" or "differentiating" factors, does reveal a certain state of affairs that merits consideration in the disposition of the question.

Before it is possible to treat the question of Libyan unity in

¹¹ *Sunday Gibli* (Tripoli), March 7, May 2, 1948.

an objective manner, two prerequisites must be met. First, the question must be removed from the chessboard of international diplomacy so that it does not become, as Secretary of State Byrnes feared the whole Italian Colony question would become, "a pawn in the settlement of other issues."¹² The problem must be approached from the point of view of not giving any one power or group of powers a material or strategic advantage over other powers in the territory. Secondly, an opportunity must be given to the people of Libya to develop politically beyond their present unsophisticated state.

Both of these conditions might be met by a single solution — the establishment of an international trusteeship over the territory, to be administered directly by the United Nations. This kind of trusteeship, originally proposed by the United States when the Council of Foreign Ministers first began considering the Italian Colony question in September 1945, and again raised in September 1948 by the Soviet Union, differs from most previous types in that the administering authority does not represent a single power, but is appointed by and responsible to the Trusteeship Council.¹³ The unfortunate experiences in the international administration of Berlin and Trieste might be avoided, since the proposed international administration would not be subject to a veto, and would be responsible to an international agency on which powers in addition to the Big Four are members.

An international trusteeship for Libya would have the further advantage of enabling the people of the territory to develop politically relatively free of outside forces and influences. One of the characteristics of the present state of nationalism in Libya is its inability to shake itself loose from outside control and inspiration. Besides the influence of the Libyan exiles and *émigrés*, nationalism in Libya has doubtless felt the presence of the British Military Administration, under whose scrutiny all political activity and organizations come. The most striking example of British influence is presented by the close identifica-

¹² Department of State Publication 2572, Conference Series 87, p. 8.

¹³ For the full text of United States plan for international trusteeship see Department of State Publication 2669, European Series 17, Document 84.

tion of Sanusi aspirations with British strategic policy in Libya. Administration of a Libyan trusteeship by a single power, notwithstanding the provisions of the United Nations Charter and trusteeship agreement, would leave the way open to a manipulation of the political development of the native population, while an international administration is more likely to fulfill the objectives of trusteeship to "further international peace and security" and "to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self government and independence" in accordance with "the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned."¹⁴ An international administration would not *ipso facto* resolve the basic question of whether Libya should be united or partitioned. The advantage of this course of action is that it would appear to lend itself, more than any other solution or a continuance of the present military administration, to an eventual resolution of the problem on the basis of "the facts."

¹⁴ Charter of the United Nations. Article 76.

POLITICAL PARTIES IN IRAN

1941-1948

L. P. Elwell-Sutton

THE ALLIED occupation of Iran in 1941 brought with it a return of constitutional government to replace the dictatorial rule of Shah Reza Pahlavi. Yet this same occupation was an obstacle to the development of Iranian constitutional institutions. Until the war receded in Russia, the Allied authorities were solely concerned with the security of their supply lines. They took little or no interest in native political developments, except to prevent them from becoming dangerously vigorous. Indeed, by their mere presence in Iran as much as by their censorship organization, they put a damper on the free and wholesome exchange of ideas that normally should have accompanied this return to constitutionalism.

But the flood of Iranian opinion, suddenly released after twenty years of suppression, was not to be denied an outlet. Too often it found expression, however, in high-sounding phrases and irresponsible abuse. Fine sentences about democracy and social revolution came strangely from the mouths of notorious profiteers, unaccompanied as they were by any practical proposals or background of experience. The constantly shifting governments of the day added to the confusion by indiscriminate suppression of the opposition press. The manner by which Iran emerged from this period outwardly unscathed is testimony to the political acumen of its leaders; it also illuminates the character of Iranian politics.

▼ L. P. ELWELL-SUTTON has been a student of Middle Eastern affairs since 1931. First a member of the Labor Department of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's administration in Khuzestan, southern Iran, he was again in Tehran from 1943 to 1947, serving as Press Attaché at the British Embassy from 1945 on.

In 1941 there were no political parties, or any possibility of continuity with those of the previous period of constitutional government from 1906 to 1921. Many of the old politicians still survived, it is true; but the conditions they knew had passed away, in Iran as well as in the world outside. Nevertheless, it was to these old men that the Allies turned, rather than to the young and enthusiastic — but untried — products of Reza Shah's educational system. This traditionalism, once established, set the tone of Iranian politics even after the Allies had gone. The 300-odd vacancies in some 24 cabinets between August 1941 and November 1948 were filled with few exceptions from a clique of 70 or 80 politicians, all over fifty years of age, and many over sixty.

The situation in the Majlis (Parliament) was nearly as unorganized. The elections for the 13th Majlis were already under way when Reza Shah abdicated. When it met in November 1941, it was found to contain virtually the same men as its predecessor, appointed by the late Shah at the height of his power. The only new departure was the formation of "fractions" which, it was carefully explained, were not parties but simply groups of deputies with similar ideas who proposed to discuss political questions together. These "fractions" continued to play an important part in the maneuvers of the Majlis, but they bore little relation to developments in the country as a whole, where political parties, unrepresented in the Majlis, were being organized in a variety of ways.

EMERGENCE OF THE TUDEH PARTY

By far the most important of these emerging parties was the Tudeh (Masses).¹ Although a labor movement had existed in Iran as early as 1916, the real founder of the party was one Dr. Arani, who absorbed his political views with his medical studies in Berlin immediately after World War I. On his return to Iran in the early 1930's, he gathered around him a group of young students and professional men whose common ground was a hatred of dictatorship and a sympathy with Marxist ideas.

¹ For a detailed account of the origins and development of the Tudeh Party, see George Lenczowski, "The Communist Movement in Iran," *Middle East Journal*, I (1947), pp. 29-45.

There is little evidence to show that they had active Russian support at this period. In 1933 the group began publication of *Donya* (*The World*), an intellectual monthly magazine. Its influence was small, but it seems to have been feared by the authorities, for in the early part of 1937 Dr. Arani and 52 of his followers were arrested and tried under an Act of 1931 prohibiting communist activities. All of the "53" were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, and Dr. Arani himself died in prison — he is generally held to have been murdered. It was the remaining members of this group that formed the nucleus of the Tudeh Party on their release in September 1941.

The group's first public activity was a demonstration at the grave of Dr. Arani on February 3, 1942, when they claimed as their leader Sulayman Mohsen Iskandari, a prince of the Qajar family with a long-standing tradition of liberal politics dating from the constitutional movement of 1906. He personally had had no contact with Dr. Arani's group, though his nephew, Iraj Iskandari, was one of those imprisoned. His name lent the party an air of respectability, which was further enhanced by the absence of any reference to communism in its program and propaganda.²

This reticence was indeed forced upon the party members by the still valid ban on communist activities, and by the prevalent distrust of Russia. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that there was then, and still is, a considerable group within the party's ranks whose left-wing views are not tainted with any subservience to Soviet policy, though they have rarely been able to exert much influence in its councils.³

The Tudeh Party, in addition to forming its own subsidiary organizations for workers, peasants, women, students, and so on, collaborated on communist United Front lines with other political groups, always with the effect of bringing them ultimately

² See Ahmad Qasemi, *Hizb-i-Tudeh-yi-Iran chi miguyad va chi mikhahad?* (*What does the Tudeh Party say and what does it want?*) (Tehran, 1943), where the full Party Program is given.

³ There was less secrecy about the party's organization than Dr. Lenczowski suggests (*op. cit.* p. 31). The members of the 11-man Central Committee and the 9-man Control Commission were named at the first Party Congress in August 1944, and held their positions at least until the end of 1946, when the party was reorganized after its defeat. A special number of *Rahbar* dated October 2, 1946, gives the names and photographs of seven party committees.

under Tudeh control. One notable example was the Anti-Fascist Society, founded by Mostafa Fateh, a high official of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Fateh left the society when the extremist element began to get the upper hand, but its newspaper *Mardom* (*People*) subsequently became a Tudeh Party organ. Again, in August 1942 the official Tudeh organ, *Siyasat* (*Politics*), joined the newly formed Press Union, and continued to support it when it became merged with the leftist press association known as "Freedom Front" in July 1943. It was not until the summer of 1944 that this latter group came wholly under Tudeh Party control.

The party was naturally strongest in the northern zone occupied by the Russians, but this need not be attributed wholly to Soviet influence. Industrialization had gone further in Gilan and Mazanderan than in most other areas, owing to the policy of Reza Shah; the peasant population, too, was less scattered and therefore more easily organized. But important branches were also formed in the industrial center of Isfahan, and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's area in the southwest, as well as in provincial towns like Meshed, Kermanshah, and Hamadan.

In Azerbaijan, the Tudeh Party faced a somewhat different case. The inhabitants of this populous and fertile province, speaking a different language from their compatriots, had been systematically neglected by the central government; and they were always ready to listen to any group that urged them to defy its authority — particularly with the prosperous example of Soviet Azerbaijan just across the frontier. Yet even here the Tudeh Party did not make marked progress; the Soviet authorities seemed content to facilitate, without encouraging, its activities, and party propaganda took as elsewhere a moderate line.⁴ There is some reason to think that the Russians paid more attention at first, at any rate, to actively separatist movements, such as the Kaveh Group formed by Ja'far Pishevari, a Soviet-trained labor agitator. It is certainly true that these extremist elements were contemptuous of the official Tudeh Party, which the USSR presumably regarded as of little value so long as the maintenance of security in Iran was the primary consideration.

⁴ See the manifesto of the Azerbaijan Committee, published in *Rahbar*, March 4, 1943.

OTHER PARTY GROUPINGS

Many other parties were announced during 1941 and 1942, but none of these had an organization comparable with that of the Tudeh whatever they may have claimed on paper. For the most part they were formed from above — a few people grouping themselves around some prominent personality, or publishing a newspaper with funds provided by an anonymous capitalist. Their programs were virtually interchangeable, and were confined to a series of pious platitudes, of which the "integrity and independence of Iran" was usually the first. Their names gave even less indication of their policy; some were new, some were sentimental revivals from the constitutional period. Parties of this type seldom spread their influence beyond their own circle of intellectuals and professional men; and their fortunes, being dependent on the whims of individuals, fluctuated widely.

One of the most promising of these was the Hamrahan (Comrades), formed in October 1942 by Mostafa Fateh, after his break with the Anti-Fascist Society. It professed a socialist policy. Indeed, it was more orthodox than the Tudeh Party in advocating the nationalization of the means of production, as well as social insurance, free medical facilities and education, and family allowances.⁵ In April 1943 it began the publication of a newspaper *Imruz va Farda* (*Today and Tomorrow*). A second group was the Adalat (Justice) Party, formed in December 1941 by the Majlis deputy Ali Dashti, a prominent journalist of the post-World War I period. For a time it had the support of the influential newspaper *Mehr-i-Iran* (*Sun of Iran*), representing the mercantile and bazaar interests; later it published its own organ, *Bahram* (January, 1944), followed by *Neda-ye-Adalat* (*Cry of Justice*). Its program was worded vaguely enough to attract the support of quite a number of deputies and other notables; one of its most active members was the lawyer Ibrahim Khajeh Nuri, Director of Press and Propaganda in the autumn of 1943, and again in 1948.

The Mihan Parastan (Patriots) had a very similar program, though leaning more to the left; its members seem mostly to

⁵ *Maramnameh-ye-Hizb-i-Hamrahan* (Tehran), Oct. 1942. See also *Hokumatha-ye Iran* (Tehran), Jan. 1943; *Ta'min-i-Kharbar* (Tehran), Feb. 1943.

have been officials and technical men.⁶ It ran a newspaper of the same name. Closely connected with it was the Paykar (Battle) Party, whose membership had a somewhat more intellectual cast; among those interested in it at one time or another were M. Husayn Ala (subsequently Iranian Ambassador to the United States) and the lawyer Dr. Isa Sadiq. Khosro Iqbal, another lawyer, edited its paper, *Bahar (Spring)*, which later became *Nabard (Struggle)*. In June 1943, the party was joined by the independent left-wing daily *Iran-i-Ma (Our Iran)* which continued to be prominent in the press world long after the Paykar Party had ceased to exist.⁷ Brief mention might be made of the Mardan-i-Kar (Men of Work) Party, a group of educated men led by Amir Ibrahim; the Millat (Nation) Party, a reformist party founded by Mohammad Sadaq Tabataba'i in January 1942;⁸ the Milli (National) Party, founded by Mohammad Tadayyon, one-time Minister of Education, in October 1941;⁹ and the Jangal (Forest) Party in Resht, a watered-down edition of the revolutionary movement of twenty-five years before.¹⁰

But parties as such had little influence on national affairs, and were rather channels for the ambitions, intrigues, and pressures of special interests: the merchants, the landowners, the tribal chiefs, the religious circles. Some were used by foreign representatives; it was also fashionable for a group to claim the support of such and such an embassy, even when this had not been offered. The Germans succeeded in forming, through their agent Franz Mayr, a group known as the Milliyun-i-Iran (Iranian Nationalists), whose leaders included Abol-Qasim Kashani and Habibollah Nobakht.¹¹ Most of these men were rounded up in August 1943, but others were active throughout the war, publishing a paper called *Dideban (Lookout)*.

The chief topic of domestic interest during 1942 and 1943 was the economic situation, highlighted by the bread riots in Tehran in December 1942. This event has been variously interpreted,

⁶ *Salnameh-yi Mihan Parastan* (Tehran, 1944).

⁷ *Iran-i-Ma* (Anniversary Number), July 24, 1947.

⁸ *Nizamnameh-yi-Hizb-i-Millat* (Tehran, 1942).

⁹ *Maramnameh-yi-Hizb-i-Milli-yi-Iran* (Tehran, 1941).

¹⁰ See *Nejat-i-Iran*, Jan. 13, 1943.

¹¹ *Tehran Daily News*, Mar. 16, 1945.

but it seems clear that the Prime Minister, Ahmad Qavam al-Saltaneh, favored by the Russians and also by the Tudeh Party, finally emerged as victor over his opponents, who included Ali Dashti and probably military and court circles. In the meantime he had called in the American Dr. A. C. Millspaugh as Director General of Finance; Dr. Millspaugh arrived in February 1943. By this time, also, the decks were beginning to be cleared for the electoral struggle of the following winter, when polling was to take place for the deputies to the 14th Majlis.

COUNTERMOVEMENT OF SEYYID ZIA

The possibilities of the situation were considerably enlivened by the return to Iran of Seyyid Zia-al-din Tabataba'i. This journalist and politician, born in Shiraz in 1889, had been associated with Reza Khan in the coup d'état of February 1921. After a hundred days as Prime Minister, he had spent the intervening twenty-two years an exile abroad. His re-entry into the Iranian scene took the form of a long interview, published in a Tehran paper in January 1943,¹² with Mozaffar Firuz, son of the late Nosrat-al-Dauleh, and a member of the Qajar family, rulers of Iran in the pre-Shah Reza days. This interview, mainly a justification of his past actions, was the signal for a campaign for his return by a variety of newspapers and political groups;¹³ in the following September the Seyyid finally acceded to "popular demand," and arrived in Tehran.

Seyyid Zia's reception was mixed. Some groups welcomed him with almost Messianic fervor; others, including the Tudeh Party, were equally violent in attacking him as a fascist and a reactionary. He seems to have created an unfortunate impression by insisting on wearing the old-fashioned fur cap instead of the European hat now universally accepted in Iran; the progressives regarded it as conclusive evidence of the conservative tendencies already noticeable in his speeches and writings.¹⁴ On the whole, the popular attitude toward Seyyid Zia was one of cautious optimism.

¹² *Iqdam*, Jan. 28, 1943.

¹³ Ittehadiyeh-yi-Keshavarzan va Taraqqikhahan (Leader, Hakim Ilahi); Vatan-khahan; Ra'd (leader Mozaffar Firuz); and the newspapers *Iqdam* and *Kushesh*.

¹⁴ E.g. *Sha'a'er-i-Milli* (*Natural Trails*), Tehran, Oct. 1943.

On October 1 appeared the first number of *Ra'd-i-Imruz* (*The Thunder of Today*), edited by Mozaffar Firuz — a revival of Seyyid Zia's old paper, *Ra'd* (*Thunder*). A few weeks later he was elected as Majlis deputy for Yazd, his home town. He had the support of several prominent deputies, including Abbas Mas'udi, proprietor of the leading evening paper, *Ittela'at* (*Information*). In the two-day debate in the Majlis on his credentials, when his chief opponent was the redoubtable Dr. Mosaddeq, he was seated by 57 votes to 29.¹⁵

The rest of the year Seyyid Zia spent in the laborious process of building up a party organization to set against that of the Tudeh. In December 1943 he formed a short-lived "National Union of the Press," and a number of papers continued their association with him.¹⁶ He next organized the Vatan (Fatherland) Party, which was superseded in the summer of 1944 by the Halqeh (Circle) Party, so-called from the "circle" or "cell" type of organization adopted. None of these groups had any very clear platform. As regards his relations with the Allies, the opposition of the Russians was obvious from the first; the fact that much of his exile had been spent in Palestine gave rise to the belief that he had British support, a belief to a large extent justified. British official policy, indeed, did not commit itself to more than a benevolent interest; and the frequent clumsy incursions of British officialdom into the Iranian scene at this time seldom achieved the results sometimes claimed for them. They were never as decisive as Russian maneuvers became a little later.

COMPOSITION OF THE FOURTEENTH MAJLIS

There was little party organization in the 14th Majlis, which began to function in 1944. About 40 percent of the old deputies survived, but among the new ones were several leading personalities, such as Dr. Mosaddeq, who had succeeded without the aid of any party backing. The Tudeh Party did the best, particularly in the northern provinces; but even in the Russian-occupied zone

¹⁵ *Yek Safheh az Tarikh-i-Mashruyyat-i-Iran* (*A Page from the History of the Constitutional Movement of Iran*), Tehran, 1944.

¹⁶ E.g. *Karvan*, *Kanun*, *Hur*, *Vazifeh*, *Keshvar*.

they secured only eight out of over fifty seats.¹⁷ The Tudeh also gave its support to Ja'far Pishevari, though not a party member. He was duly elected for Tabriz, but was subsequently rejected on his credentials. In Isfahan Taqi Fedakar, a socialist labor leader, was successful; but he probably would not have been elected if the British authorities had decided to oppose him. The Tudeh was the only group to carry its organization into the Majlis; the other deputies formed themselves into "fractions" as they had done previously. Many of the smaller groups disappeared, having achieved, or failed in, their objective of electing their leading figure. The Hamrahan Party split, the rebel group carrying with it the party newspaper to form a rival Iran Socialist Party. Paykar and Mihan Parastan amalgamated with some other small societies to constitute the Mihan (Nation) Party. Two new parties appeared which were destined to last for a considerable time. The Iran Party was a group of left-wing idealists, led by Engineer Farivar, formerly a member of the committee of the Hamrahan. In November 1944 it started the newspaper *Shafaq (Dawn)*. Secondly, the Mardom Party seems to have been a successor to the Millat, and was also led by Mohammad Sadeq Tabatabai. Its tritely worded program included mention of the word "socialism," but nothing else that could be associated with that doctrine. Its members were mainly merchants, land-owners, and officials. Another sincere but ineffectual group was the Kar (Work) Party, formed by the economist Mosharraf Nafisi, whose central principle was that "work should be the foundation of the future social and economic organization of the country."

There was also political activity among the women of Iran. The Kanun-i-Banuwan (Women's Club), formed in 1935 as a stage in the emancipation encouraged by Reza Shah, had always been non-political, and was now regarded as inadequate. In July 1943, the Tudeh Party set up its own Women's Branch (Tashkilat-i-Zanan-i-Iran), with proposals for women's rights, education, working conditions, and welfare on the lines of the the general party policy. In October some of the more active

¹⁷ Sulayman Iskandari was to have been a candidate, but he died during the summer of 1943.

members of the older Women's Clubs reacted by forming a Women's Party (Hizb-i-Zanan), with similar aims but less extremist membership.¹⁸ Neither of these groups went so far as to demand the vote; without this political weapon, their activities remained ineffectual except from the point of view of education.

IMPACT OF THE BIG POWER CONFLICT

As the war drew toward its close, the three Great Powers concerned with Iran began to turn their attention to the situation that would arise when the occupation troops were finally withdrawn. The split between the East and West was beginning to make itself felt; indeed it was in Iran that it first became obvious. From a policy of restraint, the Allies now tended toward a policy of manipulation hardly more conducive to the political stability of Iran. The Russians began to look more closely at the Tudeh Party as a possible instrument of policy, and soon it became identified both in the public mind and in fact with Soviet policy in Iran. Its long-term plans of reform and reconstruction were overshadowed by the complexities of day-to-day political maneuvers. The more sincere advocates of reform, if they did not actually leave the party, lost what influence they had over its line of action. At the first Party Congress in August 1944, there was much talk of strengthening the organization, of collaboration with "freedom-loving" elements, and of opposition to imperialism, the American advisers, reactionaries, and so on, but little of practical social reform. This sharpening of attitude naturally produced a reaction from the opposite side, and for the first time the alignment of "left" and "right" was introduced into Iranian politics.

The conflict inherent in Russia's espousal of the Tudeh Party flared up with the oil crisis of the autumn of 1944, when the Russians demanded the grant of an oil concession in the northern provinces. The Majlis, refusing to be intimidated, postponed the discussion of all concessions until after the end of the war and the withdrawal of foreign troops. But this was hardly more than one incident in the contest. What was more significant was that both "left" and "right" in Iranian political groupings

¹⁸ Manuchehr Khodayar Mohabbi, *Sharik-i-Mard* (Tehran, 1947).

associated themselves and each other with the Russians, and with the British and Americans respectively. Seyyid Zia constituted himself, and was partially accepted as, a leader of the anti-Russian front, and attacked Soviet policy in a series of strongly-worded manifestos.¹⁹ The Independence Front of the Press, formed in rather feeble opposition to the Tudeh-controlled Freedom Front, preferred not to associate itself directly with him, though it followed his lead.

Another question that was also discussed on "left-right" lines was the American Financial Mission. Dr. Millspaugh has himself given a very full account of the intrigues and maneuvers that hampered his work.²⁰ It is sufficient here to remark that this problem, and particularly the dispute with Ibtehaj, the Governor of the National Bank, was used as a debating point by both sides, the Americans now finding support from nationalist quarters which had previously shown themselves most hostile.

The struggle grew more embittered as 1945 wore on. The end of the war in Europe brought with it a demand for the evacuation of all foreign troops; but concurrently with this independent attitude was a tendency to appeal more and more openly to one of the two international blocs. The left wing became specific in its attacks on "imperialism" and "international reaction" and no longer hesitated to name Britain and less frequently the United States in this connection. Catch phrases such as "policy of balance," "one-sided policy," "reactionary," "fascist," and from the right "thief," "cut-throat," and "foreign mercenary" were liberally sprinkled over the pages of the press.

On the right, Seyyid Zia began to build up his party organization. He changed its name to Iradeh-yi-Milli (National Will), and published an elaborate and detailed program in 22 articles; a point was made of "establishing the best possible relations with the United States while preserving strict neutrality." As party headquarters he secured, apparently by purchase, the large building of the Iran Club in the center of Tehran, and set about developing the *halqeh* system already described. This had the attractive aspect of a secret society: members were grouped in

¹⁹ *Ilamiyah-yi-Seyyid Zia al-Din Tabatabai* (Tehran, Dec. 1944); *Pasukh-i-Intesharat-i-Pravda* (Tehran, Feb. 1945).

²⁰ Arthur C. Millspaugh, *Americans in Persia* (Washington, 1946).

"circles" of nine, responsible only to their "circle-leader," who in turn was one of a group of nine responsible to a "group-leader." Each member was addressed by his rank and number only.²¹

The coming to power of the Labor Government in Britain seems to have alarmed both sides. The right feared an Anglo-Soviet *rapprochement*, while the Russians were concerned to forestall a possible pro-British movement from the left. Every effort was therefore made by the parties of the left to associate the name of Britain with the conservative and "reactionary" elements in the country. These elements themselves were by no means averse to this association, doing all they could to sow doubts of the sincerity of Britain's conversion to socialism in foreign affairs. The governments of the day, still drawn from the old political clique, assisted the process by a policy of repression of left-wing opinion. It was perhaps unfortunate that Britain at this stage did not make a clearer declaration of an intention to encourage genuine democracy throughout the world, and to follow it up by some practical demonstration. As it was, its case in Iran went by default.

The breach became open in November 1945. On September 3, Ja'far Pishevari announced the formation of the Azerbaijan Democrat Party. The local branch of the Tudeh Party was dissolved, and its members incorporated in the new organization. The party program was surprisingly moderate: Azerbaijan was to remain within the Iranian state; the Provincial Councils promised by the 1907 constitution were to be formed in fact; Turki was to be taught in the elementary schools; Azerbaijan representation in the Majlis was to be increased; and half of the Azerbaijan taxes were to be spent within the province. There was little indication in all this of the rebellion of three months later, which was to separate Azerbaijan completely from the rest of the country for twelve months; nor did the program of the new "National Government" in Azerbaijan, promulgated on December 12, add very much that was fresh. Azerbaijan autonomy did, in fact, go far beyond what was planned on paper, owing to the autonomists' inability to co-operate with the Central Government; but it seems clear in the light of subsequent events

²¹ *Hizb-i-Irade-i-Milli-Goruh-i-Heedah* (Tehran), Sept. 1945.

that their intention was to encourage the formation of a left-wing government in Tehran, rather than to break away altogether. This suited the Russians' book also; the secession of Azerbaijan might have meant more Soviet territory, but would have played away a trump card. Hence, throughout the period that followed, Soviet policy was to press the Tehran Government to make itself and its methods more acceptable to the rebels.

Events during the next three months moved on to the international plan. Inside Iran, the right-wing groups were clamoring for action by the United Nations or some other international body, while those on the left — abandoning their ideology but following the Soviet line — were doing all they could to discourage any such move. Smaller groups, such as the Adalat on the right side and the Iran on the left, huddled around the two dominant parties, the Iradeh-i-Milli and the Tudeh. Upon the resignation of Prime Minister Hakimi and the return of Ahmad Qavam in January 1946, the suppression of the press ceased, and for two months both sides enjoyed unprecedented freedom — freedom which they used lavishly to exacerbate the dispute. On the northern side of the Russian "curtain," in Gilan and Mazanderan, there were evidences of preparations for a rising similar to that in Azerbaijan. Disturbances had already taken place in the factory towns in the autumn, and by February Tudeh Party guards had replaced the ordinary police in many districts. A coalition was formed of the Tudeh Party and its affiliated workers', peasants', and drivers' unions with the Mihan and Jangal groups; another offshoot of the Tudeh Party, which might have been designed to play the role of the Azerbaijan Democrats in these provinces, was the Jam'iyat-i-Tabarestan (Society of Tabarestan) led by Ihsan Tabari.

On March 29, 1946, Prime Minister Qavam, back from his conversations in Moscow, struck against his political opponents. Seyyid Zia and several of his colleagues were arrested, and others driven into hiding. His newspapers, and those sympathizing with him, were suppressed and his Party Club occupied by the police. Overnight, the opposition to a settlement with Russia had disappeared, and many observers believed that Iran was lost to the Soviet bloc.

COUNTER TACTICS OF PRIME MINISTER QAVAM

Seen from this distance of time, Qavam's actions appear to have followed a logical plan. His first task was to conciliate the Russians and ensure the evacuation of their troops. This he did by eliminating the anti-Russian party and the hostile Majlis, by promising a settlement with Azerbaijan, and by giving the Russians a general undertaking about oil. For a time he toyed with the idea of forming his own party — the Azadi (Freedom). The main plank in its platform was the formation of a Constituent Assembly, with the object, it was hinted, of modifying the status of the Monarchy. Probably at the back of this scheme was Mozaffar Firuz, who had deserted Seyyid Zia the previous summer for this more promising patron, and whose hatred for the Pahlavi dynasty was notorious. However, when the Tudeh Party showed signs of taking up the same idea, Qavam quickly dropped it.

Qavam's policy now was to lead on both the Tudeh and the Azerbaijan Democrats, on the theory that pride goes before a fall. For several months they had the field to themselves; monster demonstrations were held in Tehran on May 1, on July 19 (against Francol), and again on October 2, which was claimed as the fifth anniversary of the party's foundation. A vicious campaign was started against Britain, and in particular the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which culminated in a serious strike in the Company's area in July. On August 1 three Tudeh leaders were included in the reconstructed Cabinet. It should not be overlooked that in the midst of all this unrest a certain amount of useful labor legislation was passed.

THE IRAN DEMOCRAT PARTY

But in the meantime a fresh development was taking place. On June 29, 1946, Qavam announced over the radio the formation of the Iran Democrat Party, led by himself. This party — whose rate of expansion was quite remarkable — declared itself anxious to co-operate with the other "freedom-loving" parties, and was somewhat cautiously welcomed by the Tudeh leaders. In August a coalition was formed, which included these two

parties, the Azerbaijan Democrats, the Iran Party, the Iran-i-Ma group, and a new Socialist Party.

Having thus established his own party, Qavam proceeded to destroy its rivals. As early as August 5 rioting took place in Tehran between two groups of the coalition's supporters, and duels in the press grew increasingly bitter thereafter. The Tudeh Party complained angrily that the government propaganda machine was acting solely in the interests of the Iran Democrat Party. In September a major tribal rebellion started in the south, freely attributed by the government press to the bad example of Azerbaijan. Although urged by his Tudeh colleagues to use force, Qavam preferred conciliation — having perhaps reason to know that this would succeed. On October 16 the Tudeh ministers resigned in protest, and a week later the Iran Democrat Party held a triumphant parade, rivalling the Tudeh demonstration of three weeks before.

The new party's program was suitably vague and unimpeachably progressive.²² Its organization was extensive; workers, women, and students had their own sections, and provincial branches were announced daily.²³ Putting Seyyid Zia's previous efforts in the shade, it took possession of the huge Municipal Café in Tehran; in its parade of October 24 appeared uniformed members of the Gard-i-Nejat-i-Milli (National Liberation Guard), mounted and on foot.

In spite of all this, observers in Iran as well as abroad were unprepared for the sudden collapse in December 1946 of not only the Azerbaijan movement, but also the official Tudeh Party. During November the left wing had been campaigning vigorously against the Iran Democrats, significantly switching the attack from Great Britain to the United States. On December 7, as Government troops were moving on Tabriz, the Tudeh papers were suppressed. The remainder of the press took this as a hint to release its pent-up feelings. The six-party coalition broke up, and the Tudeh Party, appalled by its overwhelming defeat, announced its withdrawal from the forthcoming elec-

²² See *Journal de Teheran*, July 1, 1946; *Demokrat-i-Iran*, Oct. 24, 1946.

²³ Some took the form of this Radio Tehran announcement of Nov. 29, 1946: "Mr. Quli Rashidi and 5,000 men of the Hasan Khan tribe have joined the Iran Democrat Party in Kermanshah!"

tions,²⁴ and the formation of an executive committee to purge the extremists.²⁵ Iraj Iskandari was one of those excluded from this committee.

Qavam and the Iran Democrats reaped as much glory as they could from the successful end to the Azerbaijan affair, though public opinion was inclined rather to rally with patriotic fervor around the figure of the Shah. Nevertheless, popular approval was sufficient to carry Qavam's party successfully through the elections — aided by a modicum of juggling with the ballot boxes.

The opposition, led by Dr. Mosaddeq, was at first an odd medley of right- and left-wing elements associated with neither the Tudeh Party nor Seyyid Zia. Some of these had been spasmodically active throughout 1946, others were new. Among them were the Vahdat-i-Iran (Unity of Iran) Party, a break-away from the Iran, and the revived Mardom Party. Labelled as the "National Front," they cut little ice with the public in spite of Dr. Mosaddeq's dramatic gesture of taking sanctuary in the Royal Court. However, the movement continued with unabated vigor after the elections, and was joined by the Iradeh-yi-Milli papers, as they slowly began to reappear; Seyyid Zia himself was released in March. The opposition was encouraged by rumors of dissensions within the Iran Democrat ranks; and in spite of repressive measures by the government, there was already speculation about the solidarity of Qavam's party by the time the Majlis was opened in July 1947.

These doubts were fully confirmed by the reaction of the Iran Democrat "fraction" to the fresh oil "crisis" of the autumn. This time Russia, having abandoned the Tudeh Party as an instrument of policy, was using the direct method. Qavam was forced to try to induce the Majlis to ratify his pledge of eighteen months before. When the vote was taken on October 22, it was revealed that his entire party had deserted him. A knowledge of Qavam's past record and political methods would lead one to suppose that this was largely a put-up job. Yet such a theory does not quite account for the fact that six weeks later he was forced to resign on a vote of confidence.

²⁴ Tudeh Party Manifesto, Dec. 24, 1946.

²⁵ *Shohsevar*, Jan. 1, 1947.

DISINTEGRATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

With the departure of Qavam, Iranian party politics began to assume once more their normal aspect. The Iran Democrats dwindled into an ineffectual group. The Tudeh Party split, Khalil Maliki leading away a moderate Socialist Tudeh League offshoot. The official party mustered 118 delegates for its congress on May 1, 1948,²⁶ — a figure which gives a better picture of its position than the alarming estimate of a "hard core" of 50,000 members given recently in an official publication.²⁷ For some weeks in June its official organ, *Mardom*, was obliged to appear in a single sheet owing to lack of paper and funds. At the same time there began a curious *rapprochement* between the Tudeh groups and the supporters of Seyyid Zia, who combined to form an Anti-Dictatorship Front. This was joined later by sections of the Iran Democrats, but neither Seyyid Zia nor Qavam seem themselves to have played any active part.

Meanwhile the prospect of new elections in 1949 has been the cause of fresh activity among the smaller groups. The Vahdat-i-Iran, Taraqqi (Progress), Rastakhiz (Resurrection), and Ittihad (Unity) parties have been particularly vocal. The Majlis "fractions," too, have continued their maneuvers on the old familiar lines. They were largely instrumental in bringing about the downfall of Prime Minister Hazhir in November 1948 by the simple device of failing to make up a quorum. This was an effective block on new legislation, and especially on the budget, which had to trickle through in monthly installments. Although, as usual, the "fractions" bore little direct relation to outside powers, it is significant that the press was almost unanimously opposed to the Hazhir government.

There is then a general decline in the party system in Iran at the present moment. Whether it will revive may depend on the course of international events. It was the rapid growth of the Tudeh Party, with Russian encouragement, that gave the Iraideh-yi-Milli and Iran Democrat Parties their strength. If Russia once more decides to work through internal movements,

²⁶ *Mardom*, May 4, 1948.

²⁷ House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs (Subcommittee No. 5), "Communism in the Near East" (Washington, 1948).

the situation may be repeated. But the weakness of all the Iranian countermovements has been that in their eagerness to expose the political trickeries of the opposition, they have condemned all the sound elements in their program as well. What is needed is a movement that will attract the young, rebellious elements who genuinely want a change from the present regime, and follow communism only because no one has offered them a sufficiently attractive alternative.

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DEVELOPMENTS OF THE QUARTER: COMMENT AND CHRONOLOGY¹

SEPTEMBER 1—NOVEMBER 30, 1948

THE ASSASSINATION on September 17 of Count Folke Bernadotte, the United Nations Mediator for Palestine, was more than a human loss. His death partook of the nature of classic tragedy by symbolizing the lesson of Palestine: that the moral weight of well-meaning compromises laboriously worked out by an international body, no matter how august, was no match for the physical reality of irresponsible force. Count Bernadotte's death was in keeping with the spirit of the time.

Although the Provisional Government of Israel repudiated the Mediator's slayers and condemned their deed, it too won the initiative in Palestine through the successful application of force. Conversely, all other parties to the problem—the Arab governments, the United Nations, Great Britain, the United States—proved themselves impotent through their inability to stiffen their words with a show of force. In the year since the General Assembly partition recommendation of November 29, 1947, the Palestine problem had passed from one of theoretical rights and strategic interests to one of hard reality.

All independent efforts by the United Nations to work out a compromise settlement for Palestine ended with the Mediator's death and the presentation of his final report on September 20. The Bernadotte Plan attempted

to consolidate the Jewish and Arab parts of Palestine by assigning western Galilee to Israel and the Negeb to the Arabs. By providing for strategic frontiers and larger blocks of territory, it was more realistic than the General Assembly's partition recommendation of November 29, 1947, but it failed to take the strength of Israel's position sufficiently into account. While perfectly willing to include the whole of Galilee within the borders of the Jewish state, the Government of Israel was loathe to let the Negeb go: in this southern uncultivated area lay potential land resources that Israel might wish to draw upon even should the extensive property already vacated by the fleeing Arab population be finally turned over to Jewish exploitation. The Negeb, moreover, provided access to the mineral resources of the Dead Sea and gave promise of the presence of oil. The Arab states, continuing their policy of intransigence, rejected the Bernadotte Plan because it recognized the existence of a Jewish state, even though much reduced in size from the General Assembly recommendation.

The Mediator's successor, Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, for another two months attempted, with gradually ebbing authority, to re-establish the truce that had held with fair success during the previous summer. But the leaders of Israel, who had protested a truce unlimited in time when it was first introduced in July, took matters into their own hands and repudiated or acknowledged the existence of a cease-fire in accordance with their tactical interests.

¹ In general, items in the Chronology are drawn from the *New York Times* unless otherwise indicated. Non-geographical sub-headings will be found beginning on p. 83.

The Israeli Army, attacking first in the south and then in the north, assured control of the Negeb (assigned to Israel under the UN partition plan), and western Galilee (assigned to it by the Bernadotte Plan). Israeli forces also captured territory—notably the Arab town of Beersheba and a corridor to the Jewish-held new city of Jerusalem—assigned to the Arabs under both plans. Israel was thus in a strong position to dictate the terms of a “realistic” settlement based on a compromise of the two, as the United States proposed at the United Nations on November 20 and Great Britain endorsed shortly thereafter.

An attempt by the Arabs of Palestine to develop momentum through the creation, on September 20, of a government for all Palestine with temporary headquarters at Gaza, did little more than highlight the divisions within the ranks of the Arab League. Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the Mufti of Jerusalem, favored the creation of such a government as a means of reinstating himself at the head of the Palestine Arab movement. Arab League leaders, fearful of the consequences to Arab unity and the course of Arab nationalism should he again be in a position to exercise dictatorial powers, agreed to the formation of the government provided that Hajj Amin had no part in it. A cabinet was thus created, chiefly with Egypt's backing, but on October 1 the Mufti succeeded in having himself elected President of an Arab Palestine National Assembly, a move which seriously cooled the ardor of the Arab League.

Nor did the individual Arab states appear to be wholehearted in their backing. Indeed, King Abdallah of Transjordan, seeing in the Gaza government a threat to his own ambitions, flatly refused to recognize it or to permit it to extend its authority to areas occupied by his Arab Legion. Iraq found itself torn between loyalty to the Hashimite goal of a united Greater Syria—of which King Abdallah was perforce the spokesman—and that of Arab unity currently embodied in the Arab League. After consultation with Egypt, it recognized the Gaza government on October 12, but at the cost of much bitterness between the Regent and King Abdallah. The governments of Syria and Lebanon followed suit on October 14, but more from opposition to and fear of King Abdallah than from solicitude for the

Gaza government itself. King Ibn Saud adopted a notably negative attitude.

Arab antagonism to King Abdallah stemmed from a variety of causes. The long-standing rivalry between Ibn Saud and the Hashimite dynasty over the Hijaz was perhaps the deepest rift but not the most bitter. Egypt looked upon the Hashimite states (both Iraq and Transjordan) as rivals to its leadership in the Arab League. Syria was concerned even more directly because of King Abdallah's advocacy of a Greater Syria. Although a school of nationalists in Syria—as in Iraq and Transjordan—traditionally favored the scheme and were bitterly critical of the partition of the area into separate mandated territories after World War I, there was among them no inclination to permit King Abdallah to play a leading role in its realization. As an individual, he failed to command the respect that had been accorded his brother, King Faysal I. Of greater moment was the conviction that in the hands of King Abdallah the cause for a Greater Syria became less of a step toward Arab aggrandizement than a tactic in British politics.

Yet there was no direct evidence that Great Britain, for all its influence with King Abdallah, was urging the annexation by him of any part of Palestine. Slow to admit that Israel existed in fact, the British Government finally did so by implication when it supported the Bernadotte Plan, which specifically recognized Israel as an unassimilable political entity. Under this plan, Transjordan—if it annexed the Arab portion of Palestine—would have acquired access to the Mediterranean through the Negeb. Such a settlement might have been of some strategic value to Great Britain, but a “realistic” settlement on the basis of territory held at the end of October would have brought Transjordan merely the eastern portion of central Palestine, a mountainous, sparsely cultivated region which would have meant prestige to Abdallah but only an economic liability to Great Britain.

It was the aim of both British and U. S. policy to bring about, in some fashion, a solution of the Palestine problem which would not permanently antagonize the Arab states. The reason was not primarily that the Western powers expected to rely upon them as active

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allies; it grew out of the simple facts of geography: the Arabs occupied a strategically located area richly endowed with oil which Great Britain and the United States wished to safeguard as a base of operations and a source of supply.

But Great Britain and the United States approached the problem from differing premises, and thus it was not until the closing weeks of the United Nations session in Paris that their lines of action began to converge. The British proceeded directly from the assumption that no concession should be granted the Zionists which the Arabs opposed; their problem was how to relate this policy to the course of events, in which the Zionists managed to secure what they wanted with little regard for Arab wishes. The Americans, on the other hand, proceeded from the premise that a Jewish state must be established above all else; their problem was how to win the Arabs to its acceptance. More devious than the British approach, it was a policy that embraced two opposing interests and thus had to be elaborated through a bewildering series of commitments and retractions. Yet thanks to Zionist military success, it proved in the end to be the nearer of the two to reality, and it was the British who found themselves adjusting to the American position.

Although the British Government was coming to admit, of necessity, the reality of Israel, there was no indication—despite restiveness in Damascus and Cairo—that the Arab governments were ready, or domestically were secure enough, to recognize officially its existence. Nor were they prepared to admit the extent to which their own weakness and lack of application was responsible for the Zionists' success.

Afghanistan

1948
 Sept. 29: Afghan and Soviet Union delegations signed an agreement fixing the revised boundary between the two countries, the result of the work of the Russo-Afghan boundary commission set up on June 13, 1946.
 Nov. 23: Sardar Mohammad Na'im Khan, Ambassador to the U. S., presented his credentials to President Truman.

Cyprus

1948

Nov. 13: The resignation of Lord Winster as Governor of Cyprus was announced by the British Foreign Office.

Nov. 26: The mayor of Limasol and about 30 others were sentenced to imprisonment by a Limasol court on charges of having taken part in an illegal procession on Nov. 18 demanding general election for a constituent assembly.

Nov. 28: At a meeting at Nicosia, 6,000 Turks protested against Greek demands for a union of Cyprus with Greece, and asked instead for a continuation of British rule.

East Africa

(See also Italian Colonies, page 72.)

1948

Oct. 15: It was announced that the British Administration of Italian Somaliland had returned the province of Ogaden to Ethiopia.

Nov. 15: British Somaliland returned to civil rule for the first time in over seven years.

Egypt and the Sudan

1948

Sept. 2: Stanton Griffis, U. S. Ambassador, presented his credentials to King Farouk.

Sept. 7: British Prime Minister Attlee nominated Sir Francis Verner Wylie as a British Government director of the Suez Canal Company, succeeding Lord Hankey.

Count Folke Bernadotte, UN Mediator for Palestine, stated that Egyptian authorities bore "very grave responsibility" for the death of two French military observers in a UN plane at Gaza on August 26.

Sept. 9: Egyptian police arrested 31 people charged with communist activity. They included 5 Jews, an official in the Ministry of National Defense, and an engineer in the Department of Weights and Measures reported to be Acting Chief of the communist movement in Egypt.

Sept. 22: An explosion, followed by rioting, occurred in the Jewish quarter of Cairo. Nineteen persons were killed and 62 injured.

Sept. 23: The governments of Egypt and Iraq were reported to have agreed upon terms for a £E 3 million loan to finance irrigation works in the Tigris-Euphrates valley. (International

Monetary Fund Financial News Survey, Oct. 14, p. 129.)

Sept. 26: The Egyptian and Swiss governments concluded a trade and payments agreement providing for the exchange of Egyptian cotton against machine tools, spare parts, and chemicals for the Aswan hydro-electric scheme. The agreement also provided for relaxing controls on imports of cotton textiles, dairy products, and watches from Switzerland under agreed quotas. (*International Monetary Fund Financial News Survey*, Oct. 14, p. 128.)

Sept. 28: Police raided the Jewish quarter of Cairo, arresting 50 Jews suspected of "subversive activities."

Oct. 5: The Anglo-American Export-Import Agency announced a provisional agreement between the Anglo-American zone of Germany and Egypt providing for an annual exchange of goods up to \$25 million (*Al-Ahram*, [Cairo] Oct. 5.)

Oct. 8: The UN General Assembly elected Egypt, 38-19 on the fourth ballot, to be a non-permanent member of the Security Council beginning Jan. 1, 1949.

Oct. 9: Following a meeting with Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi Nuqrashi Pasha, Chapman Andrews, Acting British Ambassador to Egypt, stated Great Britain, in view of the present international situation, was not prepared to withdraw its troops from Egypt.

Nov. 9: Two guards were killed and 3 other persons injured when assailants unsuccessfully opened fire on Nahas Pasha, former Prime Minister and leader of the Wafd Party, and Saraj al-Din Pasha, Secretary-General of the Party, in a Cairo suburb.

Nov. 13: An explosion in Cairo wrecked the publishing house in which the newspapers *Egyptian Mail*, *Le Progrès Egyptien*, *Egyptian Gazette*, and *La Bourse* were printed. According to a police estimate, 11 persons were killed and 71 injured.

U. S. Ambassador Griffis left Egypt for consultations with State Department officials in Paris and Washington.

Nov. 16: Riots and a general strike led by the National Front (Ashigga Party) accompanied elections for the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan's first legislative assembly. The UMMA Party (favoring independence) claimed victory, while the Ashigga Party (favoring dominion status under Egypt) gave the small number of votes as proof of the effectiveness of its boycott.

Nov. 17: King Farouk signed a decree divorcing Queen Farida, the mother of his 3 daughters.

Nov. 22: It was reported that Egypt had rejected the proposal of Brig. Gen. William E. Riley, Chief of Staff to the Acting UN Mediator for Palestine, for direct negotiations with Israeli representatives on the matter of an armistice in the Negeb (southern Palestine).

Nov. 26: Seven politically prominent Egyptian lawyers led by Makram 'Ubayd Pasha, former Finance Minister, attempted to fly to Anglo-Egyptian Sudan to defend Muhammad Nu'al-Din, secretary of the pro-Egyptian Ashigga Party, Sulayman Musa, and 15 others arrested at Atbara in connection with election demonstrations. British authorities stopped the group who were without visas or landing permits and returned them to Cairo.

Nov. 28: The Secretary-General of the Moslem Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimun) and another leading member of the organization were arrested; it was reported they had been interned by military order in connection with the Nov. 13 explosion in Cairo.

Student demonstrations in favor of unity of the Nile Valley were held in Cairo, Alexandria, and Zagazig. Police opened fire on a mob at Zagazig, killing 2 students and injuring 14 more.

India and Pakistan

India moved to liquidate one of the major problems of settlement still facing it when it sent its army into the state of Hyderabad on September 13. Two days before the invasion took place, the Nizam had appealed to the United Nations for permission to lay Hyderabad's case before the International Court of Justice. The swift completion of India's positive action rescued the Court from the necessity of passing judgment on the question of Hyderabad's sovereignty, and the case, although not officially dropped from the Security Council agenda, was "put aside" on September 20 at the express request of the Nizam. Placed under military administration, Hyderabad began to undergo the process of transformation into an Indian state.

The problem of Kashmir, in contrast, continued to plague Indian-Pakistani relations. Previous to the brief Hyderabad crisis, both dominions conditionally accepted the UN Commission's plan for a plebiscite, but further efforts by the Commission to institute

cease-fire were unsuccessful, as were attempts to work out the practical details of the plebiscite.

Attention was more profitably turned toward Commonwealth relations and the drafting of an Indian constitution. At the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers held in London in October, both India and Pakistan indicated their desire to maintain their ties with the Empire. A question of some legal interest arose, however, over the conflict between India's intention of becoming a republic and the recognition of the Crown as the uniting symbol. Suggested formulae included a dual allegiance to both India and the Commonwealth, with only the latter involving the Crown. Of more significance than the formula involved was the equalizing trend the technicality promised to bring in the relations between Great Britain and the various dominions.

CHRONOLOGY

1948

Sept. 3: The Indian Parliament passed a bill nationalizing the Reserve Bank of India.

Sept. 4: Police mounted guard over 200 substations of Bombay's electric supply system.

Dr. Jivraj Mehta and 6 members of the new Executive Council were sworn in by the Maharaja as a "fully responsible" government was inaugurated in Baroda. (*Government of India Information Service* [GIIS], Sept. 14, p. 8.)

Sept. 6: The UN Commission for India and Pakistan announced that its cease-fire proposal for Jammu and Kashmir could not be put into effect immediately. It stated, however, that India had accepted the proposal on Aug. 20 upon assurances of the Commission that the sovereignty of Kashmir would remain unchanged; that the paramount need for security would be recognized; and that Pakistan would remain outside plebiscite participation. Pakistan accepted the proposal provided that India accepted the conditions laid down by Articles 6 through 15 (Part B) of the Security Council resolution of April 21.

The Government of India banned entry into the country of the Karachi newspaper, *Dawn*. (*India Today*, October.)

Indian troops chased Moslem "raiders" across the border into Kodar, Hyderabad; 31

Hyderabadis were killed or wounded in a short fight before Indian troops withdrew.

Sept. 7: The Maharaja of Bhavnagar was sworn in as Governor of Madras. (GIIS, Sept. 14, p. 8.)

Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru demanded "for the last time" that India be permitted to station forces in the city of Secunderabad (Hyderabad) "to insure security," and that the Nizam of Hyderabad disband the Razakars (Moslem Volunteer Corps).

Sept. 8: The Nazim of Hyderabad, in reply to a letter from C. Rajagopalachari, Governor-General of India, stated that he refused to consider reposting of Indian military forces at Secunderabad or disbandment of the Razakars.

Sept. 10: The Hyderabad Government again rejected India's demands, in a reply to Prime Minister Nehru.

Sept. 11: The Hyderabad Government appealed to the UN for permission to place its dispute with India before the International Court of Justice.

Mohammed Ali Jinnah, first Governor-General of Pakistan, died at the age of 71.

Sept. 13: The Indian Army invaded Hyderabad, 3 armored columns approaching from Chanda, Central Provinces, on the northeast; Sholapur, Bombay Province, in the west, and Bezwada, Madras Province, on the southeast. Indian forces were commanded by Lt. Gen. Maharaj Rajendrasinhji; Maj. Gen. El Edroos commanded the Hyderabad Army, while Kazim Razvi led the Razakars.

C. Rajagopalachari, Indian Governor-General, issued a proclamation declaring that "a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India is threatened by internal disturbance."

Zahir Ahmed, Hyderabad representative, cabled the UN Security Council asking it to hold an immediate meeting to stop the Indian invasion of Hyderabad. The state dispatched a delegation to the UN headed by Foreign Minister Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung.

Five demonstrations demanding support for the Nizam and war against India were held in Karachi, Pakistan, before the house of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan.

Sir Khwaja Nazimuddin, 54, former Provincial Prime Minister of Bengal, was recommended to succeed Mohammed Ali Jinnah as Governor-General of Pakistan.

Sept. 14: The UN Security Council was sum-

moned to meet in a special session Sept. 16 to consider Hyderabad's plea for action against India's invasion.

Indian troops coming from the northwest were reported to have captured Daulatabad and Jalna after heavy fighting. Another column, advancing north from Sholapur, captured Osmanabad and reached Yerma, 100 miles south of Jalna. Indian troops from Munajalla captured Suriapet, 70 miles southeast of Secunderabad.

Viscount Addison, British Government leader in the House of Lords, stated Great Britain "deplored the very unfortunate state of affairs" in Hyderabad.

Sir Khwaja Nazimuddin was sworn in as Acting Governor-General of Pakistan.

Sept. 15: The Indian Government proclaimed an emergency "public safety ordinance" restoring wartime censorship of mail, telegrams, cables, and radio.

Indian forces captured Aurangabad, second largest city in Hyderabad. From Jalna, troops advanced 40 miles toward Parbhani. Slow progress against the Razakars was reported in the area between Gadag and Hospet in the southwest. Indian troops took Khammamett in the southeast.

Sept. 16: The UN Security Council voted 8-0, 3 members abstaining, to place the Hyderabad complaint against India on the permanent agenda.

Indian troops advanced steadily into the interior of Hyderabad. Invading columns took Zahirabad on the west, advancing 5 miles above Hospet in the southwest, 15 miles beyond Khammamett in the southeast, 40 miles beyond Jalna in the northwest, and 10 miles along the Delhi-Madras railway in the northeast.

Sept. 17: As Indian forces approached to within 50 miles of the capital of Hyderabad, the Nizam issued a cease-fire order to his troops; dismissed his cabinet; formed an emergency advisory committee with his son, the Prince of Berar, a member; and instructed his representative at the UN in Paris not to press Hyderabad's case before the Security Council. He also invited Indian troops to enter Secunderabad, and banned the Razakars.

Sept. 18: Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru announced that Hyderabad would be under Indian military government until conditions there returned to normal, and that the state would elect a Constituent Assembly to decide its political future.

Indian Maj. Gen. J. N. Chaudhury, the

newly appointed Military Governor of Hyderabad, accepted the surrender of Hyderabad state troops from Maj. Gen. El Edroos.

Sept. 19: Kazim Razvi, leader of the Razakars, was arrested in a suburb of Secunderabad.

Sept. 20: The Nizam of Hyderabad informed his people that all state authority now rested with the Indian Military Governor, Maj. Gen. J. N. Chaudhury.

The UN Security Council put aside consideration of Hyderabad's case against India.

Indian Government officials took over all vital functions of the Hyderabad state, including police and communications.

Dr. John Matthai, Indian Minister for Railways and Transport, succeeded Shanmukham Chetty as Minister of Finance; N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Minister without Portfolio, became Minister of Railways and Transport. (*India Today*, October.)

Sept. 21: The UN Kashmir Commission left New Delhi for Geneva to draft its interim report to the Security Council. (*India Today*, October.)

The Press Trust of India, Ltd., a co-operative non-profit organization, was formed to take over the British Reuters' subsidiary, The Associated Press of India, Ltd.; at the same time, it became a partner in Reuters.

Sept. 23: Indian Prime Minister Nehru and Deputy Prime Minister Patel met with military commanders of Hyderabad and leading Hyderabadi affiliated with the Congress Party to formulate plans for a Hyderabad interim government.

The Nizam stated that he had been the helpless tool of the Razakars for 8 months prior to the Indian invasion, and that Hyderabad's delegation to the UN had "ceased to have any authority to represent me or my state."

Sept. 24: Jairamdas Daulatram, Food Minister of India, announced that the Indian Government would gradually reimpose control over procurement, distribution, and prices of all food grains.

Sept. 27: Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, chief delegate of Pakistan to the UN, told the Assembly that Pakistan would never recognize Israel.

Sept. 28: The UN Assembly placed an Indian motion to discuss the question of Indians in South Africa on its agenda. (*GIIS*, Sept. 30.)

Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung, Foreign Minister in the Hyderabad Government prior to the Indian invasion, insisted that the UN

Security Council recognize him and investigate the Nizam's withdrawal of the Hyderabad case from the UN. Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar, Indian delegate, stated his view that the Nawab should not be recognized and that the case should be dismissed as requested by the Nizam.

Sept. 29: Faizlur Rehman, Pakistan Minister of Industries, disclosed that industries connected with the manufacture of arms, ammunition, hydro-electric power, rolling stock, telegraph, telephone and other communications equipment would be state-owned.

Indian and Hyderabad troops and police disarmed 7,000 Arabs who were part of Hyderabad's irregular forces. Arrangements were made to repatriate them and about 2,000 Pathans from the North-West Frontier Province.

Oct. 2: Prime Minister Nehru, in a speech to the Indian nation on Gandhi's birthday, stated India would "fight . . . to the utmost" against Pakistan aggression in Kashmir.

Oct. 4: The Government of India announced that the export of raw jute would be prohibited during October because of dangerously low stocks.

A *GIIS* bulletin announced that Satyanarayan Sinha, member of the Constituent Assembly and chief Government whip, had been appointed Deputy Minister attached to the Prime Minister.

Sheikh Ghulam Husain Hidayatullah, Governor of Sind Province, died in Karachi. (*Pakistan Affairs*, Oct. 7.)

The Regional Committee of the World Health Organization for South-East Asia met at New Delhi, representatives of Siam, Burma, Nepal, Ceylon, India, and Afghanistan attending. (*GIIS*, Oct. 7, p. 4.)

Oct. 5: Governor-General C. Rajagopalachari inaugurated in Delhi the Employees' State Insurance Corporation, conferring sickness and disability benefits on 2 million industrial workers. (*GIIS*, Oct. 11, p. 1.)

Prime Minister Nehru left for the British Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London and a visit to the UN Assembly in Paris.

The Nizam of Hyderabad asked the Indian High Commission in London to sue for recovery of more than \$4 million in Hyderabad, state funds he claimed Moin Nawaz Jung, Hyderabad Finance Minister, had moved to a Pakistan account during the Indian invasion of Hyderabad.

The Regional Committee of the World

Health Organization for South-East Asia, meeting in New Delhi, approved the 1949 health programs presented by its member countries for submission to the executive board of WHO. (*GIIS*, Oct. 11, p. 2.)

Oct. 7: Prime Minister Nehru, arriving in London, told the press India wanted a close relationship with England while remaining completely sovereign and independent. (*GIIS*, Oct. 11, p. 1.)

It was announced that Din Mohammad, ex-judge of Lahore High Court, had been appointed Governor of Sind, and Ghazanfar Ali Khan had been made Minister to Iraq as well as Ambassador to Iran. (*Pakistan Affairs*, Oct. 7.)

Communists gained control of the All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC); Manek Gandhi, a Communist, was elected acting secretary at a meeting in Bombay.

Oct. 8: India was elected to a 3-year term on the UN Economic and Social Council.

Oct. 10: Muzaffar Ahmed, founder of the Communist Party of India, and 6 other Communist leaders were arrested in Calcutta under the West Bengal Security Act.

Oct. 11: The Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers began in London, representatives of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon attending for the first time. Mr. Don S. Senanayake represented Ceylon; Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, India; Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan. (*India Today*, November.)

Oct. 12: All 21 delegates to a special convention of the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, started under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah in 1932, endorsed a resolution recommending the state's permanent accession to the Indian Union. (*GIIS*, Oct. 18, p. 9.)

Oct. 15: The Travancore State Government resigned, according to the New Delhi radio.

Oct. 16: Indian Prime Minister Nehru conferred with U. S. Secretary of State George Marshall in Paris. (*India Today*, November.)

Oct. 17: The Indian Prime Minister talked with Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, and Trygve Lie, UN Secretary-General, in Paris. (*GIIS*, Oct. 18.)

Oct. 18: The *Gazette Extraordinary* announced that Maj. Gen. J. N. Chaudhuri, Military Governor for Hyderabad, had reconstituted his government to include the following persons, 2 of them Hyderabadi: D. S. Bakhale, Chief Civil Administrator in charge of political services, home, railways, supply, and law; D. R. Pradham, Additional Chief Civil Ad-

ministrator in charge of finance, revenue, commerce, and industry; Nawab Zain Yar Jung in charge of public works, rural reconstruction, and labor; Raja Dhoondi Raj, District Magistrate in charge of customs, excise, relief, rehabilitation, and education. Two new departments, Labor and Communications, were created, and the old departments of External Affairs and Planning abolished. (GIIS, Oct. 21.)

Oct. 19: The Jammu and Kashmir Government declared Pakistan to be an enemy nation; persons evacuated thither would not be permitted to return to Kashmir until hostilities were ended. (*India Today*, November.)

Oct. 21: The prime ministers of India and Pakistan discussed the Kashmir situation with Prime Minister Attlee in London.

Oct. 22: A report from Madras stated rioting took place in the French Indian possession of Mahé, and all French officials were forced to resign their posts; several thousand Indians took control of the residency and administrative offices and destroyed all voting papers and registers prepared for the October 24 municipal elections. (*London Times*, Oct. 26, p. 3.)

The Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers adjourned after discussions had been held principally on the future relation of republican dominions to the British Crown, defense and foreign policy in relation to other members of the Commonwealth, and economic questions. A final communiqué put the members on record as supporting Ceylon's membership in the UN. Private meetings between Pandit Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan on the Kashmir question broke down over the plebiscite issue. (*India Today*, November.)

Oct. 23: The mayor of Mahé asked the Indian Government to take control of the city inasmuch as the French administration there had collapsed.

Oct. 24: Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya was elected President of the Indian National Congress. (GIIS, Oct. 28, p. 2.)

Municipal elections were held in the French Indian possessions of Pondicherry, Karikal, and Yanaon. The Socialist Party, in favor of retaining the French connection, was reported to have carried in Pondicherry. (*London Times*, Oct. 26, p. 3.)

Oct. 25: Indian sources estimated 2,350 Hyderabidis were killed, 110 wounded, and 3,352 captured in the Indian invasion of the state. Pro-French candidates were reported to have won majorities in the French colonies of Karikal and Yanaon.

Oct. 27: Indians kidnapped and removed to Chombal, M. Perrier, the Administrator of the French colony of Mahé, and his family. The French Government registered a strong protest with the Indian Chargé d'Affaires in Paris. (*London Times*, Oct. 28, p. 3.)

Oct. 28: It was reported that French troops landed at Mahé, retook the Residency, the police station, and the law courts, and reinstated the French Administration. (*London Times*, Oct. 29, p. 4.)

Oct. 29: Indian States Minister Sardar Patel presided over a meeting of high officials at which a temporary arrangement providing for Hyderabad's close association with India after expiration of the Standstill Agreement on November 30 was discussed. (GIIS, Nov. 1, p. 8.)

The Government of India removed all financial restrictions against Hyderabad. (GIIS, Nov. 1, p. 8.)

Nov. 1: The Government of India announced the appointment of R. K. Nehru, Counselor of the Indian Embassy in Washington, as India's Minister to Sweden. (*India Today*, December.) It also announced that Dr. Syud Hossain, Indian Ambassador to Egypt, had been concurrently accredited as Minister to Lebanon.

The University of Jammu and Kashmir was inaugurated in Srinagar. (GIIS, Nov. 4, p. 9.)

A 3-man Indian Trade Delegation left New Delhi for Tehran. (GIIS, Nov. 8, p. 8.)

The governments of Brazil and India raised their respective missions to Embassy level. M. R. Masani, Indian Minister in Brazil, was appointed Ambassador. (*India Today*, December.)

Nov. 3: Indian Prime Minister Nehru told the UN General Assembly that an awakening Asia would demand a complete end to the "yoke of colonial rule."

Nov. 4: The Indian Constituent Assembly met to consider the draft constitution. (GIIS, Nov. 8, p. 1; Text of draft, GIIS release #3627.)

Prime Minister Nehru called on King Farouk of Egypt and Azzam Pasha, Secretary-General of the Arab League, in Cairo. (GIIS, Nov. 8, p. 3.)

Nov. 6: Prime Minister Nehru returned to India.

Nov. 8: Nathuram Vinayak Godse detailed in court his "wholly and exclusively political" disagreements with Mahatma Gandhi, and claimed sole responsibility for the leader's death.

Prime Minister Nehru told the Indian Constituent Assembly that the subject of India's future relationship to the British Commonwealth had been discussed privately in London, that he had made it clear there that the issue could be decided only by the Indian Parliament, and that he believed that the subject should be decided independently of the current deliberations on the Indian draft constitution.

Nov. 9: Gunner Valfid Jarring, Swedish Minister to India, presented his credentials to the Indian Governor-General.

Nov. 12: It was announced that King George VI of England had approved the appointment of Khwaja Nazimuddin as Governor-General of Pakistan.

Nov. 13: Shrimati Vijayalakshmi, leader of the Indian delegation to the UN Assembly, submitted to the Trusteeship Council a resolution calling on the South African Union Government to place Southwest Africa under a UN trusteeship. (*GIIS*, Nov. 19, p. 3.)

Nov. 15: Loy W. Henderson, American Ambassador to India, arrived in New Delhi.

Indian troops entered Dras in the Kashmir valley. (*GIIS*, Nov. 22, p. 6.)

K. M. Munshi resigned his post as India's Agent-General in Hyderabad. (*GIIS*, Nov. 24, p. 4.)

Nov. 22: The UN Commission for Pakistan and India sent to the Security Council an interim report on the situation in Jammu and Kashmir, and an account of its unsuccessful efforts to obtain agreement between the two dominions for a cease-fire. The report summarized the differences between India's and Pakistan's approaches and stated that although possibilities were temporarily exhausted, the way was still open for a satisfactory solution. It also stated that the Commission could not accept Pakistan's reply to the cease-fire because it imposed conditions beyond the compass of the resolution; that officials of both dominions believed a plebiscite in 1948 would be impractical.

Nov. 23: The UN Security Council received a letter from Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, Pakistani Foreign Minister, charging that the Indian Army had strengthened its contingents in Kashmir and appeared determined to force a military decision in the state.

Nov. 24: A joint communiqué announced that agreement had been reached on 13 out of the 18 items on the agenda of the Inter-Dominion Conference of Pakistan and India, just ended in New Delhi. (*GIIS*, Nov. 29, p. 7.)

Nov. 25: Trade talks began in New Delhi between representatives of Belgium and India.

The UN Security Council was informed that renewed negotiations by the UN Kashmir Commission held out hope for a broad solution of the dispute between India and Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir. The Council decided to extend full authority to the Commission in its negotiations and to endorse its plea to both dominions to refrain from any action that might aggravate the political and military situations and consequently threaten negotiations.

Nov. 29: Representatives of Pakistan and India presented their views on arrangements for a plebiscite in Kashmir to the UN Kashmir Commission.

The Indian Constituent Assembly gave final approval to a clause in the draft constitution abolishing untouchability.

A *GIIS* bulletin announced that the governments of India and Hungary had decided to exchange diplomatic representatives at legation level.

It also announced that India and Iran had reached a provisional agreement whereby an airline designated by each government would operate the Tehran-Zahidan-Karachi-Bombay route.

Iran

1948

Sept. 22: U. S. Senator Chan Gurney, Chairman of the Senate's Defense Committee, conferred in Tehran with the Shah and Prime Minister Hazhir.

Sept. 27: Maj. Gen. Vernon Evans replaced Maj. Gen. Robert W. Grow as chief of the U. S. Military Mission.

Nov. 6: The government of Abdul Hosayn Hazhir resigned.

Nov. 8: Mohammad Maraghai Sa'id was approved by the Majlis as Prime Minister.

Nov. 16: The cabinet of Prime Minister Mohammad Maraghai Sa'id was announced as follows:

Mohammad Maraghai Sa'id — Prime Minister, Interior
 Ali Asghar Hikmat — Foreign Affairs
 Sepahbod Amir Ahmadi — War
 Mohsen Sadr — Justice
 Dr. Mohammad Sajjadi — Education
 Manuchehr Iqbal — Roads and Communications

Abbas Gholi Golshayan — Finance
 Nadir Arasteh — Posts and Telegraph
 Amir A'alan — Health
 Ahmad Moqbel — Agriculture
 Gholam Hoseyn Ashrafi — National Economy
 Jemalimami Ethadi Taheri — Without Portfolio

Nov. 19: The divorce of Shah Mohammad Reza and Queen Fawzia, sister of King Farouk of Egypt, was announced.

Iraq

1948

Sept. 23: Shafiq Ades, a wealthy Jewish merchant, was hanged in Basra after having been condemned to death by an Iraqi military court for supplying arms to Zionists. A fine of 5,000,000 dinars (\$20,000,000) was also imposed on his estate.

The governments of Egypt and Iraq were reported to have agreed upon terms for a £3,000,000 (\$12,000,000) loan to finance irrigation works in the Tigris-Euphrates valley. (*Financial News Survey*, Oct. 14, p. 29.)

Sept. 27: Sadiq al-Bassam, Minister of Defense, and Ali Jawdat, Ambassador to the U. S., resigned.

Sept. 28: Edward S. Crocker, 2nd, was appointed U. S. Ambassador to Iraq.

Oct. 3: The engagement of the Regent, Prince Abd al-Ilah to Faiza al-Tarabulsi, daughter of Kamal al-Tarabulsi Bey, a retired Egyptian army officer, was announced.

Oct. 12: Iraq recognized the Arab Government for Palestine at Gaza.

Nov. 8: Prime Minister Muzahim al-Pachachi announced that the Arab states had rejected an Iraqi proposal for a unified Arab command in Palestine.

Nov. 21: The government was reported to have opened conversations with representatives of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) regarding a reinterpretation of its concession agreement. Points discussed included: (1) royalty payment in gold at free market prices instead of at the British buying rate; (2) increased oil production; (3) employment of larger numbers of Iraqi nationals; (4) the holding, by Iraqi nationals, of up to 20% stock in IPC. (*Gas and Oil Journal*, Dec. 2, p. 46.)

Nov. 28: A joint session of Parliament approved a resolution stating that the Iraqi Govern-

ment would oppose any decision of the UN to establish a Jewish state in Palestine.

Israel

(See Palestine, p. 73.)

Italian Colonies

1948

Sept. 2: The Big Four powers were reported to have agreed to award trusteeship of Italian Somaliland to Italy and to allow Ethiopia an outlet to the Red Sea by giving it the port of Assab and the Danakil region of Eritrea.

Sept. 3: The Moscow radio announced that the Soviet Union had proposed a meeting of the Big Four Council of Foreign Ministers prior to the General Assembly meeting of Sept. 15 to discuss the disposal of the former Italian colonies.

Sept. 13: Representatives of the Big Four met in Paris to discuss the problem of the Italian Colonies. The U. S. and Great Britain favored placing Cyrenaica under a UN trusteeship with Britain as administrator, and postponing final decision on Tripolitania for one year. The Soviet Union favored placing Libya, Italian Somaliland, and Eritrea under Italian trusteeship; it made no mention of UN. France wished to postpone consideration of Libya for a year.

Sept. 14: The Soviet Union proposed that the administration of the former Italian colonies be placed in the hands of the Trusteeship Council, but that the Security Council should have the power to designate "strategic" areas in the colonies which would be under its control.

Sept. 15: In the absence of agreement among the Big Four, the question of the Italian Colonies was referred to the General Assembly under the terms of the Italian peace treaty.

Sept. 21: The Moslem League of Eritrea protested to the UN regarding a proposal to place Eritrea under Ethiopian trusteeship. The League, claiming to represent 75% of Eritrea's population, asked for complete self-government under the UN.

Nov. 23: Great Britain and the U. S. reported agreement on the stand to be advanced before the Political and Security Committee of the UN General Assembly in regard to the disposition of the Italian Colonies: Cyrenaica to

be administered by the British under UN trusteeship; decision on Tripolitania to be postponed until 1949; Italian Somaliland to be a trusteeship under Italy; eastern Eritrea, including Massawa and Assab, to be administered by Ethiopia; western Eritrea undecided. *Nov. 24:* U. S. and Britain agreed to propose to the UN General Assembly that Cyrenaica be enlarged to include the province of Sirtica in eastern Tripolitania.

Lebanon

1948

Sept. 10: Emile Khuri, Minister to Italy, presented his letter of credence to President Luigi Einaudi. (*Oriente Moderno*, Aug.-Sept., p. 127.)

Oct. 1: Dr. Stephen B. L. Penrose, Jr. was inaugurated as President of the American University and International College at Beirut.

Oct. 10: The Security Departments of Syria and Lebanon ruled that all Syrian and Lebanese Jews resident abroad should return home; that all resident foreign Jews should be repatriated; that marriage between Lebanese or Syrian citizens and Jews should be forbidden; and that government officials married to Jews should be dismissed. (*London Times*, Oct. 11, p. 3.)

Oct. 14: Lebanon recognized the Arab Government for Palestine at Gaza. (*London Times*, Oct. 15, p. 3.)

Nov. 17: The third general conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) opened in Beirut.

Nov. 19: Mustafa al-Aris, labor leader and allegedly the head of Lebanon's banned Communist Party, was arrested while attending the UNESCO Conference.

Nov. 21: The World Federation of Trade Unions sent a protest to UNESCO regarding the arrest of Mustafa al-Aris, its accredited observer at the UN meetings. Dr. Julian Huxley reported that he had asked for an explanation in the name of UNESCO.

Nov. 27: Jamil Mardam Bey, Prime Minister of Syria, Gabriel Murr, Acting Prime Minister of Lebanon in the absence of Riad al-Sulh at Paris, and other leaders met at Beirut to discuss the Trans-Arabian pipeline, completion of which had been held up by the Syrian Parliament's refusal to grant transit permission after the U. S. endorsement of Palestine partition.

North Africa

1948

Sept. 1: Sidi Mohamed al-Moncef, 67-year-old former Bey of Tunis, died in exile at Pau, France.

El Abed Bouhafa, Secretary of the Committee for Freedom of North Africa, made public a memorandum attacking the French Government for deposing the Tunisian ruler and forcing him into exile in violation of existing Tunisian-French treaties, and for "colonial domination and exploitation through which France systematically robbed Tunisia of its sovereign rights and material resources." The Committee telegraphed U. S. Secretary of State George Marshall asking for "action to prevent French military action against our unarmed people."

A Tunisian agricultural mission headed by Mme. Maurice Cailloux arrived in the U. S. to study wheat production methods in Montana.

Oct. 4: Gen. Juin left Paris to return to his posts of Resident-General of Morocco and Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces in North Africa. (*London Times*, Oct. 5, p. 4.)

Oct. 20: An executive order of the Resident-General of Morocco setting limitations on the transfer of capital and securities between Morocco and other countries except Algeria and Tunisia went into effect. The limitations would apply only to transactions by or for persons residing outside Morocco or by or for companies having their main offices outside Morocco. (*Le Monde*, Oct. 23.)

Nov. 14: Thomas D. Campbell, American wheat grower, left for North Africa on the invitation of the governments of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia to advise them on the means of increasing North African wheat crops through American methods of moisture conservation, erosion control, and summer tillage.

Palestine

(*Including Israel*)

(For comment on developments of the quarter, see p. 63)

1948

Sept. 1: The Red Cross appointed Wilfred de St. Aubin of the U. S. to direct field opera-

tions of the UN emergency relief program in Palestine.

Transjordan Arab Legion troops attacked Israeli defenses on Mount Zion; sniping and shellfire were reported in other sections of Jerusalem.

Arab League headquarters revealed a plan for the demilitarization of Jerusalem which had been presented to UN Mediator Count Folke Bernadotte on August 13: Jews and Arabs to administer and police their own areas of the city; the UN to operate common services, such as power, water, and telephones; UN guards to police the boundary; Jews to visit the Old City at certain times in specified numbers; a demilitarized area to include Sharafat, Bethlehem, Bethany, 'Issawyyah, Lifta, and Bayt Jala.

Sept. 2: Both Arab and Israeli forces, acquiescing to the demands of UN senior truce observers, ceased fire in Jerusalem.

A Tel Aviv report stated that an Arab had been appointed deputy commander of the Nazareth police with 30 Arab policemen under his command. The Israeli police force was organized into Haifa, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem divisions; Galilee and the Negeb remained under military rule.

Sept. 3: UN Mediator Count Bernadotte returned from Stockholm to his headquarters in Rhodes.

Arab Legion, Israeli, and Egyptian Army commanders in the Jerusalem area met with Brig. Gen. W. E. Riley, Jerusalem representative of the UN Mediator, to discuss withdrawal of troops from a Red Cross zone in southern Jerusalem.

The Jewish Agency Executive announced that as of August 1 no Agency funds would be contributed to the Israeli Government, or spent for political or security purposes or for propaganda; funds would be used for charitable purposes only.

Sept. 4: The Red Cross enclave around Government House in southern Jerusalem became a neutral zone, as final Israeli and Arab units withdrew.

Sheikh Hasan al-Banna, "Supreme Guide" of the Moslem Brotherhood, announced in a public speech in Cairo that he would support formation of an army based on Palestinian Arabs, and a Palestine Arab Government based on the Palestine Arab Higher Committee.

Sept. 6: Ruling on five truce violations, the UN Mediator stated Arabs were responsible for

1, Israelis for 3, and both for 1; as a result of a sixth violation, Gen. Aage Lundstroem, Chief of Staff for the UN Mediator, set a permanent truce line in the Lajjun area near Jenin, with a no-man's land of 500 yards on either side.

Sept. 7: In Alexandria, UN Mediator Count Bernadotte and Abd al-Rahman Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League, reached general agreement on the Palestine refugee problem.

The UN Mediator reported to the Security Council truce board decisions that Israeli and Egyptian forces had each committed an additional violation, the former on the night of August 16-17 with an attack on the Egyptians, and the latter August 26 at Gaza, when two French UN observers were killed.

Sept. 8: U. S. Secretary of State George Marshall stated the U. S. would grant *de jure* recognition to the Government of Israel soon after elections were held in the new state.

The Arab Legion informed the UN Mediator it would withdraw from the eastern slopes of Mount Zion in Jerusalem if Israeli forces would withdraw from the hills opposite.

Israeli troops raided a Stern Group camp across the Yarkon River from Tel Aviv, seizing 15 persons for "questioning."

In conferences with Arab leaders, Count Bernadotte was told "return of the refugees is an indispensable condition for eventual acceptance of a truce and further negotiations."

Sept. 9: Israel rejected Count Bernadotte's proposal to broaden gradually the demilitarization of Jerusalem.

Sept. 10: Mrs. Golda Myerson presented her credentials as Israeli Minister to the Soviet Union.

A detachment of the Stern Group attacked the Arab village of Beit Iksa, killing 10 and capturing matériel.

Sept. 11: Shelling and shooting broke out again in Jerusalem.

Sept. 12: Jerusalem suffered its heaviest shelling since the beginning of the second cease-fire on Sept. 2.

Abd al-Rahman Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League, announced that the irregular volunteer forces sponsored by the League in the Holy Land would eventually become the regular army of the Palestinian Arab State.

Sept. 13: UN Mediator Count Bernadotte ordered Israel to readmit Arab refugees to Ayn Ghazal, Ijzim, and Jaba, south of Haifa,

and to rebuild their homes destroyed by Israeli forces on July 18 and following, in violation of the truce.

Sept. 14: Israel inaugurated a Supreme Court of 5 justices as follows: Moshe Smoira (Chief Justice), Rabbi Simhah Assaf, Itzhak Olshan, Moshe Dunkelblum, Schneur Zalman Cheshin. Sept. 15: Britons Frederick Sylvester and William Hawkins went on trial before Jerusalem's new Israeli district court on 5 charges of having communicated important military intelligence to Israel's enemies.

Sept. 16: El Salvador recognized the State of Israel.

Israeli and Arab Legion mortars and medium artillery engaged in a heavy duel in Jerusalem.

The State Council of Israel adopted an income tax bill.

Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Shertok stated Arab forces were forming for an offensive, and charged that UN truce supervision officials were inclined to be more severe toward Israeli forces than toward the Arab.

Sept. 17: UN Mediator Count Folke Bernadotte and his French assistant, Col. André Pierre Serot, while on a tour of inspection in the Katamon district of Jerusalem, were assassinated by four Jews of unknown identity, but presumed to be members of the Stern Group. Arkady A. Sobolev, Acting Secretary-General of the UN, directed Dr. Ralph J. Bunche to take over the Mediator's duties, and Gen. Aage Lundstroem, the Mediator's Chief of Staff, to carry out a complete investigation of the assassination.

Sept. 18: Military and civilian police in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, and the Israeli Army conducted a full search for persons involved in the assassination of Count Bernadotte, arresting 200 suspects. Ports and airfields in Israel were closed until further notice, and a curfew was imposed upon Israeli areas of Jerusalem.

Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, Acting UN Mediator for Palestine, sent a message to Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Shertok calling the assassination of Count Bernadotte "an outrage against the international community and an unspeakable violation of elementary morality." "The act," he stated, "constitutes a breach of the truce of the utmost gravity, for which the Provisional Government of Israel must assume full responsibility." He noted that the comments of Moshe Shertok and Colonel Yadin at a Tel Aviv press conference on Sept. 16 were not the sort which discouraged "repre-

hensible acts of this kind." Members of the foreign press corps in Tel Aviv protested inclusion of the last point in Dr. Bunche's statement; the Israeli Government denied any relationship between the Foreign Minister's statements and the murder.

Announcement was made that Gen. Aage Lundstroem would become special representative of Acting Mediator Bunche, and Brig. Gen. Riley his Chief of Staff.

The UN Security Council denounced the murder of Count Bernadotte and Colonel Serot.

Israeli Foreign Minister Shertok cabled UN Secretary-General Lie pledging "most vigorous and energetic measures" against the assassins. The Secretary-General announced that he had put the Palestine problem on the proposed agenda of the General Assembly.

Sept. 19: The Stern Group announced its dissolution as a separate military organization and the entry of its members into the Israeli Army of Defense. The curfew ended in Jerusalem.

Sept. 20: The Provisional Government of Israel adopted emergency regulations for the prevention of terrorism. They provided for 5-20 years imprisonment for persons taking an active part in terrorist acts, 1-5 years for membership in such organizations, and up to 3 years or a fine of £1,000 or both for supporting them.

The Arab League announced the creation of an Arab Government for Palestine with Ahmad Hilmi Pasha as Prime Minister, and headquarters at Gaza. King Abdallah of Transjordan refused to recognize the new government and said that he would bar it from territory controlled by his army. He appointed the Arab Legion commander, Lieut. Col. Abdallah al-Tel, as military governor of Jerusalem, succeeding Ahmad Hilmi Pasha.

The UN Assembly released Count Bernadotte's final report on the Palestine situation: (1) Peace must be restored in Palestine by any means possible; (2) Israel exists, and there are no sound reasons for assuming it will not continue to do so; (3) Israel's boundaries must be fixed by the UN if the parties concerned cannot agree on them; (4) the original partition boundaries must be revised to produce "geographical homogeneity"; (5) displaced persons must be assured the right to return home, or adequate compensation if they cannot or will not return; (6) Jerusalem, "because of its religious and international sig-

nificance and the complexity of interest involved, should be accorded special and separate treatment"; (7) international guarantees should be provided to allay fear, particularly with regard to human rights and boundaries. Suggested territorial changes included: (1) the Negeb to be Arab territory; (2) Galilee to be Israeli territory; (3) Lydda to be a free airport; (4) Haifa, including the oil refineries and terminals, to be a free port; (5) all parties to have free access to Jerusalem, which would be under UN control. Hostilities were to cease and the truce to be replaced by a formal peace or armistice. A UN boundaries commission was to delimit and establish a frontier between Arab and Jewish territories, the disposition of the territory of Palestine not included in Israel being left to the governments of the Arab states in full consultation with the Arabs of Palestine. It was recommended, however, that Arab Palestine be merged with Transjordan. Both Israel and Arab Palestine, as well as a UN Conciliation Commission, were to guarantee the political, economic, religious, and social rights of Arabs in Jewish territory and of Jews in Arab territory. (Text of conclusions, *New York Times*, Sept. 21, p. 4.)

Sept. 21: U. S. Secretary of State George Marshall announced the U. S. supported full acceptance of the Mediator's recommendations for a Palestine solution.


Egyptian and Arab League officials rejected the UN Mediator's proposals.

In reply to an Israeli Government ultimatum, Irgun Zvai Leumi officially disbanded. Some of its members joined the Israeli Army, and arms were removed from an Irgun camp in southern Jerusalem to an Israeli army arsenal. Ten additional Sternists were arrested and the Group's newspaper *Mivrak* was closed by the Israeli authorities.

Sept. 22: The Israeli Government issued the statement that it would "earnestly explore all proposals which are put forward as a basis for a final and lasting peace," but protested certain of the Mediator's suggestions, mainly those relating to the Negeb and Jerusalem.

British Foreign Secretary Bevin told the House of Commons that His Majesty's Government gave "whole-hearted and unqualified support" to the recommendations in the UN Mediator's final report.

See map opposite for Palestine territory assigned to Israel by the United Nations, or occupied by Israeli forces.



The Arab Higher Committee announced the Cabinet of the Arab Palestine Government at Gaza, as follows:

Ahmad Hilmi Pasha — Prime Minister
 Jamal al-Husayni — Foreign Affairs
 Mikhail Abcarius — Finance
 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi — Social Affairs
 Raja'i al-Husayni — Defense and Public Security
 Dr. Husayn Fakhri al-Khalidi — Health and Education
 Sulayman Tuqan — Communications
 Dr. Foti Furayj — National Economy
 Ali Hasanah — Justice
 Yusuf Sahyun — Propaganda
 Amin 'Aql — Agriculture

Arab riflemen ambushed an Israeli convoy near Latrun while en route from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem under the UN flag, killing 4, including an American engineer, and injured 3 more; the rest of the convoy returned to Tel Aviv.

Sept. 23: The General Committee placed discussion of the final report of the UN Mediator on the agenda of the General Assembly.

Secretary Marshall advocated, in a speech before the General Assembly, a Palestine free of conflict, membership in the UN for Israel and Transjordan, and economic aid to both Arabs and Jews.

The Israeli Government offered a reward of £5,000 for information leading to the arrest of UN Mediator Count Bernadotte's assassins. The Israeli State Council voted 35-0 for regulations providing severe penalties for membership in outlawed terrorist organizations.

Sept. 24: The French, Belgian, and U. S. consuls in Jerusalem conferred with Dr. Bernard Joseph, Jewish Military Governor of Jerusalem, concerning investigation of the UN Mediator's death.

Twenty-six Sternists escaped from jail in Tel Aviv; 25 of them were recaptured.

Sept. 25: The General Council of the International Refugee Organization decided against giving material aid to Arab refugees in Palestine on the basis that its resources were inadequate.

Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs pro Interim of the Palestine Arab Government, telegraphed the Secretary-General of the Arab League and the foreign ministers of all Arab countries that "the inhabitants of Palestine, in the exercise of their right to determine their own fate and

in accordance with the decisions of the Arab League Political Committee, have decided to declare all Palestine . . . an independent state ruled by a Government known as the Government of All Palestine, based on democratic principles."

Sept. 26: Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, Acting UN Mediator, requested the Israeli Government and the Arab headquarters at Amman to halt at once the sniping and shelling in Jerusalem and elsewhere in the Holy Land.

Sept. 27: Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, chief representative of Pakistan at the UN, stated in the General Assembly that his country would never reconcile itself to a sovereign state of Israel. British Foreign Secretary Bevin notified the UN General Assembly that Great Britain had "decided to support Count Bernadotte's [final] plan in its entirety."

The Israeli Government admitted shooting down an Arab plane on Sept. 24, killing two British correspondents. Brig. Gen. William Riley, the UN Truce Commission's Chief of Staff, placed responsibility for the death of 4 unarmed persons in a Jerusalem-Tel Aviv convoy on soldiers of the Arab Legion.

Sept. 28: Peter Bergson, founder of the Hebrew Committee for National Liberation, announced the liquidation of the Committee.

Hajj Amin al-Husayni, Mufti of Jerusalem, arrived in Gaza, entering Palestine for the first time in 11 years.

Sept. 29: William G. Hawkins and Frederick Sylvester, Britons held by the Israeli Government on charges of espionage, were acquitted. Sylvester was held to answer an additional indictment of complicity in the Ben Yehuda Road explosion of February 1948.

Nathan Friedman-Yellin, leader of the Stern Group, and Matityahu Shmuelovitz, his aide, were arrested by Israeli police.

Sept. 30: Umar Matar was appointed Governor-General of Palestine areas held by the Arab Legion, according to a report from Amman, Transjordan.

Dr. Chaim Weizmann, Provisional President of Israel, arrived in Tel Aviv on his first visit to the new state.

Oct. 1: The Arab Palestine National Assembly, meeting at Gaza, voted 64-11 its approval of the government headed by Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, and unanimously elected Hajj Amin al-Husayni President of the Assembly.

Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, Acting UN Mediator for Palestine, cabled the UN Security Council protesting interference by both sides with the

legitimate activities of truce observers in Palestine.

Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Shertok arrived in Paris to assume leadership of the Israeli delegation to the UN.

Dr. Chaim Weizmann, Provisional President of Israel, announced he had relinquished his British citizenship to become an Israeli citizen.

Oct. 2: In its second session, the Palestinian National Assembly at Gaza unanimously adopted a declaration of independence of a "free, democratic, sovereign state" in all Palestine.

Oct. 3: Copies of *Ma'as*, a Stern Group paper, appeared on the walls of Tel Aviv, taking responsibility for the assassination of Count Folke Bernadotte and threatening "all other foreigners" who impeded or tried to govern Israel.

The Israeli Government circulated a memorandum to the 58 UN delegations opposing any plan separating the Negeb or any part of it from Israel on the ground that the land with its petroleum and other mineral wealth and chemical resources, and its access to the Gulf of Aqaba was vital to the Jewish state's development.

Oct. 4: The Arab League submitted a memorandum to Sir Raphael Cilento, UN Director of Disease Relief, asking the UN for a credit of £E 2 million to support Arab refugees for 1 year, plus £E 500,000 to buy tents.

Oct. 5: King Abdallah of Transjordan demanded dissolution of the Palestine Arab Government at Gaza.

Henry Vigier, French member of the UN mission, was made acting head of the Palestine truce team during the absence of Dr. Ralph J. Bunche.

The U. S. destroyer *Purvis* arrived at Haifa with 92 U. S. marines for truce duty.

Oct. 7: Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the Mufti of Jerusalem, conferred in Cairo with Prime Minister Muzahim al-Pachachi of Iraq and Bahr al-din Tuqan Bey, Transjordan Minister to Egypt. He then left for Amman, Transjordan, to meet King Abdallah.

John J. Macdonald, U. S. Consul General in Jerusalem, left for consultations in Washington.

Israeli troops captured positions on heights dominating the Israeli Army's only land route to settlements in the Negeb.

Oct. 8: The Israeli Government announced an agreement with the Shell and Socony oil companies whereby they would sell sufficient sup-

plies of refined oil to Israel to meet the state's current needs.

Frederick W. Sylvester was sentenced by an Israeli district court to 7 years imprisonment on charges of espionage.

Oct. 9: Two hundred arrested Sternists disarmed guards and took control of the Jaffa military prison, where they had been confined. After some delay, the Israeli Government ordered shock troops to restore order. Some of the prisoners returned of their own free will; 35 persons were reported still at liberty.

Aubrey S. Eban, Israeli representative at the UN, protested to the Security Council concerning 6 "grave violations of the truce" by the Arabs.

Oct. 10: Sternists imprisoned at Jaffa submitted to an Israeli Army ultimatum that they submit to search and be transferred to Acre fortress, where they were put in prison cells guarded by regular army troops.

Oct. 11: Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, UN Acting Mediator, estimated that 5-6,000 guards would be required to protect UN mission members in Palestine and to internationalize Jerusalem.

Oct. 12: Egypt and Iraq announced their official recognition of the Arab Palestine Government at Gaza.

Israel and Arab forces shelled each other in southern Jerusalem. UN observers also reported heavy fighting in northern Palestine near the Lebanese frontier, where 2,000 Israeli troops were said to have attacked.

Oct. 13: Robert A. Lovett, Acting Secretary of State, announced the U. S. would not recognize the new Arab Government in Palestine.

Oct. 14: The governments of Syria and Lebanon recognized the Arab Palestine Government (London Times, Oct. 15, p. 3.)

Great Britain and China, with the support of France, strongly condemned the Israeli Government's failure to report results in its investigation of the murder of Count Folke Bernadotte. They introduced into the Security Council a draft resolution based on the Acting Mediator's recommendations designed to safeguard UN authority, to hasten apprehension of the assassins, and to prevent additional truce violations.

Henry Morgenthau, Jr., General Chairman of the United Jewish Appeal, announced that 73,000 immigrants had entered the Holy Land in the first 9 months of 1948.

Oct. 15: A 16-vehicle Israeli food convoy was heavily fired upon by Egyptian troops in the Negeb and forced to turn back. The Israeli

Army retaliated with an attack on the area.

Oct. 16: The Israeli Government rejected a UN cease-fire order issued to it and Egypt. Its forces fought to cut a corridor through the Egyptian-held Majdal-Falujah line in the Negeb; Israeli armor stormed the village of Iraq al-Manshiyyah; Israeli troops were reported to have severed the Gaza-Beersheba road in several places, and to have cut through the Majdal-Falujah-Hebron road at Karatiyya and Hattah; Israeli planes bombed Beersheba, Gaza, and Falujah. Egyptian artillery hammered at Gat and Nir Am.

Oct. 17: Israeli troops attacked Egyptian forces in the area east of Falujah; observers and newsmen were barred from the Negeb battle area.

Walter Eytan, Director-General of the Israeli Foreign Office, stated Israel "stands by its claim to the whole of the Negeb."

Oct. 18: Dr. Ralph Bunche, Acting UN Mediator, declared "a serious break of the truce was involved in the Negeb outbreak." UN representatives asked Israel for an "immediate unconditional cease-fire for 4 days in order to provide time" for a peaceful settlement. The Israeli Government proposed, instead, an immediate meeting with Egyptian representatives to "settle peacefully" the differences between the two countries regarding the Negeb.

Israeli planes heavily bombed Egyptian troops at Gaza, Beersheba, Falujah, and Majdal, and the airfield at Al-Arish. Fighting in the Negeb largely ceased; Egyptian forces at Falujah and Iraq Suwaydan were surrounded and isolated by Israeli troops which had cut Egypt's main Majdal-Falujah line in numerous places, establishing 3 corridors and linking Jewish settlements in the Negeb to Israel.

The UN Security Council voted unanimously to order an immediate cease-fire in Palestine (Text, *New York Times*, Oct. 20, p. 1), and adopted the Anglo-Chinese resolution of Oct. 14. Egypt accepted the cease-fire.

Oct. 19: The Israeli Government announced it would accept the cease-fire order.

The UN Truce Commission headquarters at Haifa announced Israeli forces had launched a small-scale attack on Iraqi positions on the central front. Israeli troops were also reported to have isolated Egyptian troops at Majdal in the Negeb, and to have attacked Egyptian forces on the Bayt Jibrin-Bethlehem road.

Oct. 20: The Political and Security Committee of the UN General Assembly voted 34-11, with 10 nations abstaining, to postpone debate

on the Palestine problem until a future time.

Israeli forces captured Hulayqat; Israeli planes bombed Gaza, Majdal, Falujah, Beer-sheba, and Bayt Jibrin.

Oct. 21: Israeli forces captured Beersheba, cutting Egyptian troops in the Jerusalem sector off from the Egyptian command at Gaza. Egyptian armor at Isdud moved toward Gaza.

The Acting UN Mediator sent Egypt and Israel an order for a cease-fire in the Negeb to begin at noon, Oct. 22, GMT.

The UN Social Humanitarian and Cultural Committee voted to postpone discussion of the Palestine Arab refugee problem until October 29.

Oct. 22: The cease-fire went into effect in Palestine.

Oct. 23: A Papal Encyclical urged Catholics to pray for peace in Palestine, and stated that freedom of access to the Holy Places should be assured by international guarantees.

After reported capture by Syrian troops of Shaykh Abbad, a height in the Menarah sector of northern Galilee, Israeli forces launched a sharp attack on Fawzi al-Qawuqji's forces in the area. Israeli forces were reported to have attacked the Egyptian Army in the Gaza area.

The Political and Security Committee of the UN General Assembly voted 19-16, the U. S. in favor and 14 nations abstaining, to postpone action on the Palestine question another week.

Oct. 24: President Truman reiterated that he would approve no change in the Nov. 29, 1947, partition plan for Palestine that was not acceptable to Israel. (Text, *New York Times*, Oct. 25, p. 2.)

Oct. 27: Dr. Judah L. Magnes, President of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and leader of the Ihud organization favoring a bi-national Arab-Jewish Palestine, died in New York at the age of 71.

The Jewish settlement of Morganthau was founded as one of a group of new colonies along the Israeli-held corridor from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

The Israeli Government officially refused to withdraw from areas its army had won in Palestine.

Oct. 28: Egyptian troops withdrew from Isdud; Israeli troops occupied it and certain villages in the Bayt Jibrin-Hebron-Bethlehem and the Isdud-Hamamah areas.

Israel's Foreign Minister Moshe Shertok instructed Aubrey S. Eban, Israel's UN rep-

representative, to offer to negotiate with the Egyptians "on all differences" between Egypt and Israel. David Ben-Gurion, Israeli Prime Minister, made an oral bid for future "neighboring relations" between the two countries.

An Anglo-Chinese resolution calling for withdrawal of Egyptian and Israeli military forces to positions occupied on October 14 was submitted to the UN Security Council. The resolution contained provisions for sanctions against either party that continued to defy UN orders in Palestine.

Oct. 29: The UN International Children's Emergency Fund voted \$6,000,000 for aid to Palestine refugees.

UN observers reported Israeli forces attacking the Arabs in northern Palestine over a large area between Al-Tabighah and Lake Hulah. In the Security Council, the U. S. delegation withdrew support of the Anglo-Chinese resolution of October 28, which went to a subcommittee for redrafting.

Oct. 30: The Israeli Government announced it had ruled that its proposed citizenship and election laws would apply to any Palestine territory in Israeli Army control. Citizenship would be automatically given to all those permanently domiciled in such territory at the time the law came into effect.

The Israeli Army shelled Tarshiha and was reported to be fighting Syrian and Lebanese troops on a wide front in northern Palestine. Iraqi forces shelled Ein Shemer and Majdal Yaba on the central front.

Oct. 31: The Security Committee of the Israeli Provisional Parliament confirmed the General Staff's decision to dissolve the separate headquarters of Palmah (assault troops) and its affiliated services.

Israeli Army headquarters stated Israeli troops had won control of 200 square miles in northern Palestine up to the Syrian and Lebanese borders. Some Israeli troops were reported to have entered Lebanon and to be near Bennet Jbail.

The Israeli Government decided on a cease-fire to take effect at 11:00 a. m.

Nov. 1: King Abdallah of Transjordan, in a speech from the throne delivered as Palestine Arab leaders were in Amman asking for his aid, stated he was "determined to bring peace" to the Arabs of Palestine and to avoid disunity and disagreement among the Arab nations.

It was announced that Henry Montor, Executive Vice-Chairman of the United Palestine Appeal and for 22 years affiliated with it,

had resigned, protesting that funds raised in the U. S. were being used "as a lever with which to change or dominate the social structure of Palestine."

The UN ordered Israeli forces to withdraw from Lebanon; the Israeli Government was reported to have refused. Observers reported Jewish forces in Lebanon to a depth of 2-3 miles along most of the northern front.

Menahem Begin, leader of Irgun Zvai Leumi and the new political party, Herut (Freedom), which evolved from it, applied for a U. S. visa.

Nov. 2: Dr. Emanuel Neumann, President of the Zionist Organization of America, stated in reply to Henry Montor that funds raised in the U. S. for Palestine were "referred to head offices in Jerusalem to be disbursed in accordance with the budgets of the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency for Palestine."

Nov. 4: British Foreign Secretary Bevin confirmed in a letter to Parliament that 20 officers and 13 soldiers of other ranks were seconded from the British to the Transjordan Army, but that none of them was serving outside of Transjordan.

The UN Security Council adopted a revised Anglo-Chinese resolution calling upon Egypt and Israel to withdraw their troops from positions taken since October 14; to conduct negotiations directly or through negotiators responsible to the UN; and to establish permanent truce lines and neutral zones. The resolution appointed a committee of the 5 permanent members of the Council and Belgium and Colombia to give the Acting Mediator any advice he might require in effecting the resolution. (Text, *New York Times*, Nov. 5, p. 10.)

Nov. 5: Brig. Gen. William E. Riley, Chief of Staff of the UN truce observation force, arrived in Paris to prepare a report for the Security Council on the recent fighting.

Egyptian forces isolated near Majdal withdrew toward Gaza, to Dayr Sunayd. Israeli forces occupied the vacated area, including Majdal.

Nov. 6: Egyptian troops withdrew from Dayr Sunayd to Jabaliyah, just north of Gaza; Israeli forces took over the evacuated territory.

Nov. 7: The Israeli Government took note of the Security Council resolution of Nov. 4, announcing it awaited proposals for new military lines in the Negev before taking action on it.

Nov. 8: Honduras became the 17th nation to

recognize the State of Israel.

Nov. 9: In a private meeting of Security Council members, the Acting UN Mediator presented a new draft resolution, including an armistice and a broad neutral zone between the armies.

It was reported that the police fortress of Iraq Suwaydan had capitulated and the town and nearby Bayt Affah were occupied by Israeli troops.

Nov. 10: Dr. Ralph Bunche, Acting UN Mediator, asked Israeli representatives to explain the arrest of two truce observation officers near Faluja in the Negeb.

The Committee of Seven, formed under the Security Council resolution of November 4, held its first meeting and elected Dr. Roberto Urdaneta Arabalaez, Colombian representative, as chairman.

Nov. 11: Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion stated that conversations in regard to a Palestine settlement were proceeding with two Arab governments.

Nov. 13: The UN Committee of Seven approved, 6-0 with the USSR abstaining, an order, opposed at the outset by Israel, calling on the Government of Israel to evacuate Beersheba and withdraw its forces in the Negeb to positions occupied Oct. 14; it called on Egypt to maintain its forces on a line 15-20 miles north of the Egyptian border. The 40-50 mile area in between would be a UN neutral zone. The order would go into effect Nov. 19.

Nov. 14: The Egyptian Government announced its acceptance of the terms of the Nov. 13 order from the UN Committee of Seven. It was learned the order would involve Israeli evacuation of Negba, Hattah, and Karatiyya. (Map, *New York Times*, Nov. 15, p. 5.)

Nov. 15: The Canadian, French, and Belgian delegations presented a resolution to the Security Council providing for an armistice in all sectors, and negotiations to be conducted by or through the Acting UN Mediator with the aim of setting permanent demarcation lines and withdrawing and reducing such armed forces as needed to insure the maintenance of the armistice during the transition to permanent peace. The resolution, which it was stated would not prejudice the Acting Mediator's actions in implementing the Security Council resolution of Nov. 4, was adopted, 8-0, with the USSR and Ukraine abstaining.

Five high executives of the United Palestine Appeal resigned, stating that the controlling body of the Appeal was not representative of the many local Jewish organizations

that raised its funds, and that it was dominated in its policy by the Zionist Organization of America.

Dr. James G. McDonald, chief of the U. S. Mission to Israel, was called to Paris to consult with U. S. Secretary of State George Marshall on the Palestine situation.

Nov. 16: Delegates to Iraq, Lebanon, and Pakistan protested consideration of Israel for membership in the UN Food and Agricultural Organization.

The Supreme Court of Israel overruled a Jerusalem district court, stating there was "not sufficient evidence to support the conviction" of Frederick William Sylvester, British constable, as a spy. A sentence of 7 years' imprisonment was countermanded.

Nov. 17: A report from Tel Aviv stated talks between representatives of the Israeli Government and 2 Arab countries (presumably Egypt and Transjordan) had broken down.

Nov. 18: Great Britain introduced into the UN Assembly's Political and Security Committee a resolution calling for a solution on the basis of the final Bernadotte report released Sept. 20. (Text of British Resolution, *New York Times*, Nov. 19, p. 18.)

The Israeli Government replied to the Security Council resolutions of Nov. 4 and 15 as follows: (1) all extra forces sent into the Negeb after Oct. 14 had been withdrawn in accordance with the Security Council resolution of Nov. 4; (2) the retention of forces in inland areas such as Beersheba was necessary to safeguard the entire Negeb and Jerusalem; (3) the Israeli Government had named representatives to negotiate for an armistice and would like to be advised of the time and place for a meeting with accredited Arab representatives.

Nov. 19: Dr. Ralph Bunche, Acting UN Mediator, ruled that the Israeli reply of Nov. 18 to the Security Council constituted acceptance in principle of his order for the return of Israeli forces in the Negeb to positions held Oct. 14. He asked the Egyptian and Israeli Governments to instruct their liaison officers to begin conferences as soon as possible with Brig. Gen. William E. Riley, his Chief of Staff, concerning establishment of provisional demarcation lines.

Nov. 20: Dr. Philip C. Jessup, in a speech before the General Assembly's Political and Security Committee, stated the U. S. official view that boundaries set by the Nov. 29, 1947, resolution should be modified only with the full consent of

Israel; that any territorial additions Israel demanded over and above the boundaries set by the partition resolution must be offset by its giving up land elsewhere; that Count Bernadotte's final plan was acceptable as a basis for renewed peace efforts; and that Israel should be admitted to the UN. (Text, *New York Times*, Nov. 21, p. 3.)

Nov. 21: It was reported from Tel Aviv that Egyptian troops had occupied Tall al-Fari'ah, Tall al-Jamma, and a number of other smaller villages in the Negeb.

Nov. 22: Semyon K. Tsarapkin, Soviet representative to the UN, demanded in a speech before the General Assembly's Political and Security Committee that the Assembly establish a permanent peace settlement in Palestine based "in substance" on the November 29, 1947, UN partition plan.

The Egyptian Government rejected a UN proposal that it negotiate directly with Israel for an armistice in the Negeb.

Nov. 23: The Israeli Government ordered cessation of unrestricted recruiting for the army; it also ordered the formation of a regular reserve of men up to 45 years of age.

Philip C. Jessup, U. S. delegate on the UN General Assembly's Political and Security Committee, proposed 10 amendments to the British proposal of Nov. 18, suggesting that both the final Bernadotte report and the Nov. 29, 1947, resolution be used as bases for a boundary settlement. (Excerpts, *New York Times*, Nov. 24, p. 4.)

Nov. 24: Muza'lim Amin al-Pachachi, Prime Minister of Iraq, told the Iraqi Parliament that the government would reject the British plan of Nov. 18 as a settlement for the Palestine conflict.

Nov. 25: Hector McNeil, British delegate, presented a revised British resolution to the UN Assembly Political and Security Committee which closely resembled the U. S. basis for a Palestine solution suggested Nov. 23. Mr. McNeil stated "The emphasis should be on the Bernadotte plan although . . . it need not rest exclusively upon it." (Text, *New York Times*, Nov. 26, p. 6.)

Nov. 26: Bulgaria recognized the State of Israel. UN negotiations for an armistice in southern Palestine were deadlocked, Israel refusing to leave Beersheba or consent to the stationing of UN observers in the Negeb.

Nov. 27: E. S. Hoofien, new Israeli Economic Director, asked the Israeli populace for "severe

austerity" measures to combat the spiraling cost of living.

Nov. 29: Israel submitted its application for admission to the UN to Secretary-General Trygve Lie.

Lt. Col. Moshe Dayan, acting for Israel, and Lt. Col. Abdallah Bey al-Tel, acting for the Arabs, ordered a cease-fire for Jerusalem as a result of peace talks under UN auspices.

Nov. 30: The second largest Israeli party, MAPAM, rejected a Communist proposal for a single list for the two parties in Israel's first election on January 25, 1949.

The armistice providing for a "complete and sincere cease-fire" in Jerusalem was signed by Arab and Israeli commanders, to go into effect at 6:00 a. m. December 1.

The UN Assembly's Political and Security Committee received a second revision of the British resolution superseding the other two resolutions and incorporating all the amendments proposed by the U. S. on November 23.

Syria

1948

Oct. 10: The Security Departments of Syria and Lebanon ruled that all Syrian and Lebanese Jews resident abroad must return home; that all resident foreign Jews be repatriated; that marriage between Lebanese or Syrian citizens and Jews be forbidden; and that government officials married to Jews be dismissed. (London Times, Oct. 11, p. 3.)

Oct. 14: The governments of Syria and Lebanon recognized the Arab Government for Palestine at Gaza. (London Times, Oct. 15, p. 3.)

Nov. 6: Muhsin al-Barazi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Nuqrashi Pasha, Egyptian Prime Minister, conferred in Cairo.

Nov. 8: Three cabinet members resigned: Lutfi Haffar — Vice Prime Minister Sabri al-'Afali — Interior Mikhail Ilyan — National Economy

Transjordan

1948

Nov. 1: King Abdallah, speaking at the opening of Parliament, stated that he was "determined to bring peace" to the Arabs of Palestine.

Nov. 4: British Foreign Secretary Bevin confirmed the fact that officers of the regular British Army were serving with Transjordanian forces, but were not being used outside the frontiers of Transjordan.

Nov. 6: Fawzi Pasha Mulhi, Defense Minister and head of the Transjordan delegation to the Arab League Council meeting in Cairo, denied the rumor that Transjordan would make a separate peace with Israel.

Turkey

1948

Sept. 23: The Rumanian Government demanded the recall of Major Fazil Belcioglu and Turgut Menemencioglu, legation secretaries, on charges that they had helped Rumanian lawbreakers to escape to Turkey.

Sept. 27: U. S. Ambassador George Wadsworth presented his credentials to President Inönü.

Oct. 17: Thirteen members of the Republican Peoples Party were elected to the Grand National Assembly as a result of the by-elections of October 11. (*News from Turkey*, Oct. 21, p. 1.)

Oct. 20: It was reported that almost 2,000 Turkish Jews had received authorization to emigrate to Israel in the previous three days.

Nov. 1: Turkey took steps to halt the further emigration of Turkish Jews to Israel by refusing to issue visas and voiding all previously issued passports.

Archbishop Spyrou Athenagoras of New York, primate of the Orthodox Church in North and South America, was elevated to Patriarch of the Greek Orthodox Church.

Nov. 2: Turkey signed a \$30,000,000 loan agreement with the Export-Import Bank, repayable in 35 years with interest at 2½%.

Sükrü Saracoglu was elected President of the Grand National Assembly. (*London Times*, Nov. 2, p. 3.)

Nov. 10: A trade agreement between Turkey and Italy was signed providing that "any eventual balance in favor of either signatory may be transferred to any country participating in the European Recovery Plan and used for the purchase of goods there."

Arab League

1948

Sept. 20: The Arab League announced the formation of an Arab Government for Palestine, with Ahmad Hilmi Pasha as Prime Minister, and Gaza as its temporary headquarters. King Abdallah of Transjordan informed the Arab League that he would not recognize the formation of a government "within the security zone of the Transjordan Government, which extends from the Egyptian Kingdom's frontiers to the frontiers of Syria and Lebanon." (For further items regarding the Arab [Gaza] Government for Palestine, see under Palestine, p. 73.)

Petroleum

The Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) inter-party agreement which was announced on November 5 settled a dispute that had first arisen in December 1946. The American partners in IPC, Standard of New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum, then announced plans to purchase 30% and 10% respectively of Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) stock, be-

coming in effect partners in the production and marketing of oil from the Saudi Arabian concession. Simultaneously the two companies announced an agreement to purchase substantial quantities of Iranian output of crude from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

Suit was immediately brought against the American partners by the French member of IPC, the Compagnie Française des Petroles, on the grounds that the proposed agreement violated the "restrictive clause," or "Red Line Agreement" entered into by the IPC group in 1928. This clause stated that no partner in IPC would act separately from the rest of the group in all matters pertaining to the acquisition and operation of concessions, or the purchase, refining, and marketing of oil produced within an area (defined by a red line) which comprised the Arab portions of the former Ottoman Empire, including the Arabian Peninsula. Back of the suit brought by the Compagnie Française des Petroles was the fear that under the proposed arrangement, Arabian and Iranian oil deposits would be developed at the expense of those controlled by IPC, upon which the Compagnie — and to a large extent France itself — was dependent. Suit was also brought by Mr. C. S. Gulbenkian, who owned

5% of IPC stock although he neither produced nor distributed any oil; he likewise feared that his interests might be submerged by the plans of the oil giants.

According to published reports, the agreement abrogated the restrictive clause in return for guarantees that IPC production and means of transport would be increased. It thus enabled Standard of New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum to formalize their association with the Arabian American Oil Company, which already had actually been in effect through the contrivance of a capital loan amounting to \$102,000,000. It recognized the closer interplay of the three giants of Middle East production — the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Iraq Petroleum Company, and Arabian American Oil Company — which characterized the current trend in Middle East oil development, and within this framework paved the way for greatly expanded production. If current plans were carried through, it was expected that Middle East oil production would be doubled within a period of three years. Aramco alone announced an intention to invest \$520,000,000, including \$200,000,000 for the Trans-Arabian pipeline project, in capital expenditure during the next five years.

CHRONOLOGY

1948

Oct. 8: The Israeli Government announced an agreement with the Shell and Socony oil companies whereby they would sell sufficient supplies of refined oil to Israel to meet its current needs.

Nov. 2: The Arabian American Oil Company announced that it had given up its option on oil concessions in the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia neutral zone.

Nov. 5: An out of court settlement of points of difference among members of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) included: (1) removal of the restrictive ("Red Line") clause of 1928; (2) agreement to increase the means of production upon demonstration of need by any single member, specifically to plan the construction of an additional 30-inch pipeline from Kirkuk to a Mediterranean port; (3) agreement to permit sale and purchase of oil between members. (*Oil and Gas Journal*, Nov. 25, p. 63.)

Nov. 21: The government of Iraq was reported to have opened conversations with representatives of the Iraq Petroleum Company regarding a reinterpretation of its concession agreement. Points discussed included: (1) royalty payment in gold at free market prices instead of at the British buying rate; (2) increased oil production; (3) employment of larger numbers of Iraqi nationals; (4) the holding by Iraqi nationals, of up to 20% stock in IPC. (*Oil and Gas Journal*, Dec. 2, p. 46.)

Nov. 27: Jamil Mardam Bey, Prime Minister of Syria, Gabriel Murr, acting Prime Minister of Lebanon in the absence of Riad al-Sulh in Paris, and other leaders met at Beirut to discuss the Trans-Arabian pipeline project, completion of which had been held up by the Syrian Parliament's refusal to grant transit permission to a U. S. company after the U. S. endorsement of Palestine partition.

United Nations

1948

Sept. 4: The UN divulged that 14 countries and a number of large relief agencies had promised aid and supplies for Palestine war refugees; gifts included £5,000 from Ethiopia for the purchase of food; 100,000 rupees from India; and 1,000,000 rupees from the Nizam of Hyderabad.

Sept. 7: It was announced that the UN had decided to open a central field office in Beirut to aid Arab refugees from Palestine.

Oct. 8: The UN General Assembly elected Egypt, 38-19 on the fourth ballot, to be a non-permanent member of the Security Council beginning Jan. 1, 1949.

Nov. 15: The Economic and Financial Committee of the General Assembly, by a vote of 38 to 9, recommended to the Economic and Social Council that consideration be given to the establishment of an Economic Commission for the Middle East.

Nov. 17: The third general conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) opened in Beirut.

The General Assembly adopted a resolution authorizing Secretary General Trygve Lie to advance immediately up to \$5,000,000 from the UN's working capital to aid Palestine refugees, most of them Arabs, during a nine-month period starting Dec. 1, the cost of aid to be repaid by voluntary governmental contri-

butions. Mr. Lie was further empowered to appoint a UN director of relief for the Palestine refugees and to assume responsibility for over-all planning. A sum of \$29,500,000 was fixed as needed to aid all the refugees with another \$2,500,000 for administrative and operating expenses. Britain announced that it was giving £100,000 (\$400,000) in currency or goods and equipment; Vincent Broustra of France stated his government hoped to provide

about 500,000,000 francs (about \$1,670,000). *Nov. 27:* The U. S. delegation to the General Assembly tentatively pledged \$13,000,000 to \$15,000,000 to UN relief for Palestine, final authorization being dependent on Congress.

The Political Committee of the UN General Assembly voted to ask the Security Council to re-examine the cases of countries, among them Transjordan, which had previously been turned down for membership in the UN.

BOOK REVIEWS

Recent Books on the Problem of Palestine

J. C. Hurewitz

ON NO area of the Middle East has so much been written by so many with so little concern for objective appraisal and analysis as on Palestine. Any attempt to analyze exhaustively the books, pamphlets, official documents, and articles of even the last dozen years would demand a volume in itself and the collective effort of many scholars, for no one can pretend to have read — let alone digested — all of this material. Much of it is still buried in government files; a good deal was illegal at the time of its appearance and has never reached the general public. This brief review, intended primarily for the guidance of the inquisitive reader, will present merely a sampling of those books published in English since 1937 — including a few official reports — which deal with the major political aspects of the Palestine problem. Only that literature will be considered which touches the period prior to the Mandate's end and serves to illustrate the major trends in writing, as well as the topics still awaiting research.

During this period the Palestine Mandate progressively disintegrated, until it reached its chaotic termination in May 1948. The problem was inflated into a world issue of primary importance. At stake were the fates of the Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine; the hopes of the Arab and Jewish worlds; the prestige of Great Britain and the United States; and the authority of the United Nations. If the impartial historian seems to have been discouraged from tackling the thorny question, the explanation is not far to seek. The problem is one of the most challenging

in our generation, exciting the most intense passions. The quantity of source material, moreover, has reached staggering proportions: it can be said without exaggeration that there are at least three versions of the daily happenings in Palestine in the past decade.

The study of the Palestine issue has become virtually a discipline in its own right. An intimate knowledge of the history of the Arabs, of the Middle East, and of the Big Power interests in that region does not equip the investigator for a well-balanced evaluation any more than an equal fluency in the history of the Jews, of anti-Semitism, and of Zionism. The domestic politics of Britain and the United States enter into the picture as much as does the logrolling at the United Nations. A study of Palestine in this larger sense is a massive undertaking, and we are too close to the problem for definitive analysis.

As if these factors in themselves were insufficient, there is also the language barrier. The student of the issue as a whole must possess a command of Arabic, Hebrew, and English, while a working knowledge of German, French, Italian, and Russian would provide useful additional aids.

The Palestine problem was not always so tangled as it has become since the mid-1930's. It passed through its least complicated stage between the time of the ratification of the Palestine Mandate by the Council of the League of Nations in September 1923 and the outbreak of the Palestine Arab revolt in April 1936. In those years the contestants to the dispute comprised only the United Kingdom,

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as mandatory, the local Arab national movement, as spokesman for the Arab community, and the Zionist Organization (and its successor, the Jewish Agency), as spokesmen for the Jewish National Home.

These early developments are examined by the *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Command Paper 5479, London, 1937), which remains a classic example of fair and frank assessment in the best British tradition. The Peel Report, as it is commonly known, is indispensable for any clear understanding of the background of the later problem. It explains the nature and growth of Arab and Jewish interest in the country, and the origins of the mandate and its operation. The Report sums up the achievements of the two communities and the British administration; but it does not recoil from criticizing the excesses of Arab and Jewish nationalism or from enumerating the failures of the Palestine Government. The Peel Report's chief weakness is the omission of any inquiry into the shifting policy of the mandatory. The most detached consideration of this topic is Paul L. Hanna, *British Policy in Palestine* (Washington, 1942). Hanna traverses much the same ground as the Royal Commission, but expends less effort on events in Palestine and more on the whys and wherefores of decisions in London. Moreover, he carries his documented narrative through the first two years of World War II and is thus able to allude to the manner in which the Axis Powers became involved. The Royal Institute of International Affairs published in 1937 *Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1936* (London), which was essentially a digest of the appropriate chapters of the annual *Survey of International Affairs*, the better-known mandatory publications, and popular British works on the subject. This compendious introduction to the Palestine problem was later brought up to date in 1939 and again in 1945. Though the second revision is well-conceived, it is poorly executed and does not meet the usually high standards of the Royal Institute. The final chapter, covering the war years, suffers in particular from brevity and errors of emphasis as well as fact.

The Peel Report, Hanna, and the first edition of the Royal Institute's booklet possess in common the quality of dispassion, especially as

regards the Arab and Zionist positions. Furthermore, excepting the report of the Royal Commission, whose primary function was to find some way of breaking the political deadlock, they content themselves with a description of the problem's unfolding. On rare occasions other books have appeared which treat the Palestine problem without bias, but their authors insist on offering their private recommendations for a solution. Into this category falls John Marlowe (pseud.), *Rebellion in Palestine* (London, 1946), an undocumented — except for lengthy extracts from mandatory reports in the earlier chapters — statement by a former British resident of Palestine. Incidentally, Marlowe's epilogue on the war years is a sober but personal interpretation. More often those writers who propose their private solutions are either pro-Arab or pro-Zionist, even though their recommendations may not necessarily follow the accepted line. Richard B. Williams-Thompson, *The Palestine Problem* (London, 1946), is an example which is friendly to the Arab cause, while Sigmund Katzenelson, *The Palestine Problem and its Solution* (Jerusalem, 1946), is one whose underlying sympathy is for Zionism.

Most literary contributions to the Palestine problem, however, belong strictly to the partisan class. Books of this type are characterized by preoccupation with theories, not conditions. Their authors betray a marked penchant for moralism and little concern for the niceties of precise historiography. Arabs as well as Zionists could, and did, muster powerful moral arguments. But instead of presenting both sides objectively, the partisans see the issue as black and white without intermediate shades. They usually defend the espoused cause and attack the contrary with equal emotion. Besides, the very fact that the problem has remained unsettled for so long has tended to stimulate special pleading.

The Arab nationalist argument lends itself to easy restatement. The Arabs are, and have been for centuries, a majority of the population of Palestine and possess most of its land. They therefore see no reason why an alien people who are dedicating themselves to the eventual purpose of ruling the country should be suffered to settle there. The only just solution, in their view, would be to have the Arabs

establish Palestine as an independent Arab state. This is the central theme of M. F. Abcarius, *Palestine through the Fog of Propaganda* (London, 1946), and of Frank C. Sakran, *Palestine Dilemma: Arab Rights versus Zionist Aspirations* (Washington, 1948). Both authors are Christian Arabs of Palestine origin. Abcarius, who was a civil servant of the Palestine Government for twenty-three years, relates his story primarily from the standpoint of what has occurred in that country. Sakran, however, emigrated to the United States on the eve of World War I and deals with the local and Big Power aspects alike. The Arab claims are also featured in works by non-Arab sympathizers, as, for instance, in J. M. N. Jeffries, *Palestine: the Reality* (London, 1939), and Nevill Barbour, *Nisi Dominus* (London, 1946).¹ These two British authors imply that Zionism is essentially an international conspiracy to defraud the Palestine Arabs of their land. Although they have documented their thesis, their methods of research are open to serious question, for both appear to have sought mainly such evidence as would serve to substantiate their preconceived beliefs. This pro-Arab literature of the past decade has been predicated on the assumption that the Jewish National Home is still only an experiment, and that if it were proved to rest on unjust foundations the experiment should be abandoned.

Meanwhile, the Zionist argument, if somewhat more complex than that of the Palestine Arabs, is also morally cogent. The Jews who came to Palestine to build their national home under the sponsorship of the League of Nations did so in good faith. They paid high prices for the relatively small acreage acquired. The Arab population of Palestine expanded at an unprecedented pace, and its living standard was raised to a point higher than that in any of the nearby countries. The question of whether or not a Jewish national home should be established in Palestine had become academic by the mid-1930's, for the national home already existed. The paramount question now, insisted the Zionists, was that of future immigration to provide refuge and rehabilitation for the uprooted European Jews.

¹ Published in the United States under the title *Palestine: Star or Crescent?* (New York, 1947).

If Great Britain would not facilitate Jewish immigration as it was required to do by the terms of the mandate, the Palestine Jews had no recourse but to demand full statehood immediately, so that they would be able to regulate immigration themselves. The open demand for Jewish sovereignty became part of the official Zionist position in 1942 and began to be included among the arguments which provided the main burden of most of the books written by Zionists and their champions. Bernard Joseph, *British Rule in Palestine* (Washington, 1948), presses these arguments within a legal framework; Walter Clay Lowdermilk, *Palestine: Land of Promise* (New York, 1944), from the point of view of large-scale projects for land reclamation, power generation, and water conservation; Ellen Thorbecke, *Promised Land* (New York, 1947), and Pierre van Paassen and Herbert S. Sonnenfeld, *Palestine: Land of Israel* (Chicago, 1948), with the aid of pictorial records; and Frank Gervasi, *To Whom Palestine?* (New York, 1946), on the ground that the Palestine Arabs have no valid historical, political, or moral claims to the country. By and large the pro-Zionist literature has tended either to ignore or gloss over the existence of the Arab national movement in Palestine, or to stress its wartime affiliations with the Axis.

The perusal of one or two books representing each side will furnish an easy acquaintance with the Arab and Zionist views. But where can the neutral reader find factual accounts of the successive phases through which the Palestine problem has passed since the mid-1930's, and an analysis of the problem today? This question is not simple to answer, because no standard work on the subject in all of its complexities has yet been published. The political developments within Palestine during the war and postwar years remain to be traced impartially, as do their echoes throughout the Jewish, Arab, and Moslem worlds. Little research has been directed toward finding out how the Palestine issue was drawn into the vortex of Big Power politics and how this, in turn, has affected the actions of the United Nations. Finally, the interaction of all these forces—perhaps the most elusive aspect of the Palestine problem—is still largely unexplored.

Esco Foundation, *Palestine: A Study of*

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Jewish, Arab, and British Policies (2 vols., New Haven, 1947), attempted an exhaustive survey from Zionist origins in the nineteenth century through World War II. This detailed work, based on monographs by twenty Christian and Jewish scholars, is useful primarily for reference purposes. Its inclusive bibliography should prove helpful to those seeking more information on specific subjects. However, the chapters are not of uniform quality. In general the coverage of trends and events prior to 1939 is far superior to that of the years following. Moreover, while the Esco study itself proposes no final solution, it avowedly favors the Zionist cause. The editor stands at times in moral judgment, replying at length to Arab arguments. This practice, which reduces Esco's worth, is not pursued by Charles R. Gellner of the Congressional Library's Legislative Reference Service in his *The Palestine Problem: An Analysis Historical and Contemporary* (Public Affairs Bulletin No. 50, Washington, 1947). Gellner outlines the course of the problem through the breakdown of the London conference on Palestine of 1946-47. Though dispassionate, his statement rest exclusively on sources and secondary literature in English, and owing to its brevity constitutes more of a summary than an analysis.

As regards the changing situation in Palestine itself, there is little to recommend. The Palestine Government's *A Survey of Palestine* (3 vols., Jerusalem, 1946), *Supplement to Survey of Palestine* (Jerusalem, 1947), and *Supplementary Memorandum* (Jerusalem, July 1947), evidence submitted to the Anglo-American and United Nations inquiry committees, must be approached with caution. These volumes, it is true, contain much valuable data, but the treatment throughout is apologetic, absolving the Palestine Administration from any responsibility for the Arab-British-Zionist impasse. Even the chronology of principal political events, which appears in Volume I of the *Survey* and in the *Supplementary Memorandum*, is colored.

The available literature on Palestine as a problem of the Arab, Moslem, and Jewish worlds is spotty at best. No author has delved into the alleged growing interest in Palestine of the non-Arab Moslem countries during the

past decade. George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (London, 1938), presents lucidly and persuasively the story of the rise of nationalism in the Arab world and the Arab attitude toward Zionism and Palestine. In this latter respect, Antonius' chief contribution consists of documents appended to his book, particularly the Husayn-McMahon correspondence and other Allied statements to the Arabs during World War I. The first official British version of some of these documents was not made public until March 1939. But otherwise in regard to Palestine, Antonius generates little light on the local Arab national movement and mostly heat on Zionism and Great Britain. The story by an Arab of the general Arab national movement, of which that in Palestine has been an integral part, has not yet been brought up to date, although the Arab League's views on Palestine are summarized in *The Future of Palestine* (London, August 1947), drawn up and published by the Arab Office in London. As for Zionism, Israel Cohen, *The Zionist Movement* (New York, 1946), constitutes the best, brief history, while Chapter 15 of the Esco study summarizes the several Jewish schools of thought on Palestine, including those of the non-Zionists and the anti-Zionists. The anti-Zionist position is developed in full by Elmer Berger in *The Jewish Dilemma* (New York, 1945).

Until a final settlement is reached, the Big Power angle will continue to be of supreme significance, for ultimately the action or inaction of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union must influence vitally the course of events in Palestine. The *Report to the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom* (Washington, 1946)² by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine, and the *Report to the General Assembly* (Lake Success, 1947) by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine treat the situation in Palestine and the European D.P. camps as well as the attitudes of Arabs and Jews generally. As far as they go, these reports relate the findings without prejudice. The two inter-

² Issued by the British Government as *Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry regarding the problems of European Jewry and Palestine* (Command Paper 6808, London, 1946).

national investigations, however, skirt the subject of Big Three competition and its effect on the Palestine problem. E. A. Speiser, *The United States and the Near East* (Cambridge, Mass., 1947), comprises one of the most able, succinct analyses of the background of the Big Power interests and conflicts in the Middle East and thus provides the reader with at least a basis for evaluating their respective positions on Palestine.

Additional light on the inner workings of the two investigative bodies is shed by personal narratives of individual members: Richard Crossman, *Palestine Mission* (New York, 1947); Bartley C. Crum, *Behind the Silken Curtain* (New York, 1947); and Jorge García-Granados, *The Birth of Israel* (New York, 1948). The first two authors were members of the Anglo-American Committee, representing Britain and the United States respectively; the last represented Guatemala on the United Nations Committee. All three became exponents of Zionism as a result of their experiences. Crossman's introspection should not discourage the reader, for this former Oxford don and present leader of the left-wing rebels of the Labor Party has some pertinent observations to make on British interests in Palestine and the Middle East. Crum's volume is part of a crusade for his adopted cause; though honest, it necessarily falls into the category of special pleading. García-Granados, as the title of his book attests, takes sides; but he acquits himself with dignity and tells a press-worn story with simplicity, freshness, and a keen sense of the elements of human interest. Jacob Robinson, *Palestine and the United Nations* (Washington, 1947), which considers in essence only the first special session of the General Assembly, dissects the various arguments advanced by all who participated in the debates. The volume is more useful as a guide to the debates than as an analytical statement of the problem confronting the United Nations.

Urgently needed is a balanced work on the British position in the past decade. Such a study would have to undertake to explain British policy on Palestine in the context of Britain's war-enervated economy, contracting empire, economic and political dependence on the United States, and strategic as well as

economic interests in the Middle East. As for the Soviet Union, any estimate of its attitude toward Palestine must rest, for want of positive documentary evidence, largely on known past actions. Still, enough material has already accumulated to render possible a reconstruction of Moscow's stand and the likely motivations behind it. The very enigmatic quality of the Kremlin's behavior has had a mischievous effect on the interaction of all the other parties to the Palestine quarrel.

More harmful in its impact than Soviet tactics, however, has been the United States' failure to develop a consistent policy. Here there is no lack of source material, but none of the books which purport to deal with American policies does the subject justice. Reuben Fink, *America and Palestine* (New York, 1944), merely reprints pro-Zionist declarations by American presidents, congressmen, state governors, and other public figures. While such collections save the researcher time, they hardly constitute a study of policy. Carl J. Friedrich, *American Policy toward Palestine* (Washington, 1944), is only a suggestive legal essay partial to Zionism, and appeared too early to appreciate the extent to which the United States was to be implicated in the issue. By the time Sumner Welles wrote *We Need Not Fail* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), Washington was already immersed neck-deep in the Palestine quicksands and was dragging the United Nations along with it. Welles offers a pro-Zionist explanation of the dilemma which the United States largely created for itself. He brings to bear his experience as a former career diplomat of highly responsible rank and as a leading columnist on international affairs. His views, therefore, cannot be dismissed lightly. Yet his book is less a study of the succession of American stands on Palestine than a plea for American consistency and leadership. These volumes notwithstanding, the status of research on the United States' aspect of the issue is no more advanced than that on the British and Soviet aspects.

The confused state of the literature on Palestine of the last dozen years is merely a reflection of the Palestine problem itself. The intense passions which have been aroused will not die easily. The literary output of the next

few years is, therefore, likely to be dominated by the same qualities of moralism, partisanship, and emotion that have plagued the production of the past. But attention will now be focused on the current problem rather than on that of the mandate. Scholars should therefore be able to achieve at least some degree of perspective

in treating the earlier period. But until such balanced works reach the library shelves, the inquisitive reader can hardly be expected to form sound, unbiased opinions on the post-mandate phase of the problem, a phase which threatens to be with us for some time to come.

The Middle East Journal will order on behalf of its subscribers any book reviewed or listed in the following pages. *Books published in the United States*: Supplied at list price, postpaid. Mail check with order or request invoice. *Books published abroad*: Supplied at list price at current rate of exchange, plus cost of handling. Payment due upon receipt of invoice; all payments to be made in dollars. Service guaranteed on books published in the United States only. Address all orders to Book Service, The Middle East Institute, 1906 Florida Ave., N.W., Washington 9, D.C.

GENERAL

Land and Poverty in the Middle East, by Doreen Warriner. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948. 149 pages. \$2.50.

Miss Warriner deals, initially, with general aspects of the Middle Eastern agrarian scene: the characteristic mass poverty and archaic social system; the effects of an arid climate; and the destitution of the peasants, a condition crying for radical change. In separate chapters, she concentrates on agrarian conditions in Egypt, Palestine, Transjordan, Syria, the Lebanon, and Iraq; two concluding sections are devoted to the lessons taught by the facts of her investigation and to the need for a new approach, particularly to the problems of land tenure and agricultural planning.

This is a promising subject, one on which few studies are available to the public in Western languages. The Middle Eastern area has in recent years become a focus of world politics, and it is relatively seldom that writers on Middle Eastern themes succeed in doing their jobs without taking sides. Miss Warriner in many respects reveals the sound approach of the expert agrarian researcher. She has rendered an important service in collecting and analyzing many relevant data. As she has had access to the studies and source materials of the Middle East Supply Center in Cairo, hers is an interesting and undoubtedly a valuable contribution.

However, she is obviously somewhat perturbed by the considerably more optimistic evaluations of Middle Eastern potentialities made by certain other economists before her. Again and again she stresses the tremendous difficulties that stand in the way of an effective utilization of Middle Eastern resources, and of a rise in the peasants' income. In the face of all the financial, political, social, and technical obstacles she enumerates, the reader may well ask himself what, if anything, is left for a positive solution.

The author's critical attitude toward optimistic evaluations is revealed particularly in the chapter on Palestine. Here she unfortunately either labors under a number of misconceptions, or allows herself to be guided by prejudices. Two themes are especially elaborated: the insufficient land resources of the Arabs, and the continued dependence of the Jewish settlements on subsidy.

With regard to the amount of cultivable or cultivated land available in Palestine, Miss Warriner has relied primarily on data from the years 1930, 1936, and 1938, thereby failing to take into account the immense amount of technical knowledge acquired during the past decade. To lend more weight to her contentions, she refers (page 59) to the memos submitted by the Palestine Government to the Royal Commission for Palestine (wrongly named by her "Royal Commission Memorandum"), according to which only between 7,000 and 10,000 acres can be brought under

cultivation. As a matter of fact, the Royal Commission in summing up their conclusions on this point expressed themselves as follows: "We ourselves do not consider it possible at any given date to estimate with any accuracy how much land can be classed as 'cultivable.' This must depend, as is generally recognized, on irrigation and the improved use of available water supplies, on the draining of marshy areas and on the adoption of new methods of agriculture, more especially in the hills." (page 235 of the Report). Since 1937, the method of trial and error recommended by the Royal Commission in order to gain a better insight into the country's resources of cultivable land has been very successfully applied by Jewish settlers. It is a pity that the elaborate investigations undertaken by noted American irrigation experts and presented to the various Commissions of Inquiry have been ignored by Miss Warriner.

As for Miss Warriner's second point, many of the Jewish settlements are admittedly not self-supporting in their initial stages. But the financial aid extended to them must cover capital requirements and the expense involved in training newcomers to become full-fledged agricultural workers. Miss Warriner's concern about the support granted to the Jewish settlements is surprising considering her previously published demand for very considerable subsidies for the maintenance and increase of postwar agricultural production in England. If England is not to be bound by strict business principles in formulating agricultural policy, the Middle East, with its own peculiar, slum conditions, has less reason to be. The lessons of modern agrarian sciences do not preclude a bold and enterprising approach, which alone is capable of blazing new trails in this long-neglected part of the globe.

It also reveals some odd misunderstanding to state that the farmers of the co-operative settlements are not free to cultivate or sell except as dictated from above, and that every major decision as to production, methods of cultivation, and so on is made by experts of the Jewish Agency. The latter would perhaps sometimes wish this were true. It is likewise misleading to use rural population figures to indicate farm population. This, of course, reduces the per capita area, which is in fact

much higher when calculated as it should be, per head of the farm population proper.

Finally, this reviewer would like to refer to two of the author's observations on his own views, as he stands accused of having ignored important limiting factors in his appreciation of the prospects of agricultural development in the Middle East. Miss Warriner quotes him as having argued the case for some 30 million additional settlers on the land in the Middle East. Actually, he speaks of the additional *agricultural population* resulting from the natural increase within a space of two decades. Moreover, in his treatment of the problems of the Middle East he has naturally included Turkey, a fact entirely disregarded by Miss Warriner. Since the cultivable area in Turkey is larger than that in any other Middle Eastern country, its inclusion makes a vast difference.

ALFRED BONNÉ¹
Jerusalem, Palestine

Hate, Hope and High Explosives: A Report on the Middle East, by George Fielding Eliot. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1948. 274 pages. \$2.75.

A military analyst, like a field gun, is most accurate when observation is direct. Major George Fielding Eliot toured the Middle East (except for Arabia) to see for himself. What drew his particular attention was the situation in Palestine, which he visited in the portentous days before the termination of the British Mandate. Limiting himself to his own specialty, Eliot made little effort to determine justice in the great issue dividing Zionists and Arabs. He tried, rather, to decide for himself whether war was inevitable, and if so, which side would prove to be the stronger. His findings, now summarized in *Hate, Hope and High Explosives*, are vivid and at times penetrating.

Major Eliot succeeded in talking with leaders on both sides of what is sometimes called the "Camel's-Hair Curtain." He found British, Arabs, and Jews in perfect agreement on one point at least: a fight was indeed inevitable. As to the relative strength of Jews and Arabs,

Eliot formed a high opinion of Haganah's war plans and training methods during a visit to Tel Aviv late in March; early in May, he saw these methods successfully applied when Haganah captured the Katamon quarter of Jerusalem. Hesitating at first to accept the low estimate of Arab striking power made by Jewish and British military men, he was eventually led to the same conclusion by his own observations in Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, and Amman.

Hate, Hope and High Explosives is largely a day-to-day record of what Eliot saw and what he was told. In the second category, we hear Sir Alan Cunningham regretting that the United Nations had failed to provide the small armed force that might have kept Jerusalem out of the battle, Azzam Pasha relying on Arab economic resistance rather than military victory to make the Zionists eventually abandon their hope of statehood, and Ahmed Sharabati discussing the possibility of anti-Jewish rioting in Syrian cities. Most illuminating of all is a series of conversations with Samir Rifai Pasha, Glubb Pasha, and King Abdallah of Transjordan, recorded in Amman during the first week in May, after the decisive Arab defeats at Haifa and Mishmar Haemeq. Eliot's report leaves no doubt that on strictly military grounds, Glubb Pasha advised King Abdallah against committing the Arab Legion to a fight to the finish in Palestine. Yet two weeks later, the irreplaceable men and munitions of the Arab Legion were being expended in a vain attempt to break through Haganah defenses in the New City of Jerusalem, a sequence of events suggesting that non-military advice prevailed in Amman.

Major Eliot is attracted to King Abdallah's Greater Syria scheme. He is quite correct in his conclusion that the military superiority of the Legion over other Arab formations has strengthened Abdallah's position in the Arab world. However, he apparently does not appreciate certain other factors. Transjordan does not yet possess such essentials for leadership as internal revenues, a large settled population, or even an adequate office-holding class. Besides, as long as the efficiency of the Legion depends on British guidance and subsidies, this instrument of power may not commend itself

to neighboring Arab peoples who put independence ahead of efficiency.

The belligerents and their sympathizers may be upset by Major Eliot's bluntness. Nevertheless, they must recognize that events since he completed this volume on July 20 have underlined the soundness of his military estimate. The book is well worth reading for its eyewitness report on the Palestine problem at a crucial stage.

Other chapters cover Major Eliot's eleven-day visit to Tehran, and even briefer pauses in Istanbul, Ankara, Athens, Salonika, and aboard the flagship of the U. S. Mediterranean Fleet. Out of this somewhat blurred picture, one truth emerges clearly: the need for greater coordination in the program of American assistance to governments which feel themselves threatened by the Soviet Union. He concludes that "our political and military policies in the Mediterranean and the Middle East must be all wrapped up together in one compact package. Everything that happens in one part of that area reacts on every other part, to a greater or lesser degree. Maybe in Iran they don't care much about Palestine, for example; but nevertheless the Palestine trouble is precisely what has prevented, so far, the creation and implementation of a sound workable program of Anglo-American co-operation for the security of the Middle East, on which the safety of Iran may largely depend."

FARNSWORTH FOWLE
London, England

A Short History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to Modern Times, by George E. Kirk. London: Methuen, 1948. 289 pages, maps, bibliography. 16s.

An outgrowth of a series of lectures delivered by Mr. Kirk at the Middle East Center for Arab Studies, this survey is designed to give the nonspecialist a background for an understanding of present-day Middle Eastern problems. In fact, it is an admirable introduction to the area. The author has compressed into these few essays a quantity of pertinent factual information; he has also included fourteen good maps and charts, and a

fairly adequate bibliography. The work deals mainly with political developments, but sufficient attention is given to cultural, economic, and social aspects to make it well-balanced.

The picture becomes more detailed as Mr. Kirk approaches the immediate present. In a discussion of Arab nationalism, he explains to some extent how Western penetration and domination of the Ottoman Empire stimulated the first nationalistic impulses of the Arab people. He points out that national feeling was accentuated by the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 when Arab leaders, disappointed with the outcome, became painfully aware of the fact that the Arabs were an alien element in a Turkish Empire. The "Revolt in the Desert" and then the First World War with the frustration of Arab hopes which followed, were, he believes, the factors which finally culminated in a full-blown nationalist movement.

The author's analysis of the Palestine problem is fair and penetrating. He traces the growth of Zionism from the time of Theodore Herzl down to the present day, and regrets that forces of circumstance and expediency prompted the British Government to make contradictory commitments to the French, the Zionists, and the Arabs — commitments which they subsequently found impossible to fulfill. Few, however, will be satisfied with Mr. Kirk's conclusion that it is the intransigence of both the Arabs and the Zionists that has brought about the chaotic situation existing at present. The book discusses the relationship between the Palestine issue and local Arab politics, and touches on the interests of and parts played by Great Britain, Russia, and the United States.

Mr. Kirk seems to feel that the Arabs will have to decide to orient their policies toward either the United States or the Soviet Union in the very near future. He hopes to see America play a more responsible part than it has in the past, and while suggesting that U. S. meddling in Palestine has been unfortunate, he concludes that the Arab world has much more to gain from Anglo-American liberalism than it has from communism.

LYLE S. SHELMIDINE
College of Puget Sound
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ARAB WORLD

Cultural Survey of Modern Egypt, Part II,
by M. M. Mosharrafa. London: Longmans,
Green and Company, 1948. 71 pages. 5s.

An understanding of how modern Egyptian scholars read their own history is indispensable in appraising the nature and direction of the Arab reawakening. Dr. Mosharrafa's thoughtful and provocative survey, brief as it is, is thus of particular interest to the Western reader.

The author bases this second section of a projected four-part study on a completely economic interpretation. His thesis is that Asiatic history, like European, must be re-evaluated "from the point of view of class formation." In this brief volume, the attempt is made to summarize the results of such a re-evaluation of Egyptian history from the days of the Pharaohs until the present, giving special emphasis to the significance of the religious systems that have flourished successively in the valley of the Nile. At many points the approach is illuminating and suggests new meanings to familiar events. Yet it is difficult in fifty pages to review all the major forms of Eastern religion — ancient polytheism, monotheism, Christian trinitarianism, and Islamic monotheism — as purely expressions of class struggle. There is obviously much scholarship in the fields of psychology and religious history that the author needs to appraise and refute to substantiate his point of view.

Moreover, there are specific questionable statements in the book. For example, it is strange to claim that the "Coptic Church has preserved the Semitic unitarian faith of early Christianity, or at least . . . adopted it in opposition to the Roman Trinity." The Coptic Church is as thoroughly Trinitarian as any of the "orthodox" Christian bodies. Its theological quarrel was not with the Trinity but with the relation of the divine to the human in the nature of Christ; its opponents were not Roman, but Byzantine; it was not, in the end, theological, but political pressure that separated the Copts from the more "orthodox" body.

Apart from its central thesis, there is much

in this account to interest and enlighten the Western reader. The concluding section on modern culture is all too brief, however, and this reviewer awaits with expectation its expansion in the forthcoming two parts of the study. A diagnosis of the past is always interesting, but what most Western students need to know is that Egypt has a present and future as well as a past.

JOHN S. BADEAU
Princeton, New Jersey

Plan de Reconstruction de l'Économie Libanaise et de Réforme de l'État, by Gabriel Menassa, with the collaboration of M. Joseph Naggear and members of the Comité d'Études Techniques of S.L.E.P. Beirut: Editions de la Société Libanaise d'Économie Politique, 1948. 634 pages. £L.10.

There has been no comprehensive study of the Lebanese economy since S. B. Himadeh's *Economic Organization of Syria*, published in 1936. Since that date many fundamental changes have taken place, and Mr. Menassa's book, therefore, is extremely welcome to all those who are interested in the economic and political problems of the Middle East.

Leaving out Greece and Palestine, both now subject to abnormal influences, Lebanon is the outstanding example of a "Mediterranean economy." Large-scale agriculture is impossible owing to the hilly and barren nature of the land, and to the scarcity and irregularity of water. Industry is seriously restricted by the lack of mineral resources, especially coal and iron, and by the narrowness of the market. Moreover, the population is increasing rapidly, and emigration, which was formerly practiced on a large scale, has been slowed down by the restrictive measures of the receiving countries. Consequently Mediterranean countries, and most of all Lebanon, are forced to rely heavily on invisible exports to pay for their essential imports of food, raw materials, and machinery. Of these exports, the chief have been commerce, brokerage, the tourist trade, and remittances sent home by emigrants.

Against this background, Mr. Menassa describes the present conditions of Lebanese agriculture, industry, commerce, and the balance

of payments. He also expounds his plan for reconstruction. Lebanese agriculture and industry are to secure markets by the superior quality of their products, and the necessary steps toward this end are enumerated. A large-scale program of public works is recommended (the chapter on this subject, written by Mr. Joseph Naggear, is particularly interesting). Lebanon's water resources are to be used for both irrigation and electric power, and its roads, hotels, and public utilities should be both improved and expanded. A ten-year program involving the expenditure of over \$250,000,000 is recommended; it is proposed that this sum come mainly out of the state budget. In order to make this possible, the author urges a strict retrenchment in unnecessary expenditure and a thorough overhauling of the administrative machinery. The final chapters of the book are devoted to a constitutional reform which would ensure more stability and efficiency in the government.

The main theme running through the book is that Lebanon, being a producer of services rather than of goods, must aim at a free trade policy and reduce customs barriers to a minimum. This, in the author's opinion, involves a break-up of the economic and financial union with Syria, an agricultural and industrial producer which is bound to be protectionist. At the same time, it necessitates reciprocal agreements with the Arab and other Middle Eastern countries.

It is impossible, in a brief review, to discuss the merits of the proposal to end Lebanon's economic and financial union with Syria, around which there has been intense controversy during the last two or three years. That the interests of Syria and Lebanon diverge at some points is true, but it is no less true that the two economies are in many respects complementary, and that Lebanon gains from the association as much as does Syria. It would also seem to the present reviewer that Mr. Menassa has been oversanguine regarding Lebanon's competitive power under free trade. But whatever one's opinion of the views advanced, there is no doubt that the book fills a great gap in the economic literature on the Middle East.

CHARLES ISSAWI
Lake Success, New York

AFRICA

Ethiopia: The Study of a Polity, 1540-1935. by David Mathew. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1947. ix + 254 pages. 15s.

In this latest of many works, Archbishop Mathew takes his reader with him into an altogether new field. Nothing has prepared us to include Dr. Mathew among professional orientalists, but it must be recognized at once that here he contributes a most interesting history of Ethiopia during the last 500 years. It is a history different from the usual type. Instead of giving a chronological account of the emperors and the various aspects of their reigns, the author follows, through successive periods, the idea of the Solomonic Throne, the tradition which gives a sort of unity and continuity to Ethiopian history. The result is something like a philosophy of the history of Ethiopia.

Needless to say, the work is written in a very attractive style which makes reading it a literary pleasure. In particular, the descriptions of the scenery, the author's impressions of the places he visited, reveal a real artist and an articulate lover of nature. Dr. Mathew also excels in grouping events around personages and episodes, under striking titles which arouse the curiosity of the reader. Thus, Chapter V, entitled "The Jesuit from Cochin," describes the coming of the Jesuit missionaries in the first half of the seventeenth century, and their labors, so successful at first, yet doomed to prompt failure. Chapter XII is entitled "The Angel of the Last Anti-Christ" after a phrase in the Royal Chronicle of Abyssinia, 1769-1840 (edited by H. Weld Blundell).

The volume includes a convenient list of the emperors of Ethiopia from the end of the fifteenth century to Haile Selassie, now reigning. The sixteen plates, in part reproduced from unpublished Ethiopic manuscripts, but mostly culled from photographs published elsewhere, are all of excellent quality. The end paper is a modern map of Ethiopia which conveys a general impression of the country, though it is insufficiently detailed: one would like such a map to contain all the names of the towns and provinces mentioned in the text, for the convenience of the reader anxious to follow the details of the narrative. It might

also be mentioned that the spellings of proper names in the volume are not consistent. In a foreword, the author enumerates many persons, Ethiopians and others, who assisted him, to varying degrees, in his historical researches, but the acknowledgment does not enable the reader to identify his sources. Nor does Archbishop Mathew include a bibliography. The reader, however, will find references in the footnotes showing that the author has consulted at least valuable English works which supply his history with a solid foundation, even if occasionally one or another work has been overlooked, or certain facts are open to a different interpretation. It is a pleasure, in any case, to recommend this fascinating history of the sole Christian Empire in Africa.

EDWARD P. ARBEZ
Catholic University
Washington, D. C.

British Military Administration of Occupied Territories in Africa during the Years 1941-1947, by Francis James Rennell, Lord Rennell of Rodd. London: H. M. Stationery Press (British Information Service, New York), 1948. 637 pages. \$4.65.

The Allied victories in World War II brought in their wake the imposing and onerous problem of governing occupied enemy territory. The first such territory to be put under Allied military government was the Italian Colonial Empire in East Africa and Libya. In establishing these early military administrations, the British had little to guide them, for, as Lord Rennell points out, the only comparable modern experiences of military government were in Palestine, Mesopotamia, and German East Africa following World War I. Although the responsibility of occupation governments stems from international law, Lord Rennell observes that the problems involved "found no practical and simple solutions in the text-book." He thus admits that the British were unprepared for the military administration of the Italian Colonies when the burden fell upon them in 1941. However, he is led to conclude that because of "that capacity for improvisation which the British have, the outcome was not unsatisfactory." Considering the tremendous complexity of the operation, one is disposed to agree with his estimate.

Lord Rennell attributes much of the success of the British Military Administration's rule to its two "first principles": the firm, quick establishment of an authority free of laws, orders, or rules which might be disregarded or difficult to enforce; and the sparing use of troops in enforcing the rule of the occupying authorities. Any call for troops to maintain authority or to quell disturbances represents failure for a military administrator, declares Lord Rennell. In the light of the British Military Administration's failure in preventing wanton destruction and brutality during the anti-Jewish riots of November 1945 in Tripolitania and during the anti-Italian riots in Mogadishu, Italian Somaliland, in 1947, one may question the unqualified soundness of this basic principle.

The book is broad in scope and seeks to give a detailed account of the great amount of planning involved in preparing and establishing the government of occupied enemy territory, and of the ways new problems and issues were met and disposed of as military government developed. It deals not only with the occupation of the Italian Colonies, but also with that of Ethiopia, British Somaliland, Madagascar, and the Island of Rhodes. It ranges from questions of highest policy, such as the thorny Anglo-Vichy-De Gaulle negotiations over Madagascar, and relations between the British Military Administration and Emperor Haile Selassie over the governing of Ethiopia, to the philatelically momentous fact that Italian stamps were replaced by British stamps overprinted M.E.F. for use in the colonies. While such a detailed and varied account undoubtedly will prove interesting to nostalgic officials who served in the B.M.A., other readers, lacking this personal interest, may find the book overladen with trivia and sentiment. Mildly critical at times, it is mainly descriptive rather than analytical, with the result that it becomes, as the jacket describes it, "a tribute to British Administration."

Admittedly, organizing the voluminous data is a difficult task; it is, in a sense, unfortunate that the author has chosen to arrange his material geographically and chronologically, as the result is disjointed and protracted. For example, to obtain a complete story of the Anglo-Ethiopian negotiations, one has to go to at

least Chapters IV, IX, XIV, and XIX. Several functional chapters toward the end of the volume seek to tie together certain common problems such as finance, law, and the custody of enemy property, but the attempt is only partly successful because they often merely restate without integration or analysis.

Much of the book's value lies in the documents and official letters found throughout the text and in the appendices. In bringing together a mass of hitherto unavailable data on the operations of British Military Administration in Africa, Lord Rennell has performed a valuable and difficult service, shedding light on some of the more obscure aspects of the war and its aftermath. The abundant material contained in this volume will doubtless prove to be the basis of many further studies of the territories.

BENJAMIN RIVLIN
Harvard University

INDIA

John Company at Work: A Study of European Expansion in India in the Late Eighteenth Century, by Holden Furber. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948. xiv + 407 pages. \$6.00.

After a number of years of intensive investigation and research, Professor Furber has brought out in this study a book which, within its carefully defined limits, may be regarded as a definitive work. The volume covers in perspective three centuries of the East India Company's operations, but is concerned in detail with the decade 1783-1793, during which time shares in the Company were being traded on the Exchange like those in any other joint stock concern.

The introduction provides an interpretation of the way in which European imperialism was extended into Asia as a concomitant of trade. It also throws new light, as most of the book does, on the extent to which the Company had become an international concern by the latter part of the eighteenth century. The early chapters deal principally with the relations subsisting between the English East India Company and the East India operations of the French, Dutch, Danes, and Portuguese and

the extent to which all of these came to be dominated by the British. The account of the importance of the "country" trade to commercial activities as a whole in India, and the helplessness of the Company's governors, being little more than puppets in the hands of the great and generally irregular "country" traders, is one of the most illuminating features of the volume.

"The Company in its corporate capacity was simply a tool used by groups of individuals who cared not a whit what the balance sheet looked like so long as their private ends were served," the author points out. While apparently these groups were never distinct, four categories of "interests" are defined: (1) the proprietors of East India stock; (2) directors and associates who bought and sold on the Company's behalf; (3) nabobs and retired Anglo-Indians; and (4) the shipping interest. Even after the Company to all intents and purposes became bankrupt, there still was a great deal of trade with India and China, a large part of which, however, remained in private hands. In fact during the period under particular analysis, the Company was becoming an economic liability to the British public, since the market for India's goods in Europe did not keep pace with the rising costs of administration, and the Company's governors were becoming aware that they could solve their financial problems only by marching on down the road of empire.

As to the balance sheet of imperialism, Dr. Furber finds that India, contrary to a widespread opinion, was not impoverished by British exploitation. He believes that European enterprise in India may even have tended to create wealth there. He points out, however, that no final estimate of this process can be given until an exhaustive examination has been made of native Indian records, a task which this author has not undertaken.

The book contains throughout a wealth of illustrative detail. It is fully documented and is supported further by eighty pages of appendices consisting importantly of statistical tables and an impressive list of the official records and other authorities consulted. Moreover, it is notably well written. While all of his conclusions are conservatively drawn, the author has made good and appropriate use of the his-

toric imagination. He is to be congratulated on having mastered so thoroughly the intricate business methods employed in the India trade, which were all the more involved because of conscious attempts to conceal activities of which a great proportion were not in keeping with the Company's official regulations. *John Company at Work* is a basic piece of historical writing which loses little of its value from the fact that the empire to which it alludes no longer exists.

HALFORD L. HOSKINS
The Middle East Institute

My Indian Years, 1910-1916, by Lord Hardinge of Penshurst. London: John Murray, 1948. 144 pages. 10s. 6d.

In this entertaining volume, Lord Hardinge supplements an earlier work, *Old Diplomacy*, with his viceregal reminiscences. Like many similar volumes, the book calls to life, in all its panoply and pageantry, India in the early twilight of the British *raj*. Yet as he moves about the scene from the meticulous arrangements of the royal durbar to a losing struggle with red tape and clashing authorities in the first phases of the Mesopotamian campaign, Lord Hardinge never indicates that he has any realization that he is witnessing the end of an era. Despite his genuine love for India and his earnest efforts to conciliate and understand Indians, one wonders whether he really made great progress in understanding Indian life and society. Lord Hardinge emerges from these pages as a man of great courage, of warm sympathy, and of marked administrative capacity, but of little originality, brilliance, or imagination.

The most refreshing thing about these reminiscences is their frankness and simplicity, qualities which, to the reader, more than make up for the somewhat disconcerting frequency with which the scene is changed. Innocent of false conceit and pretentiousness himself, Lord Hardinge was an acute observer of the foibles and follies of those highly placed in the official world about him. He has no more hesitation in telling anecdotes which reflect on the competence and intelligence of servants of the Crown and *raj* than he has in giving his col-

leagues and associates due credit for their share in the achievements of his viceroyalty. The aim of the narrative throughout is to give his recollections of the period without embellishment, and to let the record speak for itself. In regard to the important decisions to reunite partitioned Bengal and move the capital of India to Delhi, Lord Hardinge would give the greatest measure of credit to Sir John Jenkins, the Home Member of his Council. Indeed, Lord Hardinge's greatest asset was his keen judgment of men and his willingness to surround himself with capable subordinates to whom he could delegate authority. The sight of Lord Curzon's enormous ledger containing all the Viceroy's personal accounts written in Curzon's own hand quite horrified him.

Lord Hardinge's memoirs are written with such forthrightness that one regrets their brevity. Indians and non-Indians alike would welcome a fuller account of many of the incidents touched upon, especially those relating to the Viceroy's contacts with and knowledge of Indian opinion. We have, for example, only one sentence as to his relations with the Indian member of his Council to set beside numerous records of contacts with princes, whether for sport or politics. As it stands, this slender volume is innocent of thorough discussion of many problems and situations which the Government of India then had to confront. Lord Hardinge's courage in the face of attempted assassination, his devotion to duty in the midst of overwhelming private sorrows, and his love of India's children have long been recognized; for the sake of brevity, he may perhaps have missed an opportunity to demonstrate the extent of his understanding of the country he governed.

HOLDEN FURBER
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KURDISTAN

Kurds and Kurdistan, by Arshak Safrastian. London: The Harvill Press, 1948. 106 pages, illustrations, notes. 7s. 6d.

Dr. Safrastian has assembled in *Kurds and Kurdistan* a mass of valuable and generally accurate information from ancient and modern

sources, all of it bearing on Kurdish history from the third millennium B.C. to 1938. The concentration of facts is impressive evidence of a great deal of painstaking and commendable labor. This reviewer knows of no comparable single-volume compilation available in English.

In his treatment of the subject, Dr. Safrastian is distinctly romantic. Courageous Kurds dash about on horseback from pages 1 to 95, and in their coursing are foully murdered by Turks or other oppressors given to dastardly tricks. The author's theme is that "The Kurdish race is awakening to national consciousness—an awakening which is full of promise."

But such a treatment is too close to the concept of "the noble savage" for veracity. While adequately recognizing the native dignity, courage, and independence of the Kurds, the author fails to note their cupidity, their interminable and unjustifiable feuds, and the social inadequacy of their tribal system. The Kurdish Agha is as socially callous as any landlord in the Middle East, and the surrounding states have traditionally found it easy to purchase the services of one Kurd to fight another. Group loyalty outside the tribe is practically unknown.

The reviewer would, therefore, disagree with Dr. Safrastian's conclusion that the national future of the Kurds is bright. The development of natural resources of Kurdistan, especially its water power, would demand large capital outlays, but the low economic standard, added to Kurdish political immaturity and fickleness, will not encourage investment of large sums from abroad. Such development is more likely to come, if at all, as a result of the effort of the states which now trisect the mountainous land called Kurdistan.

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PALESTINE

We Need Not Fail, by Sumner Welles. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948. xiv + 135 pages. \$2.50.

When Great Britain referred the problem of Palestine to the General Assembly of the

United Nations in the spring of 1947, the United States, as a prominent member of that body, was faced with the necessity of deciding not only whether it approved of a Jewish state, but also what it was willing to do toward its creation. Numerous resolutions in favor of a national home for the Jews had previously been passed by a variety of organizations in this country, but little serious thinking had been done by people approaching the question primarily as Americans concerned with the interests of the United States as a world power and with the cause of world peace.

This sort of thinking Mr. Welles sets out to do in *We Need Not Fail*, evaluating in particular the role the United States has played in the United Nations' handling of the Palestine case. He presents his main thesis very ably, but unfortunately does not get to it until he has devoted three opening chapters to a review of the background of the situation. The interpretation of Palestine history which Mr. Welles presents forces the reader to question the objectivity with which he studied the current problem. Twelve hundred years of Jewish "history" in Palestine are contrasted to three hundred years of Arab "occupation." No consideration is apparently attached to the fact that the Arab "occupation" was subsequent to the Jewish "history." Great emphasis is put upon the point that the Arabs of Palestine governed the country themselves but briefly, and that for the greater part of their "occupation" they were subjected by one conqueror after another. There is no suggestion that this process has characterized Palestine history since its earliest days, and certainly characterized the twelve hundred years of Jewish "history" in the land. Mr. Welles gives no hint that Palestine has continually acquired accretions of population — including the Jewish — from the desert, and that the Islamic invasion of the seventh century A.D. was far more cultural than physical. Nor does he exhibit any understanding of the universal character of classic Islamic society, or of the fact that it was not until the nineteenth century that the Western concept of nationalism began to assume prominence in Islamic lands.

Coming down to more recent times, Mr. Welles apparently regards the abortive Treaty of Sèvres of 1920 as the definitive instrument

in the disposition of the Ottoman Empire after World War I; no mention is made of the Treaty of Lausanne. In his view, the Allies were justified in providing for the creation of a national home for the Jews in Palestine by the simple right of conquerors to dispose of enemy territory as they see fit. There is no mention of British commitments to the Arabs, or of Arab co-operation with the British against the Turks, or of the American King-Crane Commission, which recommended a drastic curtailment of the Zionist program after surveying the wishes of the native population, in accordance with one of the declared principles on which the mandates were to be assigned. Mr. Welles finally dismisses the Arab case with a sentence which to a believer in self-determination is the very heart of the matter: "On the sole ground that the Arabs constitute a majority of Palestine's population and have inhabited the country for many centuries, [the propagandists for the Arab Higher Committee of Palestine] insistently maintain that the United Nations has no vestige of right to recommend or impose any solution for the problem of Palestine, unless that solution is one that meets with Arab approval."

Mr. Welles' presentation would have been immeasurably strengthened had he left the question of comparative right to one side and limited himself to the problem in its present form: How can the world (through the United Nations) most peaceably resolve the situation in Palestine? This problem he sets out to explore in his later chapters, and granting his premise, does it very well. Mr. Welles' argument is that the General Assembly had full jurisdiction to recommend any settlement it pleased for the political future of Palestine. It recommended partition because it believed that to be the plan best calculated to provide a workable solution with the greatest justice to all. Each member of the United Nations, including those opposing the plan, and each organ of the United Nations, was morally bound to carry out the provisions of the recommendation. Their failure to do so constitutes a grave danger to the cause of world peace through collective security.

In line with this reasoning, Mr. Welles castigates the Arabs for taking military action to prevent the creation of a Jewish state; the

British for not facilitating the plan during the months previous to their departure; and the United States for deciding that it was unwilling to implement the plan by force. The first two were at least relatively consistent in their stand; against the United States was also to be recorded vacillation and even reversal of policy in midstream.

One can fully share Mr. Welles' exasperation at the indecision that has characterized U. S. action on Palestine. What is clearly shown by his account is that Americans by and large still have not done any practical thinking on the Palestine problem and their country's relation to it. American authorities have spoken in favor of the creation of a Jewish state, and yet, because of the Big Power conflict and possibly because of certain democratic scruples, they have been unwilling to use force to see it accomplished. This hesitation to back up a commitment leads one to wonder whether U. S. support of partition was indeed taken in the firm belief that it best served the interests of world peace, and therefore of the United States, or was determined by a variety of special interests eager, for one reason or another, to see political Zionism succeed. If the latter, one can more readily understand why our original purposefulness has proved vulnerable to contrary pressures.

Many of the problems involved in the United Nations' handling of the Palestine case are now rapidly becoming academic so far as that particular question is concerned. The course of events has itself limited U. N. authority to moral suasion in an effort to contain the conflict, to unremitting efforts to bring stability on the basis of the *status quo*, and to attempts to find a formula for agreement between Arabs and Jews, which, after all is said and done, must preface a final settlement. By *force majeure*, the United Nations has thus found its present level of operation.

Nevertheless, the Palestine case, as Mr. Welles clearly indicates, raises two specific questions which must be clarified if the present experiment in collective security is to succeed. First of all, it must be determined whether a General Assembly recommendation is binding upon the individual members: here is involved the fundamental question of sovereignty. If members refuse to comply, can they properly

be termed aggressors, and the recommendation be put into effect by force? Since there is reason to believe that a General Assembly recommendation may be influenced by Big Power alignments and even by the action of pressure groups (Mr. Welles himself freely admits that in the Palestine case American officials, acting under the "direct orders of the White House," exerted "every form of pressure, direct and indirect"), what body would then protect the small powers, deprived of the veto and of any independent interpretation of the Charter, from a tyranny of the United Nations?

Secondly, to what extent are the organs of the United Nations, in particular the Security Council, bound by a General Assembly recommendation? If, for example, the General Assembly recommends a political settlement which the Security Council believes cannot be enforced without threatening world peace, where does the greater authority reside? Precedent would point to the Security Council, and precedent would appear to be supported by Article 12 of the Charter, which states that "While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests."

Until these jurisdictional limits are clarified, and above all until the Big Powers settle their own differences and become disposed to give substantial backing to the cause of collective security, the United Nations will continue to be little more than a group of semi-autonomous agencies, each of which acts to the best of its ability as a sort of catalyst in the resolution of its own concerns. What the Palestine experience lays bare is not so much the progressive decline of the United Nations, as Mr. Welles fears, but rather the limited stage of its evolution.

HARVEY P. HALL
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Approach to Palestine, by Robin C. R. Maugham. London: Falcon Press, 1947. 99 pages. 5s.

Palestine Dilemma: Arab Rights versus Zionist Aspirations, by Frank C. Sakran. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1948. 219 pages, bibliography. \$3.25.

Robin Maugham writes in his preface that on the subject of Palestine "millions of impassioned phrases have poured from a thousand quivering pens." These two authors contribute several thousand more, this time from the point of view of the Arab Higher Committee and the Arab League. Maugham's material on the history of Palestine from 1919 to 1939 is actually taken verbatim, he says, from an unpublished work by Albert Hourani; Frank Sakran is a Christian Arab, born and educated in Palestine, a resident in this country since 1914, and an American citizen since World War I. Believing that the Arab side of the Palestine question has not been adequately presented in this country, Sakran aims "to present all the essential facts in the Palestine story, and the chief events which led to the present crisis." Maugham hopes to give his readers "a short means of approach to the problem." Each author traces the history of the territory from the beginning of civilization there to the moment of publication of his book. Each discounts the historic claims of the Zionists and opposes any further Jewish immigration; analyzes the conflicting promises and performances of the British Government from 1916 to 1947; and describes the part played by the American Government in recent years.

These books emphasize the political rather than the strategic and economic aspects of the Palestine problem. Very little mention is made of nearby oil fields and pipelines to Haifa; of harbors, airfields, and military installations; of the importance of Palestine as an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea, a transit land, and therefore an apple of discord throughout history, apart from religious and national quarrels.

Furthermore, the authors weaken their case by being more anti-Jewish than pro-Arab. Sakran presents a startling interpretation of Jesus as a "Galilean, in whose veins perhaps flowed more Aramaean and Canaanitish than Jewish blood," who "blasted their [the Jewish priests'] doctrine of racial superiority and exclusiveness." The Zionists, he says on page 139, were responsible for the fact that the

Grand Mufti fled to Berlin. He even seems to think that if there had been no Arab-Jewish conflict, part of the money that was spent on a police force would have been used to improve the public schools (p. 120). Maugham's bias is even more clearly shown. For example, he generalizes as follows on the Palestinian Jews he met: "The adults varied. But every single Jewish child I saw looked at me with unconcealed hatred. And every single one could speak no language except Hebrew. Fascism has come to Palestine. And the Jewish young man is potentially more dangerous than the storm-trooper. He is more intelligent."

Sakran, at the end of a book weighted down with quotations from the Bible, the Koran, White Papers, and commission reports, concludes that an independent Arab Palestine, safeguarding the rights of Jews now living there, is the only just solution for the Palestine dilemma. Maugham, however, says that there should be a "very small Jewish State," and a large independent Arab Palestine, and that Jerusalem and Haifa should be internationalized.

Both books are far from scholarly, and show signs of careless proofreading. In this reviewer's opinion, writers who air violent prejudices and search for points of difference rather than points of agreement do not help the cause of the Arab peoples or of world peace. A careful study not only interpreting but evaluating the Arabs' attitude, aspirations, and potentialities in relation to the Palestine question would be very welcome indeed.

MARY ZWEMER BRITTAI
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BOOKS ALSO NOTED

General

American Interests in the Middle East, by Harvey P. Hall. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1948. (Headline Series Pamphlet No. 72). 61 pages. 35¢. A brief historical review of American activity in the Middle East during the last century, followed by a discussion of the chief current concerns of the U.S.: containment of the Soviet Union, petroleum, and Palestine. Appended is a brief discussion of "Problems Facing Israel," by Carl Hermann Voss.

Documents of British Foreign Policy. Vol II: 1919. Edited by E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler. London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1948. 32s. 6d. Contains survey of secret minutes of Paris and London discussions, October 16, 1919—January 21, 1920, on Middle Eastern and other questions. Available at British Information Service, New York.

L'Islam et l'U.R.S.S., by François de Romainville. Paris: Hermès, 1947. 206 pages. 170 fr. The 20,000,000 Moslems in the USSR are discussed, their history briefly surveyed, and their future role speculated upon.

Most of the World: The Peoples of Africa, Latin America and the East Today. Edited by Ralph Linton. New York: Columbia University Press, 1949. xii + 875 pages, maps. \$5.50. Contains essays and bibliographies on the Near East, North Africa, and India. Contributors include James Batal, F. L. W. Richardson, Jr., Carleton S. Coon, Daniel and Alice Thorner.

The United States in World Affairs, 1947-1948, by John C. Campbell. Introduction by Dean Acheson. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1948. 510 pages, maps, chronology, bibliography. \$5.00.

Afghanistan

An American Engineer in Afghanistan, by A. C. Jewitt. Edited by Marjorie Jewett Bell. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1948. 335 pages, photographs. \$5.00. Entertaining letters describing life and tribulations in the Afghanistan of 1911-18.

Arab States

A Demographic Study of an Egyptian Province (Sharqiya), by A. M. Ammar. London: Lund Humphries, 1948. viii + 98 pages, diagrams, maps, illustrations. 7s. 6d.

Egypt Throughout the Ages. Cairo: Egyptian State Department, 1948. 164 pages. A tourist's handbook of Egypt.

The Land of Enchanters. Edited by Bernard Lewis. London: The Harvill Press, 1948. 128 pages, illustrations. 10s. 6d. Nineteen Egyptian short stories covering the period from the 2nd millennium B.C. to the present. Translations by Dr. Bernard Lewis, Reader in the History of the Middle East at the University of London, and Professor Gunn, occupant of the chair of Egyptology at Oxford.

Report of the United States-Lebanon Agricultural Mission. Washington: Office of Foreign

Agricultural Relations, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1948. 76 pages. International Agricultural Collaboration Series, No. 7. The mission, sponsored jointly by the Departments of Agriculture and State, went to Lebanon in March 1946. Dr. Franklin Stewart Harris, Dr. Robert Earle Buchanan, and Dr. Afif I. Tannous, members of the mission, recommended national effort in Lebanon to increase agricultural production and the development of complementary agricultural industries, organization of experiment stations, development of water resources, and initiation of a national program of agricultural education.

The Stream of Days, by Taha Hussein. Translated by Hilary Wayment. London: Longmans, Green, 1948. xi + 134 pages. 8s. 6d. Part II of this Egyptian literary figure's autobiography. An introduction contains a description of the author and a summary of Part I. *Villes Blanches, Tentes Noires*, by J. H. Muller. Paris: Attinger, 1947. 224 pages. Concerns Iraq.

India

Artist in Unknown India, by Marguerite E. Milward. New York: Universal Distributors, 1948. Illustrated. \$8.00. A well-known sculptress recounts her experiences among aboriginal tribes.

Biographical Studies in Modern Indian Education, by H. V. Hampton. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1947. 10s. 6d.

The Bombay Industrial Relations Act, Vol II, by P. B. Patwari. Bombay: Bharti Sahitya Sangh, Ltd., 1947. 294 pages.

The Federal Problem in India, by D. R. Gadgil. Poona: Gokhale Institution of Politics and Economics, 1947. vii + 201 pages. Rs. 8. Discusses the incorporation in the Indian Union of the Indian States, the division of powers, the composition of the federating units, and the problem of relations between the two main communities.

The Five Brothers: The Story of the Mahabharata. Adapted by Elizabeth Seeger. New York: John Day, 1948. 288 pages, illustrations. \$3.75. A condensation of the 13-volume translation from Sanskrit by Ganguli.

The Future of the Co-operative Movement in India, by A. I. Qureshi. Madras: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press (Indian Branch), 1947. x + 166 pages. Rs. 6.

Great Soul: The Soul of Gandhi, by Herrymon Maurer. Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1948. 100 pages. \$1.50. Survey of Gandhi's achievements.

Indian Labour Code, by S. N. Bose. Calcutta: Eastern Law House, Ltd., 1948. xiv + 359 pages.

Indian Labour Problems. Edited by A. N. Agarwala. London: Arthur Probsthain; Allahabad: Kitabstan, 1947. xxii + 406 pages. 35s; Rs. 16. A symposium by 23 experts of India's main labor difficulties.

Mahatma Gandhi: An Interpretation, by E. Stanley Jones. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1948. 160 pages. \$2.00. Uncritical evaluation of Gandhi's meaning for our time; the author believes the Indian soul and the Mahatma's pacifism fill our greatest needs.

Muslim League Yesterday and Today, by A. B. Rajput. Lahore: Sheikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1948. 288 pages. Rs. 8. Interesting account by a Pakistani of the rise of Pakistan.

The New India, by Sir Atul C. Chatterjee. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1948. 201 pages, maps. 8s. 6d. Aims to provide a vivid and up-to-date picture of India's cultural, economic, social, and political structure.

The Pageant of India's History, Vol. I, by Gertrude Emerson Sen. New York: Longmans, Green, 1948. 443 pages, illustrations, maps. \$4.50. A lively picture of Indian civilization from its beginning to the 11th century; scholarly material, simple exposition.

Punjab Uprooted, by J. Nanda. Bombay: Hind Kitabs Ltd., 1948. 114 pages. Rs. 2. Survey of the Punjab riots and rehabilitation problems.

Regional Planning in India, by R. Balakrishna. Bangalore: Bangalore Printing & Publishing, 1948. xiii + 458 pages. Rs. 20.

The Rural Economy of Gujarat, by M. B. Desai. University of Bombay Publications, Economics Series, No. 2. Bombay: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press (Indian Branch), 1948. iv + 352 pages. Rs. 20.

The Sahibs, by Hilton Brown. London: William Hodge, 1948. 266 pages, line drawings and half-tone illustrations. 15s. An entertaining collection of observations on British life in India.

State and Economic Life, by Rao Bahadur B. V. Narayanaswamy Naidu. Delhi: Delhi University, 1947. 140 pages. Eight lectures analyzing Indian agriculture, industry, and finance, and proposing government action to improve conditions in all three sections of the Indian economy. Suggests, among other things, TVA-type projects, state control of banks, encouragement and protection of certain industries such as aluminum and rayon.

A Statistical Study of India's Industrial Develop-

ment, by N. S. R. Sastry. Bombay: Thacker, 1947. 191 pages. Rs. 12/8.

The Story of Induraja, by Hilda Wernher. Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1948. 251 pages. \$2.75. A novel about Indian social conflicts, centered around the life of a progressive high-caste Indian widow. The author also wrote *The Land and the Well* and *My Indian Family*.

Iran

Iran, Past and Present, by Donald N. Wilber. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1948. 211 pages, appendices, map, bibliography, photographs. \$3.00. Factual history of Iran from 4000 B.C. to the present, plus an exposition of the present structure of the country.

Siyasat-et Daulat-e Shuravi dar Iran (Soviet Policy in Iran), Vol. I (in Persian), by M. A. Manshur Garakani. Tehran: 1948. 280 pages. 13s. 6d.

Tarikh-i Bidari-i Iran (Awakening of Iran) (in Persian), by Habibullah-i Mukhtari. Tehran: 1948. 923 pages, illustrations. £2 12s. 6d.

Tarikh Rawabet Siyasi Iran ba Donya (History of Iran's Political Position in the World), by Najufgholi Moezi (Hessamoddolek). Tehran: Hejazi, 1946. 450 pages. 30s.

Israel: See Palestine

Italian Colonies

L'Italia in Africa: Incivilimento e sviluppo dell'Eritrea, della Somalia e della Libia, by Pietro Franca, Armando Maugini, Amilcare Fántoli, Giuseppe Daodiace, and Enrico de Agostini. Rome: Società Geografica Italiana, 1947. L. 180. The record of a conference held in the spring of 1947 to take stock of Italy's relationship with its African colonies.

North Africa

L'Afrique Française en Danger, by Henri Bénezet. Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1947. 318 pages. 160 fr. An analysis of the elements in the present situation which threaten French sovereignty.

La Berbérie Orientale sous les Hafside, des Origines à la Fin du XV^e Siècle, Vol. II. Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1947. 502 pages. Publication of L'Institut d'Etudes Orientales d'Alger.

Documents Algériens: Synthèse de l'Activité Algérienne. 2 vols. Algiers: Gouvernement Général de l'Algérie, Service d'Information et de Documentation, 1946-47. Vol. I: October 30, 1945-December 31, 1946, 377 pages. Vol. II: January 1, 1947-December 31, 1947, 254 pages. Maps, tables.

Essai sur l'Esprit du Berbère Marocain, by Père Ange Koller. Fribourg, Switzerland: Imprimerie Saint Paul, 1946. 410 pages. Sw. fr. 10. A Franciscan who lived among the Berbers for 12 years contributes information on North African psychology and ethnology.

Essor de l'Algérie. Edited by the Gouvernement Général de l'Algérie, under the direction of M. Yves Chataigneau. Paris: L'Imprimerie E. Desfossés-Neogravure, 1947. 124 pages, illustrations, charts. 29 brief essays on various aspects of present-day Algeria.

Le Fezzan, ses Jardins, ses Palmiers: Notes d'Ethnographie et d'Histoire, by J. Lethielleux. Tunis: Institut des Belles Lettres Arabes, 1948. 253 pages. 300 fr.

North African Prelude: The First 7,000 Years, by Galbraith Welch. New York: William Morrow and Co., 1949. 624 pages. \$6.00.

Notre (?) Afrique du Nord, by Paul Reboux. Brussels: Chabassol, 1946. 315 pages. 225 fr. Impressions, political and otherwise, of French North Africa, during and since World War II, by a novelist and essayist.

Palestine

Ben Gurion: Selections. New York: Labor Zionist Organization of America, Poale Zion, 1948. 82 pages. 50¢. Brief biographical sketch by Brakhah Habas, followed by 6 selected statements by Ben Gurion with notes explaining the circumstances under which they were made.

The Birth of Israel: The Drama as I Saw it, by Jorge García-Granados. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948. 291 pages. \$3.00.

Blessed Is the Match, by Marie Syrkin. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947. 361 pages. \$3.50. More on the Jewish exodus from Europe to Palestine.

Essays in Jewish Biography, by A. Marx. Philadelphia: Jewish Publishing, 1948. 298 pages, bibliography. \$3.00.

Etiopi in Palestina, by Enrico Cerulli. Story of the Ethiopian Community of Jerusalem: Vol. II. Rome: Libreria dello Stato (Collezione Scientifica e Documentaria a cura del Ministero dell'Africa Italiana), 1947. vi + 539 pages.

L'Expérience Sioniste, by Georges Reutt. Paris: Ch. Riveill, 1948. 231 pages, 30 photographs, maps.

Instead of Arms, by Count Folke Bernadotte. New York: Bonniers, 1948. 228 pages. \$3.00. Autobiographical notes to within several weeks of his assassination.

Israel and the World, by Martin Buber. New

York: Schocken Books, 1948. 255 pages. \$3.75. Twenty-two philosophical essays.

Palestine's Economic Future: A Review of Progress and Prospects. Edited by J. B. Hobman. Introduction by Chaim Weizmann; 23 contributions by Sir John Russell, Harold J. Laski, C. Wilson Brown, Walter C. Lowdermilk, S. Hoofien, etc. London: Lund Humphries, 1948. 310 pages, illustrations. 15s. Discusses, among other things, the relation of Palestine's development to Middle East economy, the projected Jordan Valley hydro-electric scheme, and the potash, chemical, textile and diamond industries under war expansion.

Star over Jordan: The Life and Calling of Theodore Herzl, by Josef Patai. New York: Philosophical Library, 1946. 352 pages. \$3.75. A biography of the outstanding Zionist protagonist, originally written in Hungarian, but now available in Hebrew, German, and English. Bibliography and list of Herzl's writings appended.

Theodor Herzl, by J. Fraenkel. London: J. Fraenkel, 1948. 152 pages, 55 illustrations. 6s. 6d.

This is Israel, by I. F. Stone. New York: Boni & Gaer, 1948. 128 pages, photographs, maps. \$2.75. The author reported first-hand for *PM* many of the events of Israel's first year.

Trial and Error, by Chaim Weizmann. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949. 482 pages. \$5.00. Autobiography of the first President of Israel.

The Wisdom of Israel. Edited by Lewis Browne. New York: Random House, 1948. 656 pages. \$3.95. An anthology.

Sudan

Gordon, Gessi e la Riconquista del Sudan, by Carlo Zaghi. Florence: Centro di Studi Coloniali dell'Università degli Studi di Firenze, 1947. 640 pages. L. 900.

The Nuba: An Anthropological Study of the Hill Tribes of Kordofan, by S. F. Nadel. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1947. xvi + 527 pages, illustrations, diagrams. £2 2s. A Sudan Government sponsored study of tribal law and custom, economic life, British and Arab influences.

Turkey

Büyük Türkili (Türkistan) ve Yakin Tarihi (The Present Land of the Turks and Its Recent History), Vol. I: *Bati ve Kuzey Türkistan*, by A. Zekî Velidi Togan. İstanbul: Arkas, Ibrahim Horoz ve Güven Basimevi, 1942-47. Türkili (Türkistan) Bilik, N.2. xii + 696 pages, large folding map. T. L. 8.

Economic and Commercial Conditions in Turkey, by E. R. Lingeman. London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1948. 228 pages. 4s. Author is British Economic Counsellor, Ankara. Published by the Export Promotion Department, Board of Trade. Available at British Information Service, New York.

Facts on Turkey. New York: Turkish Information Office, 1948. 32 pages. Statistics in an attractive and compact layout.

Vom Kalifat Zur Republik, by Herbert W. Duda. Vienna: Verlag für Jugend und Volk, 1948. 169 pages, bibliography, map. Sch. 29.50.

Linguistics

Qaraqalpaq Grammar, Part I: Phonology, by Karl H. Menges. New York: King's Crown Press, 1947. xviii + 110 pages. \$2.50. Translation from German of the first part of a comparative historical grammar of the Qaraqalpaq and Qazaq languages (Turkic languages of Inner Asia). Contains, as well, a summary of historical and geographical in-

formation, comments on the spread of European words among Qaraqalpags, and a map of Soviet Asia.

Religion

The Essence of Judaism, by Leo Baeck. New York: Schocken, 1948. 288 pages. \$4.00. Revised edition of a standard work which includes a guide to rabbinical quotations and other references.

Hasidism, by Martin Buber. New York: Philosophical Library, 1948. 201 pages. \$3.75. Analysis and discussion of the Jewish sect founded by Rabbi Israel ben Eliezer Baal-Shem and devoted to purification, simple realistic living with mystical overtones. Beautifully written in a romantic style.

Muslim Theology, by A. S. Tritton. London: Luzac, 1947. 218 pages. 12s. 6d.

Toward Understanding Islam, by Harry Gaylord Dorman, Jr. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1948. 131 pages, bibliography. \$2.50.

Zionism: See *Palestine*.

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Note: It is the aim of the Bibliography to present a selective and annotated listing of periodical material dealing with the Middle East roughly since the rise of Islam. In order to avoid unwarranted duplication of excellent bibliographies already dealing with certain aspects and portions of the area, the material included will cover only North Africa and Moslem Spain, the Arab world, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Turkey, the Transcaucasian states of Soviet Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkestan. An attempt is made to survey all periodicals of importance in these fields. The ancient Near East, Byzantium, Zionism and Palestine¹ are excluded; also, beginning with this issue, India and Pakistan will no longer be included within the scope of the Bibliography. According to present plans, the American Council of Learned Societies, in co-operation with the South Asia Section of the Library of Congress, will soon produce independently a bibliography of South Asia in which India and Pakistan will receive full treatment.

¹ Palestine, the Jews of Palestine, Zionism, and Israel are omitted only because of the existence of a current, cumulative bibliography devoted to this field, i.e. *Zionism and Palestine*, a publication of the Zionist Archives and Library in New York.

For list of abbreviations, see page 117.

GEOGRAPHY

(General, description, travel and exploration, natural history, geology)

2287 ASHKENAZI, TOUVIA. "Jebel ed-Druz mountains and state." *Hatteva' Wehaaretz* 7 (N '47) 357-64 (in Hebrew). Based on a diary of a visit to the Jebel ed-Druz in the year 1931-1932; the author gives a description of the frontiers, the villages, mountains, valleys, and antiquities. Illust.

2288 BABA, NUZHET. "Storks in Ankara." *La Turquie Kemaliste* (Ankara) No. 48 (D '47) 4-8. Turkish storks are probably very little different from storks of any other country but they have a superior propagandist, as this delightful article shows.

2289 TILMAN, MAJOR H. W. "Wakhan: or how to vary a route." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 35 (Jl-O '48) 249-54. Account of a trip by little-used routes from Kashgar to Chit-

ral, cutting across corners of Soviet and Afghan territory. Maps.

2290 TOGAN, ZEKI VELIDI. "Ibn al-Fakih's information relative to the Turks." (in Turkish) *Bulleten* (Ankara) 12 (Ja '48) 11-16. A brief summary of the contents of that portion of al-Hamadhāni's work preserved in Meshhed relating to the Turks, comprising some 90 pages.

HISTORY AND POLITICS

(Ancient, medieval, modern)

2291 "Italy, the former colonies and ourselves." *Round Table* (London) No. 152 (S '48) 762-7. An explanation of the British attitude, which must take into consideration that Italy has a definite claim on western support since it cleared the communist hurdle last April. At the same time we

must recognize, says the author, the danger of Italy going communist after it regains its colonies.

2292 "The new Anglo-Trans-Jordan Treaty." *Perspective* (Washington) 2 (Je '48) 133-7. The provisions of the treaty, signed at Amman on March 15, 1948, do not differ fundamentally from those of the Anglo-Transjordan Treaty of 1946. They provide the British with a fairly secure foothold in a region which is still economically and strategically important to the Empire.

2293 "Plans for a new deal on Palestine." *New Times* (Moscow) No. 29 (Jl 29 '48) 1-2. Armed conflict in Palestine affords America a favorable opportunity to consolidate its position in the country, wipe out rival British oil interests, and at the same time strike a deal with Great Britain.

2294 ARNOLD, G. L. "Lessons of Palestine." *Nineteenth Century and After* (London) 144 (O '48) 192-201. An extremely important article that clarifies the differences between the British and American attitude toward the problem of the Middle East in general and that of Palestine in particular. It is mandatory reading for all those who believe that Zionism for Americans is purely an issue of domestic politics.

2295 ARSENIAN, SETH. "Wartime propaganda in the Middle East." *Middle East J.* 2 (O '48) 417-29. A description of the propaganda themes used by both the Axis and Allied powers, with an evaluation of their effectiveness. Concludes that wartime propaganda cannot win by itself; it is largely useful as a preparation for fullest capitalization of military success.

2296 DARBINIAN, REUBEN. "The question of Armenian boundaries and the repatriation." *Armenian Rev.* (Boston) 1 (Winter '48) 103-7. A stinging exposé of Soviet motives behind the repatriation scheme. As to the problem of boundaries, there is no intention of extending them, as Vishinsky's October 24, 1947 statement on Kars and Ardahan made clear.

2297 DUNCANSON, D. J. "Two Spanish captives in south Arabia, 1589-1596." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 35 (Jl-O '48) 278-81. Summary of a work, recently republished in Portuguese, of the Jesuit priest Pedro Paéz, who was captured while en route from Goa to Ethiopia and spent six years as a prisoner in southern Arabia.

2298 EBAN, AUBREY S. "The future of Arab-Jewish relations." *Commentary* (New York) 6 (S '48) 199-206. The thesis of this ably written article by the Israeli representative to the UN is that peace and prosperity can be assured only through the co-operation of equal and separate states, not through enforced unity.

2299 ELWELL-SUTTON, L. P. "The press in Iran today." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 35 (Jl-O '48) 209-19. An informed discussion of the Iranian press since 1941.

2300 FARAGO, LADISLAS. "The sources of Soviet policy in the Middle East." *United Nations World* 2 (Ag '48) 17-22. Concludes, after reviewing Soviet policy since the war, that the aim is to effect a revolution purely by peaceful means.

2301 FARIS, NABIH. "Clouds in Arab skies." (in Arabic) *Al-Abbâth* (Beirut) 1 (Je '48) 22-32. These clouds are caused by a host of external and internal problems. Chief among the former is the necessity for the Arabs to abandon the notion that they can remain neutral in the struggle between the democracies and the communist states.

2302 FAY, SIDNEY. "Arabs, Zionists, and oil." *Current Hist.* 14 (My '48) 270-6. A standard (and by now proven faulty) analysis of Zionist and Arab strength, concluding with the opinion that peace and American interests would be best assured by abandoning partition in favor of federalization.

2303 GEROUNIAN, H. "Armenia under Soviet rule." *Armenian Rev.* (Boston) 1 (Summer '48) 3-13. An eye-witness account of what happened in Soviet Armenia during the 20's when, here as elsewhere in the USSR, the land-owning kulaks were purged.

2304 HALL, H. DUNCAN. "Zones of the international frontier." *The Geog. Rev.* 38 (O '48) 615-25. A discussion of the problems of stabilizing the international frontiers of the world, which the author defines as "the major areas in which the interests, activities and forces of the Great Powers . . . meet, overlap, and conflict." The Middle East, from Tangier to Kashmir, is treated as such a zone. Map.

2305 ISSAWI, CHARLES. "The contribution of the Arabs to Islamic civilization." *Muslim World* 38 (Jl '48) 172-84. An evaluation of this contribution and an attempt to discuss the reasons which determine its particular nature. A comparison of the Arab role with the Roman in their respective civilizations is more interesting than meaningful.

2306 HUGHES, C. J. PENNETHORNE. "Three classes in Egypt." *Fortnightly* (London) No. 979 (Jl '48) 15-25. An able analysis of the main classes of Egyptian society and their ills.

2307 KIRK, GEORGE. "Independent Syria and Lebanon." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 35 (Jl-O '48) 259-72. A detailed discussion of political events in Syria and Lebanon since the end of World War II, with their economic and social implications.

2308 LEHRMAN, HAL. "The U.S.-British entente on Palestine." *Commentary* (New York) 6 (S '48) 214-21. Prognosis of Anglo-American policy toward Palestine. Outline of the terms of settlement which appear to have been agreed upon by the two powers and which assumes, if not safeguards, Israel's survival.

2309 LENGYEL, EMIL. "Strains and stresses in the Middle East." *Annals of the Amer. Acad. of Polit. and Social Sciences* 258 (Jl '48) 8-13. Principally a discussion of Turkey's need to find allies who are nearer to hand than the U. S. Turkey's efforts in this direction have been unsuccessful for obvious reasons.

2310 MALIK, CHARLES. "The basic issues of the Near East." *Annals of the Amer. Acad. of Polit. and Social Sciences* 258 (Jl '48) 1-7. Like many articles dealing with this theme, it is more cogent in its diagnosis than in its suggestions for treatment.

2311 MARDIKIAN, M. "The museum of the city of Yerevan." *Armenian Rev.* (Boston) 1 (winter '48) 117-9. Rather a brief history of the city of Yerevan.

2312 MARLOWE, JOHN. "What next for the Arab League?" *Commentary* (New York) 6 (O '48) 305-12. A brilliant analysis of the prospects for peace in Palestine.

2313 NALBANDIAN, V. C. "Babylonian origins of the Armenian people." *Armenian Rev.* (Boston) 1 (Summer '48) 90-4. Comments on Armenian ethnic names in cuneiform texts.

2314 ROOSEVELT, KERMIT. "The puzzle of Jerusalem's mufti." *Saturday Evening Post* 220 No. 50 26ff. Reviews the main facts in the life and character of the Mufti and concludes, among other things, that he collaborated with the Axis against the Allies.

2315 SAFWAT, MUHAMMAD MUSTAFA. "Germany's position vis-à-vis the British occupation of Egypt." *Al-Kitāb* (Cairo) 3 (Je '48) 19-26. Germany's non-obstruction of the British occupation of Egypt was a function of the general policy initiated by Bismarck of co-operation with Britain in Europe against France and Russia.

2316 SARKISSIAN, A. O. "On the authenticity of Moses of Khoren's history." *Armenian Rev.* (Boston) 1 (winter '48) 38-43. Summary and evaluation of the criticism bearing on the dating and historicity of Moses of Khoren's famous *History of Armenia*.

2317 SINCLAIR, LT. COL. J. M. "Correspondence." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 35 (Jl-O '48) 295. Letter to the Editor correcting the details of an incident recounted by Glubb Pasha in his *Story of the Arab Legion*.

2318 TOPOLEV, S. "American monopolies in Egypt." *New Times* (Moscow) No. 28 (Jl 7 '48) 24-6. Americans are exceedingly active in the economic, political, military, and cultural life of Egypt. Add reports that the Marshall plan may be extended to the Near East, primarily to Egypt, and you have absolute proof that American imperialism is about to make another conquest.

2319 TURAN, OSMAN. "Vakfiyes of the Seljuq period, III: Celâleddin Karatay, his Vakifs and Vakfiyes." (in Turkish) *Bulleten* 12 (Ja '48) 17-171. This thorough monograph deals with the life, times, and works of the important Rum Seljuq atabeg and statesman, Celâleddin Karatay (d. 652 A. H. or 1254 A. D.). His biography (pp. 17-49) is followed by discussions of his *vakifs* (caravanserai between Kayseri and Elbistan, medrese at Konya, Dâr us-Sulâhâ at Antalya), and photographic reproductions, transcribed texts and Turkish translations of the extant *vakfiyes* of the two former buildings and his mosque and zaviye at Konya. An index (pp. 159-171) facilitates the use of the article as a work of reference.

2320 UZUNCARSIL, I. HAKKI. "Organisation de la cour Ottomane." *La Turquie Kemaliste* (Ankara) No. 49 (Mr '48) 23-8. Notes on the functions of the component parts of the *enderun* (interior) and *birun* (exterior), the two major subdivisions of the Ottoman court. Illust.

2321 UZUNCARSIL, I. HAKKI. "Some documents relating to Süleyman Hüsnü Pasha's life in exile." (in Turkish) *Bulleten* 12 (Ja '48) 207-21. Principally letters from the Turkish general ("Commander at Shipka") in exile at Baghdad to the Sultan in Istanbul. Reproductions of the documents are accompanied by transliterations into modern Turkish characters.

2322 VEMIAN, A. "Two little known letters of Enver Pasha, written from Moscow." *Armenian Rev.* (Boston) 1 (Summer '48) 56-8. Dated August 25 and 26, 1920, they cast light on the Turco-Soviet collaboration in overthrowing the independent Armenian republic and the subsequent loss of Armenian territory.

2323 VRATZIAN, SIMON. "How Armenia was sovietized." *Armenian Rev.* (Boston) 1 Nos. 1, 2, 3 ('48) 74-84ff. An exceedingly valuable study, based on original source material, of why and how Armenia was sovietized.

2324 WEINRYB, BERNARD D. "Arabs in Israel." *Pal. Affairs* (New York) 3 (O '48) 113-5. Describes the first steps taken by the government to integrate the Arabs into Israel through two of the agencies

chiefly involved, the Ministry of Minorities and the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

2325 YEREDOR, JACOB. "La Palestine et la politique des grandes puissances." *Politique Etrangère* 13 (Je '48) 235-44. An analysis of the motives behind the actions of the major powers.

See also: 2290, 2334, 2338, 2360, 2362, 2363, 2398.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(General, finance, commerce, agriculture, natural resources, labor, transportation and communications)

2326 "The economic future of Turkey." *Gt. Brit. and the East* 65 (O '48) 35-6. Brief summary of a report on economic and commercial conditions in Turkey prepared by the British commercial counselor in Ankara. Many of the types of goods now being imported will soon be produced within Turkey proper.

2327 "The Eti bank." *La Turquie Kemaliste* (Ankara) No. 48 (D '47) 25-8. An outline of the activities carried on by the bank, which was set up in 1935 to deal with mining and power activities carried on by the state.

2328 "The foreign trade of Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon." *Pal. Affairs* (New York) 3 (Ag '48) 95-7. The economic position of these three countries is still fairly secure. But Syria and Lebanon will soon experience grave difficulties due to the decline both of Palestinian buying and tourists.

2329 "High payment to Kuwait ruler by Aminoco." *Oil Forum* (New York) 2 (Ag '48) 314. Some details of the important concession granted to the American Independent Oil Company. The royalty is higher than anywhere else in the Near East.

2330 "Industries of the Sumer bank." *Gt. Brit. and the East* 65 (S '48) 41-2. An outline of the industries and establishments operated by this vast organization.

2331 "Mid-East awakening spurred by oil industry." *Oil Forum* (New York) 2 (My '48) 175-7. Describes the development in communications effected by the oil companies.

2332 "Off-shore oil—a Middle East issue, too!" *Oil Forum* (New York) 2 (Ag '48) 320-1. Some discussion of whether rights to off-shore oil were granted to Aramco and I.P.C. by the various concessions.

2333 ADLER, JOSEPH L. "Difficulties attending exploration in Qatar." *Oil Forum* (New York) 2 (My '48) 178-9. The climate and lack of skilled labor will not prevent Qatar, Arabia, from becoming, according to geologists, one of the world's major oil-producing areas. The concession here is held by subsidiaries of the Iraq Petroleum Company, Ltd.

2334 ALAI HESHMAT. "How not to develop a backward country." *Fortune* 38 (Ag '48) 76-7ff. The author fears that the vast capital plans now being pushed for the development of Iran will create far less wealth and prosperity for the country than the fostering of small native business, which would simultaneously promote not only economic but political freedom.

2335 BAKER, JAMES S. and ADAMS, CLYDE B. "Egypt may become important oil producer." *Oil Forum* (New York) 2 (My '48) 186-9. Operations by three major companies, following modification of unattractive laws, have increased the country's output to 33,000 barrels daily through the discovery of two new fields, and a third one is in sight.

2336 BEE, JOHN. "A vast seven-year development plan." *Gt. Brit. and the East* 65 (Ag '48) 31-2. Some details of the Iranian plan, which is another indication that the Middle East (or one segment of it) recognizes the necessity for really comprehensive economic development.

2337 HARDING, C. L. "Major shortage without Middle East oil." *Oil Forum* (New York) 2 (My '48) 182-5. The director of the Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc. holds that it will be impossible to meet even minimum demands for petroleum should the Middle East supply become unavailable. World requirements by 1956 will be 11,650,000 barrels daily, when the Western hemisphere will be producing only 9,227,000.

2338 HIMADAH, SA'ID. "Advantages to Syria and Lebanon from a unified customs and other ties." (in Arabic) *Al-Abhāth* (Beirut) 1 (Je '48) 15-21. Syria and Lebanon are proceeding in the direction of dissolving their long-standing economic bonds, a trend fraught with grave dangers.

2339 HIMADAH, SA'ID. "Remarks on the recent Lebano-French financial agreement." *Al-Abhāth* (Beirut) 1 (Mr '48) 18-29. A valuable analysis, together with a description of the Syro-Lebanese currency situation prevailing before this agreement, by the leading Lebanese economist, who disapproves of it.

2340 LOUIS, A. "La pêche et les pêcheurs Kerkenniens." *Ibla* (Tunis) 10 (4th trim. '47) 355. A detailed study followed by a glossary of the principal Arabic words used.

2341 SARC, OMER CELAL. "Economic policy of the new Turkey." *Middle East J.* 2 (O '48) 430-46. The chief weaknesses of Turkey's economic planning have been the failure to give adequate attention to power and transportation, and the failure to set clear limits to the scope of governmental activity.

2342 VERSCHOYLE, T. "Turkish tea." *Asiatic Rev.* 44 (Jl '48) 336-8. A brief account of the attempt to grow tea in Turkey.

2343 VILLIERS, ALAN. "Some aspects of the Arab dhow trade." *Middle East J.* 2 (O '48) 399-416. An entertaining description of the social and economic structure of the dhow trade from the Persian Gulf to the coast of East Africa. Four line drawings of various types of Arab dhows.

See also: 2307, 2318.

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

(General, education, population and ethnology, medicine and public health, religion, law)

2344 "Mid-East awakening spurred by oil industry." *Oil Forum* (New York) 2 (Ag '48) 313. A sketch of the public health measures initiated and supported by the oil companies.

2345 ABU AL-SU'UD, 'ABD AL-HAFIZ. "The educational renaissance in Nubia." (in Arabic) *Al-Risâlah* (Cairo) 16 (S 27 '48) 1101-3. Sketches the school system prevailing in Nubia (Upper Egypt) and contrasts the desire of the Nubians for education with the apathy shown by the Egyptian fellahin.

2346 ABU AL-SU'UD, 'ABD AL-HAFIZ. "The social situation." (in Arabic) *Al-Risâlah* (Cairo) 16 (S 6 '48) 1012-14. A brief picture of the way of life of the Nubians of Upper Egypt, with special attention to housing.

2347 ASHKENAZI, TOUVIA. "The 'Anazah tribes." *Southwestern J. of Anthropology* 4 (Summer '48) 222-39. An analysis of the tribal organization and population of the 'Anazah, the most powerful Bedouin confederation of northern Arabia. Map.

2348 ASHKENAZI, TOUVIA. "The sheikh, the mukhtar, and the elders of the Bedouins, *Hatteva' Wehaaretz*." (in Hebrew) 7 (S '47) 283-6. Deals with Bedouin lore in Upper Galilee. The powers and jurisdiction of the Sheikh, the Mukhtar, and the Elders among the semi-nomadic tribes of northern Palestine.

2349 BOWMAN JOHN. "A British museum Arabic eschatological fragment." *Muslim World* 38 (Jl '48) 198-215. Translation and exegetical notes of a 5 folio ms. ca. 14th century that uses Surah 55: 26 as a basis for introducing into Moslem eschatology a feature found in early Jewish eschatology. Plus some notes on archangels in Islam.

2350 DAVIS, GEORGE W. "Sufism: from its origins to al-Ghazzâli." *Muslim World* 38 (O '48) 241-56. An explanation of the Sufi emphasis in Islamic history, which al-Ghazzâli finally succeeded in making a

recognized part of Islam almost 500 years after Mohammed, who was "a Sufi when on his way to be a prophet."

2351 DEMEERSEMAN, A. "L'évolution féminine Tunisienne." *Ibla* (Tunis) 10 (4^e trim. '47) 301-26. A detailed study of the psychology and behavior of Tunisian women in the realms of family, culture, and education.

2352 DOUGLAS, ELMER H. "Al-Shâdhili, a North African Sufi, according to Ibn al-Sabbâgh." *Muslim World* 38 (O '48) 257-80. The influence of the Moslem mystic Al-Shâdhili (d. 1248 A. D.), founder of the religious order bearing his name, has been more profound than that of any other North African religious leader. His biography and teachings are preserved in the *Durrat al-Asrâr wa-Tuhfat al-Abdrâr* of his disciple Ibn al-Sabbâgh.

2353 EISENSTADT, S. N. "Some remarks on demographic factors in a situation of culture contact." *Man* 48 (S '48) 101-2. Discusses the factors affecting the adaptability of Oriental Jews in Palestine to European Jewish culture.

2354 FOISSY, P. "L'entre-aide dans l'île de Djerba." *Ibla* (Tunis) 11 (1^{er} trim. '48) 17-36. Jerba lacks, for example, beggars because of the strong feeling of communal solidarity. Some of the interesting aspects of the aid rendered (*i'dnah*) are here presented.

2355 FRAYHAH, ANIS. "Adonis: feast of spring in ancient Lebanon." (in Arabic) *Al-Abhâth* (Beirut) 1 (Je '48) 50-69. An interesting account of the rites with which under various names the advent of spring has been greeted up to our own time.

2356 GIBB, H. A. R. "The structure of religious thought in Islam: III, law and theology." *Muslim World* 38 (Jl '48) 185-97. A highly abstract discussion of the historical development of these two aspects of Islamic thought.

2357 GIBB, H. A. R. "The structure of religious thought in Islam: IV, Sufism." *Muslim World* 38 (O '48) 280-91. "The efficient principle of Sufism is the organized cultivation of religious experience and, like theology, it arises at an advanced stage in religious development." The last and most notable of Professor Gibb's brilliant series re-evaluating Islam.

2358 HENNINGER, JOSEPH. "Le sacrifice chez les Arabes." *Ethnos* 13 (Ja-Je '48) 1-16. Includes an analysis of modern practices and those practiced in pre-Islamic times, with consideration of the meaning of sacrifice among the Arabs generally.

2359 KUSIKIAN, I. "Folkloristics in Soviet Armenia." (in Russian) *Sovetskaya Etnografija* No. 1 ('48) 238-40. Interest in

collecting and studying folklore in Armenia is long-standing. Moses of Khoren, the great 8th century Armenian historian, devoted much attention to the subject.

2360 LICHENSTADTER, ILSE. "The 'new woman' in modern Egypt." *Muslim World* 38 (Jl '48) 163-71. A series of sound if unoriginal observations of the conditions of lower class Moslem women, told with unintentional humor.

2361 MAXOUDIAN, NOUBAR. "The church of Armenia." *Armenian Rev.* (Boston) 1 (winter '48) 110-16. A useful sketch of its origins, differences between it and the Greek and Latin churches, and theology.

2362 TALVACCHIA, FILIPPO. "Il centenario del ristabilimento del patriarcato latino di Gerusalemme (1847-1947)." *Oriente Mod.* 28 (Jl-S '48) 117-21. An account of the circumstances that led to the re-establishment of the Latin patriarchate after an absence of 500 years.

2363 THOMPSON, RT. REV. W. J. "Conditions of daily life in Iran, 1947." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 35 (Jl-O '48) 199-208. A comprehensive description of the changes that have occurred in Iran since the end of World War II.

2364 ZURAYK, COSTI. "The duties of the Arab thinker at the present time." (in Arabic) *Al-Abhāth* (Beirut) 1 (Mr '48) 3-17. A staggering list of duties confronts the Arab intellectuals, for in addition to sharing the necessary tasks being performed by westerners, the Arabs have specific ones that have thus far seemed to overtax their strength.

See also: 2306.

SCIENCE

2365 FIELD, HENRY. "The University of California African expedition: I, Egypt." *Amer. Anthropologist* 50 (Jl-S '48) 479-93. A preliminary report on archaeological and anthropological researches conducted in Sinai as part of the University of California African Expedition.

ART

(*Archaeology, architecture, epigraphy, numismatics, minor arts, painting and music, manuscripts and papyri*)

2366 "Some Turkish commemorative series." *La Turquie Kemaliste* (Ankara) No. 48 (D '47) 29-30. Brief description of the stamps issued in connection with the Izmir Fair of 1947, the 25th anniversary of the "Battle of the Commander-in-Chief," the Congress of Grapes and Wine held in Istanbul, 1947, and the International Railway Conference held in Istanbul, 1947.

2367 "Le théâtre arabe à cent ans." *La Bourse Egyptienne* (Cairo) (S 13 '48) 4. A brief but informative article on the inauguration of the Arabic theater by Märün Naqqāsh in Beirut one hundred years ago. The plays presented were principally by such French authors as Molière, Racine, and Corneille.

2368 "Turkish knittings." *La Turquie Kemaliste* (Ankara) No. 49 (Mr '48) 29-30. The Ankara Halkevi featured from Nov. 18-Dec. 18, 1947 an exhibition of this ancient Turkish art. Illust.

2369 ARTAM, NURETTIN. "A great Turkish photographer." *La Turquie Kemaliste* (Ankara) No. 49 (Mr '48) 36-9. Ali Enis, who died in April 1948, was distinguished for his photographs, both of Turkish architectural masterpieces and specimens of famous calligraphers. Illust.

2370 BOYAR, SAMI. "The *yali* of Köprülü Hüseyin Pasa." *La Turquie Kemaliste* (Ankara) No. 49 (Mr '48) 13-16. The magnificent reception room of the *yali* (summer home) of Köprülü Hüseyin, a distinguished 18th century diplomat, is still excellently preserved on the Bosphorus near Anadolu Hisar. It is a fine example of the Turkish artistic taste. Plans and photographs.

2371 CEMİL, MESUD. "Voices from the leaves of an old book." *La Turquie Kemaliste* (Ankara) No. 48 (D '47) 9-11. Brief mention of the first Turkish musical composition noted according to the European system. Illust.

2372 GERNGROSS, O. and ÖNCÜ, CAHİT. "Old Turkish leathers." *La Turquie Kemaliste* (Ankara) No. 48 (D '47) 17-22. Description, with illustrations, of a dozen examples of Turkish leather-working technique.

2373 MARDIROSIAN, FLORENCE. "Armenian music." *Armenian Rev.* (Boston) 1 (spring '48) 103-8. An interesting analysis.

2374 ÖZ, TAHSİN. "Restoration of the Topkapi museum." *La Turquie Kemaliste* (Ankara) No. 49 (Mr '48) 4-9. After their recent restoration, the kitchens of the great palace built by Sultan Fatih Mehmet II (1451-81), conqueror of Istanbul, were converted into a museum said to contain, among other things, the richest collection of Chinese porcelains (over 10,000 items) in the world. Illust.

2375 ROES, ANNA. "Birds and fishes." *Jaarbericht van het Vooraziatisch-Egyptisch Genootschap Ex Oriente Lux* 10 ('45-'48) 461-72. History of the motif of birds and fishes from prehistoric Iran to medieval Muslim times.

2376 RUBEN, W. "Noteworthy monuments of Kırşehir." (in Turkish with German summary) *Belleten* (Ankara) 12 (Ja '48) 173-

205. A continuation of No. 1915. See Bibliography, Part VII, *Middle East J.*, II (1948), p. 374. The only part of the article relating to the Islamic period deals with the oldest houses of the city. Illust.

2377 YONETKEN, HALIL BEDİİ. "Foremost Turkish composers of today." *La Turquie Kemaliste* (Ankara) No. 49 (Mr '48) 32-5. Bio-bibliographical sketches of Necil Kâzim Akses, Ferid Alnar, Ulvi Cemal Erkin, Cemal Resit Rey, and Ahmet Adnan Saygun, contemporary musicians who have composed in the European style.

LANGUAGE

2378 LESLAU, WOLF. "Supplementary observations on Tigré grammar." *J. Amer. Orient. Soc.* 68 (Jl-S '48) 127-39. Based on a recently completed field trip to Eritrea.

2379 NALBANDIAN, V. C. "About the theory of the Babylonian origin of the Armenian people." *Armenian Rev.* (Boston) 1 (Winter '48) 15-19. Traces alleged Armenian ethnic names in Assyro-Babylonian cuneiform texts.

2380 PELLEGRIN, A. "Contribution à l'étude de la toponymie tunisienne: l'étymologie de Bizerte." *Ibla* (Tunis) 11 (1^{er} trim. '48) 43-6. Derived from the Arabic *Benzert* which in turn is derived from the vulgar Latin *Ippone Zareio*, a deformation of the name of the Julian official HIPPO DIARRHYTUS.

2381 PELLEGRIN, A. "Contribution à la toponymie tunisienne: l'étymologie de Tunis." *Ibla* (Tunis) 10 (4th trim. '47) 420-4. "Tunis" was taken into Arabic after the conquest of the city by Hasan b. Nu'mân from the Berber verbal root *ens*, "to lie down, pass the night, bivouac."

2382 ROSSI, E. "La fonte turca della novella poetica albanese 'Erveheja' di Muhamet Cami . . . e il tema di 'Florence de Rome'." *Oriente Mod.* (Rome) 28 (Jl 5 '48) 143-53. The theme of the "Erveheja" is ultimately derived from Indian sources through Persian and Arabic versions.

See also: 2340.

LITERATURE

2383 AL-AHWANI, AHMAD FU'AD. "The essay of . . . al-Kindi on the soul." (in Arabic) *Al-Kitâb* (Cairo) 6 (O '48) 399-405. The author publishes herewith the text of a short and hitherto unknown essay by the Arab philosopher Abû Yûsuf Ya'qûb ibn Ishâq al-Kindi. The original was discovered among a collection of MS essays in the Taymûriyah Library.

2384 AL-'AMMARI, 'ALI. "Poetry in the Sudan." (in Arabic) *Al-Risâlah* (Cairo) 16 (Ag 2 '48) 869-71. Poetry, which is the only active phase of Arabic literature in the Sudan at present, is still dominated in the main by classical models. The names of contemporary poets are given, accompanied by examples of their verse.

2385 BEN ALI, A. and A. LOUIS. "Sidi l'Hâdi." *Ibla* (Tunis) 11 (1^{er} trim. '47) 57-72. Scenes of Saharan life. Arabic text, translation, glossary, and notes.

2386 BRUSSOV, VALERY. "The poetry of Armenia." *Armenian Rev.* (Boston) 1 Nos. 1, 2, 3 ('48) 93-102ff. A readable sketch preceded by a bird's-eye view of Armenian history.

2387 DAGORN, R. "Abû-Firâj al-H'amadâni." *Ibla* (Tunis) 10 (4th trim. '47) 327-53. Line by line analysis and a translation of a poem written to his mother by this Arab poet who flourished at the court of Sayf al-Dawlah.

2388 EDIBOGLU, BAKI SUHA. "Le grand poète Turc Yahya Kemal Beyatî." *La Turquie Kemaliste* (Ankara) No. 49 (Mr '48) 10-11. An analysis of the style of this great contemporary Turkish poet-diplomat, who was named ambassador to Pakistan in January 1948.

2389 GRAF-DE LA SALLE, M. "Le 'Kitâb-al-'Ayn.'" *Ibla* (Tunis) 11 (1^{er} trim. '48) 37-41. A discussion of the arguments favoring attributing this famous Arabic dictionary to al-Khalil b. Ahmad. Decision withheld.

2390 AL-KHALIDI, AHMAD SAMIH. "The Kitâb al-Nawâdir of . . . Ibn al-A'râbî." (in Arabic) *Al-Risâlah* (Cairo) 16 (Ag 7 '48) 864-6. Description of a MS of part one of this rare work found in the Khâlidiyah Library in Jerusalem, with a discussion of the life and works of the author.

2391 LAW, H. D. GRAVES. "A Persian symposium." *Asiatic Rev.* 44 (Jl '48) 309-25. A delightful article containing examples of the art of three contemporary Persian poets—Ra'di Azarkashi, Mas'ûd Farzâd, and Mir Fakhrai (Gulchin-i Gilâni). The text of the original is followed by an English translation.

2392 LETHIELLEUX, J. "Au Fezzan—le calendrier agricole." *Ibla* (Tunis) 11 (1^{er} trim. '48) 73-82. The people of Fezzan do not accept this lunar calendar but remain faithful to an old tradition. Their solar months begin on the 14th of ours; nor do their seasons exactly match ours. Proverbs, mnemonic devices and legends, given here, aid them in making quick calculations.

2393 MAGNIN, J. "Abu l-'Atâhiya, poète de l'ascèse." *Ibla* (Tunis) 11 (1^{er} trim. '48) 47-56. Short extracts with translation.

2394 MAGNIN, J. "Le testament spirituel d'Abu Zakariyya." *Ibla* (Tunis) 10 (4th trim. '47) 393-407. Arabic text and translation

of a document notable not only for its literary and moral content, but for its historical commentary on several chapters of Ibn Khaldūn's *Prolegomena*. Abū Zakariyyā' (1202-49) was a grandson of Abū Hafs, of the famous Almohad dynasty.

2395 QUEMENEUR, J. "Mah'all châhed" d'El Arbi n-nejjâr." *Ibla* (Tunis) 10 (4^e trim. '47) 409-19. Four selections of the orally transmitted sententious verse of this poet. *Mahall shâhid* is the genre to which they belong.

2396 AL-TANAHI, TAHIR. "Two savants in the life of Mlle. Mayy." (in Arabic) *Al-Hildâl* (Cairo) 56 (O '48) 53-64. Consists principally of quotations from Mayy Ziyâdâh's letters to Shibli Shumayyil and Ya'qûb Sarrûf, publisher of *Al-Muqtataf*. *See also:* 2290, 2305, 2316, 2349, 2350, 2352.

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2397 ROSSI, E. "Il XXI Congresso Internazionale degli Orientalisti a Parigi (23-31 luglio 1948)." *Oriente Mod.* (Rome) 28 (Jl-S '48) 153-7. Lists the authors and titles of papers dealing with the Middle East.

See also: 2377.

BIOGRAPHY

2398 "Taher Pacha Kheireddine." *Ibla* (Tunis) 10 (4^e trim. '47) 425-36. Biography of this Tunisian, who during the first part of the century rendered valuable diplomatic service to the Turkish Empire.

2399 AL-BUSTANI, FU'AD AFRAM. "'Abdallâh al-Zâkir, 1680-1748." (in Arabic) *Al-Kitâb* (Cairo) 6 (O '48) 386-98. A worthwhile account of the life and works of 'Abdallâh al-Zâkir, the Arab Gutenberg, who set up the first Arabic printing press to operate in an Arab country. This press, which was at first situated in Aleppo, was enlarged and improved and moved to al-Shuwayr (Lebanon), where it commenced operations in 1733. Illust.

2400 AL-KAYYALI, SAMI. "Amin al-Rihâni, 1876-1940." (in Arabic) *Al-Kitâb* (Cairo) 3 (Je '48) 56-66. A fairly comprehensive account of the life, works, and travels of this well-known Arab-American writer. It is worth mentioning that Rihâni, who emigrated to America at the age of 10, first became interested in the Arab world through reading the works of Carlyle.

2401 MASISSIAN, V. "Anetis Aharonian (1866-1948)." *Armenian Rev.* (Boston) 1 (Summer '48) 47-51. Foremost Armenian poet of this century.

2402 MESROBIAN, ARPENA. "Nigol Aghbalian." *Armenian Rev.* (Boston) 1 (Winter '48) 69ff. Aghbalian (1873-1947) was a noted teacher who helped found in Beirut the Armenian Jemaran, the only day

school approaching junior college status outside of Soviet Armenia.

2403 SAHAKIAN, ARAM. "Cardinal Aghajanian." *Armenian Rev.* (Boston) 1 (Summer '48) 15-20. When His Eminence was a bishop in Beirut, he did much to resist the Soviet repatriation operation for Armenians.

See also: 2396.

BOOK REVIEWS

2404 *The Middle East, 1948. Muslim World* 38 (O '48) 300-1. (H. A. R. Gibb).

2405 *Persian art and design influences from the Near and Middle East. Middle East* J. 2 (O '48) 490-1. (Florence E. Day). "The volume would more properly have been entitled *Islamic Art and American Textile Design*."

2406 AHMAD, SHEIKH MAHMUD. *Economics of Islam*. *Middle East* J. 2 (O '48) 488. (Sidney Glazer). A futile attempt to demonstrate that Koranic economic dictums are practicable for a 20th century state.

2407 ALI, ZAKI. *Islam in the world. Muslim World* 38 (Jl '48) 221-2 (C. Robert Avery, Jr.).

2408 AMMAR, BADAWI, NOSHI, GHORBAL, ZAKI. *The unity of the Nile valley*. *Middle East* J. 2 (O '48) 476-7. (Frank H. H. Roberts, Jr.). Presents the Egyptian case.

2409 ASLAN, M. *Etudes littéraires arabes*. *Ibla* 10 4^e trim. '47) 443. (J. Quéméneur).

2410 BANFI, FLORU. *Felix Ragusinus*. *Oriente Mod.* 28 (Jl-S '48) 160. (E. Rossi). Ragusinus was a 16th century writer and Turkish historian.

2411 BRUNSCHVIG, ROBERT. *La Berberie Orientale sous les Hafsiades*. *Oriente Mod.* 28 (Jl-S '48) 162-3. (E. Rossi).

2412 BRUNSCHVIG, ROBERT, ed. *Le livre de l'ordre et de la défense, d'al-Musani*. *Ibla* 10 (4^e trim. '47) 445. (J. Magnin). Text and translation of a legal tract.

2413 AL-BUSTANI, F. E. *Al-Majâni al-Hadîth 'an Majâni al-ab Cheïkho*. *Ibla* 10 (4^e trim. '47) 442-3. (R. Dagorn).

2414 CERULLI, ENRICO. *Etiopi in Palestina*. *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 35 (Jl-O '48) 289-91. (D. E.) "The purpose of the book is threefold: to trace the relations between Europe and Ethiopia from the earliest known sources up to the present day, the Ethiopian community in Palestine being the channel of communication; to study the internal organization and history of the community at Jerusalem; and to trace the history of the relations between the Coptic and other Christian Churches."

2415 COLUCCI, MASSIMO. *Il Regime della Proprietà Fondaria nell'Africa Italiana*. Vol.

1, Libia. Africa (London) 18 (Ja '48) 70-1. (E. E. Evans-Pritchard).

2416 COSTANZO, G. *L'Ecloga araba nel Fetha Nagast e la sua versione in italiana*. Oriente. Mod. 28 (Jl-S '48) 158-9. (Antonio d'Emilia).

2417 CRESWELL, K. A. C. *Early Muslim architecture*. Royal Cent. Asian J. 35 (Jl-O '48) 282-4. ". . . a full, practically an exhaustive description of the buildings raised by the Believers before A.D. 905 . . . in the whole realm of Muslim archaeology no other scholar, of any nationality, has wrought more solidly than" Creswell.

2418 CUNY, A. *Invitation à l'étude comparative des langues indo-européennes et des langues chamito-sémitiques*. Ibla 11 (1^{er} trim. '48) 84-5. (A. Pellegrin).

2419 DEBECHE, DJAMILA. *Leila, jeune fille d'Algérie*. Ibla 10 (4^{er} trim. '47) 444-5. (Neyla).

2420 DEMOMBYNES, GAUDEFROY. *Introduction au livre de la poésie et des poètes d'Ibn Qotaiba*. Ibla 11 (1^{er} trim. '48) 83-4. (M. Graf-de la Salle).

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2422 DIMAND, M. S. *A handbook of Muhammadan art*. Muslim World 38 (Jl '48) 225-6. (Mehmed A. Simsar).

2423 DODD, STUART CARTER. *Social relations in the Middle East*. Muslim World 38 (Jl '48) 220-1. (Charles G. Chakarian).

2424 FLEISCH, HENRI. *Introduction à l'étude des langues sémitiques — éléments de bibliographie*. Ibla 11 (1^{er} trim. '48) 85-6. (J. Quéméneur).

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2426 GAFUROV, B. *Istoriya Tadzhikskogo naroda b kratkom izlozhennii*. Voprosy Ist. (Moscow) No. 7 ('48) 107-10. (M. D'yakonov).

2427 GALWASH, AHMAD A. *The religion of Islam*. Middle East J. 2 (O '48) 486-7. (Vergilius Ferm). "One is reminded of the fact that a prophet's religion must always be distinguished from that of those who follow with their own more circumscribed interpretations and practices."

2428 GARDET, LOUIS. *La propriété in Islam*. Muslim World 38 (O '48) 298. (Arthur Jeffery). This important essay, dealing with private property, including the *waqfs*, as conceived by Islamic theologians and jurists, is an extract from Ibla No. 38, 1947.

2429 GARDET, LOUIS. *Rencontre de la théologie musulmane et de la pensée patristique*. Muslim World 38 (O '48) 297-8. (Arthur Jeffery). This article is an extract from the *Revue Thomiste*, 1947.

2430 GIBB, H. A. R. *Modern trends in Islam*. Royal Cent. Asian J. 35 (Jl-O '48) 284-5. (George Kirk).

2431 GLUBB, J. B. *Story of the Arab Legion*. Royal Cent. Asian J. 35 (Jl-O '48) 285-6. (C. S. Jarvis). "the story of the Arab Legion from the days when it was first raised as a subsidiary force to the ordinary police of Transjordan . . . in 1920 until the end of the recent war." Glubb devotes some chapters to Bedouin laws and customs, particularly tribal raiding." "The second half of the book deals with the important part played by the Arab Legion when it . . . cleared the way for the British column that set out from Transjordan for the relief of Baghdad."

2432 GOITEIN, S. D. *The land of Sheba*. Asiatic Rev. 44 (Jl '48) 342. (Owen Tweedy).

2433 GRAF, GEORG. *Geschichte der Christlichen Arabischen literatur*. Muslim World 38 (Jl '48) 218-19. (S. M. Zwemer).

2434 GRANQVIST, HILMA. *Birth and childhood among the Arabs*. Man 48 (S '48) 93. (Lord Raglan). A detailed ethnographic description of the practices and beliefs relating to birth and childhood in an Arab village in southern Palestine.

2435 GREENBERG, S. *The influence of Islam on a Sudanese religion*. African Stud. (Johannesburg) 7 (Mr '48) 53-4. (M. D. W. Jefferies).

2436 GROSECLOSE, ELGIN. *Introduction to Iran*. Muslim World 38 (Jl '48) 219-20. (J. Christy Wilson).

2437 HAJJI, KHALIFAH. *Kashf al-Zunūn*, ed. Serefettin Yaltkaya and K. R. Bilge. Oriente Mod. 28 (Jl-S '48) 161-2. (E. Rossi).

2438 EL-HAKIM, TEWFIK. *Maze of justice*. Middle East J. 2 (O '48) 479-80. (Philip Woodruff). A revealing description, in narrative form, of the tortuous workings of justice in an Egyptian rural community.

2439 AL-HAMAMISI JALAL AL-DIN. *Mādhā fi al-Sūdān?* Oriente Mod. 28 (Jl-S '48) 163-4. (N. Rizzitano).

2440 HINZ, WALTHER. *Altpersischer Wortschatz*. J. Amer. Orient. Soc. 68 (Jl-S '48) 151-3.

2441 HOUSEHOLD, GEOFFREY. *Arabesque*. Middle East J. 2 (O '48) 478-9. (Helen A. Kitchen). This novel of wartime intrigue in the Middle East is saved from mediocrity by the author's "tangy" style.

2442 ISSAWI, CHARLES. *Egypt: an economic and social analysis*. Muslim World 38 (O '48) 292. (E. M. Wright).

2443 JAMME, A. *Le panthéon sud-arabe préislamique d'après les sources épigraphiques*. Ibla 10 (4^{er} trim. '47) 446 (J. Magnin).

2444 JARRING, GUNNAR. *On the distribution*

of Turk tribes in Afghanistan. *Amer. Anthropologist* 50 (Jl-S '48) 532-3. (Elizabeth Bacon). The author has set himself the task of giving "a picture of the distribution of the Turkish peoples in Afghanistan on the basis of the knowledge obtainable from all the scattered sources about the country." "Dr. Jarring has performed a considerable service in bringing together widely scattered material."

2445 KHAN, EBRAHIM. *Anecdotes from Islam*. Middle East J. 2 (O '48) 488. (Sidney Glazer). ". . . brief, humorless messages dedicated to spiritual uplift."

2446 LANE, A. *Early Islamic pottery: Mesopotamia, Egypt and Persia*. The Connoisseur 121 (Mr '48) 60. (H. G. F.).

2447 LLOYD, SETON. *Foundations in the dust*. Middle East J. 2 (O '48) 488-90. (Nelson Glueck).

2448 LOFGREN, O. and LAMM, C. J. *Ambrosian fragments of an illuminated ms. containing the zoology of al-Gahiz*. Ibla 10 (4th trim. '47) 446-7. (J. Quéménieur).

2449 MATHEW, DAVID. *Ethiopia: the study of a polity, 1540-1935*. Africa (London) 18 (Ja '48) 71-2. (Dennis J. Duncanson).

2450 MAUGHAM, ROBIN. *Nomad*. Middle East J. 2 (O '48) 477-8. (P. T. Hart). "A sincere beginning in [the author's] personal quest for Arab-Western understanding."

2451 MAXWELL, JAMES A. *I never saw an Arab like him*. Middle East J. 2 (O '48) 486. (Benjamin Rivlin). A group of sketches of wartime Tripolitania which catch the mood of the country.

2452 MERCHANT, MUHAMMAD VALIBHAI. *Quranic Laws*. Middle East J. 2 (O '48) 487-8. (Fuad Massa).

2453 MONTAGNE, ROBERT. *La civilisation du désert*. Politique Etrangère 13 (Je '48) 264-5. (Vincent Monteil).

2454 NADEL, S. F. *The Nuba*. African Affairs (London) 47 (Ap '48) 120-2. (M. Fortes). An anthropological study of the hill tribes in Kordofan.

2455 NATHAN, R. R., GASS, OSCAR, and CREAMER, DANIEL. *Palestine: problem and promise*. Politique Etrangère 13 (Je '48) 265. (Pierre Rondot).

2456 NEWTON, FRANCES E. *Fifty years in Palestine*. Royal Cent. Asian J. 35 (Jl-O '48) 288-9. (E. D.). The author devotes the first half of the book to her experiences as a missionary in Palestine. The second half is devoted to a carefully documented statement presenting "The Case for the Arabs."

2457 O'SHEA, RAYMOND. *The sand kings of Oman*. Middle East J. 2 (O '48) 475-6. (Eric Macro). The book is dated and inaccurate in some of the facts it presents; nevertheless it is a revealing word-picture of life in a desert outpost.

2458 PANETTA, ESTER. *Forme e soggetti della letteratura popolare Libica*. Africa (London) 18 (Ja '48) 70. (E. E. Evans-Pritchard).

2459 PEARLMAN, MAURICE. *The mufti of Jerusalem*. Muslim World 38 (Jl '48) 224-5. (S. M. Zwemer).

2460 PHILBY, H. ST. JOHN B. *Arabian days*. Middle East J. 2 (O '48) 474-5. (Garry Owen); Muslim World 38 (O '48) 298-300. (S. M. Zwemer).

2461 PHILBY, H. ST. JOHN B. *The background of Islam*. Middle East J. 2 (O '48) 490. (C. N. Brown). "Philby's hypotheses on unsolved points of history are often strikingly at variance with older views."

2462 PIERSUIS, J. *L'oeil de Mahmoud, contes et récits*. Ibla 11 (1st trim. '48) 86. (A. Pellegrin).

2463 POUJADE, JEAN. *La route des Indes et ses navires*. Man 48 (Jl '48) 81-2. (James Hornell). "an account of maritime traffic through the gateways of the Mediterranean — the Cape route to the Indies — the areas of navigation in antiquity — the ships of the Orient and the Occident used on this route — the interdependence of the various types of ships employed and the techniques of naval construction characteristic of the shipping concerned."

2464 RIVALS, LOUIS. *Contes de la Gazelle, en pays d'Islam*. Ibla 10 (4th trim. '47) 445-6. (J. Quéménieur).

2465 RONDOT, PIERRE. *Les institutions politiques du Liban*. Oriente Mod. 28 (Jl-S '48) 164. (E. Rossi).

2466 ROSSI, E. *Elenco dei manoscritti persiani della biblioteca Vaticana*. Oriente Mod. 28 (Jl-S '48) 160-1. (Francesco Gabrieli).

2467 SETON-WILLIAMS, M. V. *Britain and the Arab states: a survey of Anglo-Arab relations 1920-1948*. Oriente Mod. 28 (Jl-S '48) 164. (E. Rossi). "A substantial book, seriously informative, not lacking in criticism."

2468 STEINER, M. J. *Inside Pan-Arabia*. Royal Cent. Asian J. 35 (Jl-O '48) 287-8. (E. M.). "the story of the rise of Islam and of the Arab Empire and the latter's fall . . . traces the emergence of the Arab National Movement to Jamal-ad Din al Afghani . . . Present and future tendencies . . . are the most interesting parts of the book." "As writer of a 'general reader' . . . Dr. Steiner has succeeded well."

2469 STITT, GEORGE. *A prince of Arabia*. Royal Cent. Asian J. 35 (Jl-O '48) 288. (Kenneth Williams). The story, taken from his diaries, of Ali Haider, claimant to the Emirate of the Hijaz. "Cheated of this opportunity, Ali Haider . . . never upbraided fate, never intrigued . . . a most readable work."

2470 TAILLARD, F. *Le nationalisme marocain*. *Middle East* J. 2 (O '48) 484-6. (Carleton S. Coon). ". . . a sincere attempt . . . to understand why France's stock has fallen in Morocco, and to prescribe a cure."

2471 TRITTON, A. S. *Muslim theology*. *Muslim World* 38 (O '48) 295-6. (Kermit Schoonover).

2472 TWITCHELL, K. S. *Saudi Arabia*. *J. of Modern Hist.* 20 (S '48) 262-3. (Afif Tannous).

2473 VAN LEEUWEN, A TH. *Ghazali als Apologeet van de Islam*. *Muslim World* 38 (Jl '48) 222-3. (D. C. Mulder).

2474 VAUMAS, ETIENNE DE. *Les terrasses d'abrasion de la côte libanaise*. *Geog. Rev.* 38 (O '48) 683-4. (H. E. Wright, Jr.). A geological study of the rock-cut terraces of the Lebanese coast. "The contribution of De Vaumas's paper lies in the local descriptions of the wave-cut terraces and in the presentation of the author's ideas on the Quaternary history."

2475 VON GRUNEBAUM, G. E. and ABEL, T. M. *Az-Zarnūjī's "Ta'lim al-Muta'allim."*

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NEW PUBLICATIONS

The Armenian Review (Boston). A quarterly containing many valuable articles of historical and literary interest, and some fiction.

Oriens (Istanbul). Journal of the newly-founded International Society for Oriental Research, Istanbul. Articles; reviews of books and periodicals published in the Middle East. In Turkish, French, English, German. Vol. 1, No. 1: June 1948.

ABBREVIATIONS

<i>English</i>		<i>Arabic</i>
Acad., Academy	Mag., Magazine	K., Kitāb
Amer., American	Mod., Modern	Maj., Majallah, Majallat
Bull., Bulletin	Mus., Museum	
Cent., Central	Natl., National	
Contemp., Contemporary	Numis., Numismatic	
Dept., Department	Orient., Oriental	
East., Eastern	Pal., Palestine	
Geog., Geographical	Philol., Philological	
Gt. Brit., Great Britain	Polit., Political	
Hist., Historical	Quart., Quarterly	
Illust., Illustrated	Res., Research	
Inst., Institute	Rev., Review	
Internat., International	Soc., Society	
J., Journal	Stud., Studies	
	Trans., Transactions	
		<i>Italian</i>
		Mod., Moderno
		<i>Russian</i>
		Akad., Akademii
		Fil., Filosofii
		Ist., Istorii
		Izvest., Izvestiya
		Lit., Literaturi
		Otdel., Otdeleniye
		Ser., Seriya
		Yaz., Yazika

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